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296 263* 

Boob will be issued onfr <* prei*iiata d ^^ 

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THIS book will compel the attention ot 

the war-ridden world. Its analysis of the 
Jewish problem tears down the shams and 
ignorance which have been built up 
around it. The solution of the Jewish 
problem is vital not only to the Jewish 
people but to the health of the world. 
Jabotinsky's proposals for the new world 
after the war are not only the demands of 
a Jewish patriot- they are the essence of 
bold statesmanship, and constitute a 
challenge to which the civilized world 
must reply. 

Vladimir Jabotlnsky, one of the best- 
known figures in the Jewish world, fought 
for the rights of the Jewish people for 
nearly forty years. In World War I he 
struggled against enormous odds for the 
creation of the Jewish Legion which ulti- 
mately participated in Allenby's Palestine 
campaign. A brilliant orator, soldier, poet 
and writer, he devoted his life to the re- 













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lisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief 
passages in connection with a review written for inclusion 
in magazine or newspaper. 



AS i REMEMBER HIM by Pierre van Paassen 7 














* **' * 














CONCLUSION by Col. John Hemy Patterson, D.S.O. 251 



Ecce Homo! 

Ja, icli weiss woher ich stamrne! 
Ungesattigt glcich der Flammc 
Gliihe und verzeh' icli mich, 
Licht wird alles, was icli fasse, 
Kohle alles was ich lasse: 
Flamme bin ich sicherlich! 


HE WAS saying that even as the Roman Empire 
ceased to exist not, to be sure., in the fifth cen- 
tury of the Common Era, as the date-loaded school his- 
tory books would have it, but right in the first year of 
the first century, even so France, Germany and Britain 
must des mamtenant be considered as very far ad- 
vanced on the road to disintegration. ... It is some- 
times pathetic, he went on, to hear politicians, states- 
men and editorialists warn the nations that a great 
danger has come to threaten them all since Germany 
broke from her moorings and started on the rampage 
once more, as if the danger were but a thing of yes- 
terday, coincidental in genesis for instance with Hit- 
ler's rise to power or with the shackling of the Reich 
in the chains of Versailles. I do by no means wish to 
minimize the threat of Nazism, he said, looking up, 



but I also believe that the hour of decision for our 
civilization struck long ago. 

With the rise of Hitler the crisis in human affairs 
grew infinitely more acute. It was really the agony that 
set in. But you must go back nearly a century to find 
the more or less exact moment when the process of 
dissolution itself began. The first alarming symptom 
perhaps was the Franco-Prussian War. What followed 
thereafter: the financial panics, the ever-recurrent busi- 
ness depressions, the wars, the revolutionary upheavals, 
all that was consecutive: ineluctable and logical se- 
quence in the operation of the law of cause and 
effect. ... 

With the immediate, rapidly changing scene before 
our eyes and the ground whereon we stand trembling 
under our feet, he resumed after a short silence, our 
attention is riveted on the petty affairs of the day, on 
our personal, group or national interests and we are apt 
to lose sight of the fact that civilizations, like all living 
things, are born and die, sometimes never even reach 
their maturity. It is a cycle everlastingly being devel- 
oped and consummated. Like living organisms, civili- 
zations eliminate their wornout and dead particles by 
degrees, and assimilate others derived from their sur- 
roundings which renew their flesh and blood until the 
day when their powers of adaptation relax and finally 
stop altogether. Then comes death because they no 
longer nourish life. But the dying process, the agony 
may be quite long. It may take as long as the life-span 
of one or even more generations. . . . 
And then, suddenly, dropping his chin on his breast 


and speaking in a voice of plaintive sadness in which 
there crept a note both of disillusion and bitterness, 
Jabotinsky sighed: "It is the tragedy of the men of my 
generation to have lived in a dying era. To me person- 
ally this knowledge has the last few years deepened 
my ever-present sense of exile/' 

It was in New York, on the evening of one of those 
sultry, sweltering days in midsummer of 1940 that we 
walked for the last time and sat on the green in Cen- 
tral Park till the city grew hushed with the coming 
of dawn. 

He looked pale and worn, the Rosh Betar, after 
weeks and weeks on end of writing and conferences 
and discussions with journalists and politicians and 
disciples, always planning, always thinking of some 
new venture, some new approach to the old problem 
of Jewish national emancipation. I had to tear him 
away, literally, from the clutches of some devoted 
chassidim who were gathered in the humble apart- 
inent which he occupied during the last few months 
of his life near the Park. 

Once outside, however, in the open air, his cares 
and worries seemed to leave him. He was as cheerful 
as I had seldom seen him. His step was brisk and 
light and he laughed heartily at the pranks of some 
colored children who were playing with a dog on the 

That night after dinner he talked uninterruptedly, 
not in a vainglorious display of his almost encyclo- 
pedic knowledge and quiet wisdom or because he was 


of a garrulous nature. He merely felt released from 
his most pressing cares for the moment. The breadth 
of his spirit took a wider sway in the freedom of the 
trees and meadows. 

And of what did he not talk? Of the need not to 
confuse the historical moment with the trend of his- 
tory, the phase with the permanent Weltgefiihl; of 
the campaign on the Jordan where the valley burned 
like a fiery furnace when he led his men of the Jew- 
ish legion to victory against the Turks; of the neo- 
pagan movement in the days of the Borgias and of 
the Italian Renaissance as proto-typical of the present- 
day Hauser school in Germany; of his last-minute, 
futile intervention with Malcolm MacDonald, the 
son of Ramsay, "a ridiculously pedantic fellow with 
the mind of a flunkey" to save the life of a young 
Zionist activist in that Crusader's dungeon in Acco 
where he himself spent weary months of incarcera- 
tion and where Ronald Storrs and T. E. Lawrence 
came to shake hands with him through the bars of 
his cell; of the atmosphere in the Dutch public schools 
which he thought so pleasant, that it was almost 
inevitable that a love of learning should flourish in 
that country; of Martin Buber's book on the Mythos 
of the Jews; of his last interview with Joseph Beck, the 
Foreign Minister of Poland; of the University of 
Ghent as the center of the struggle for cultural auton- 
omy in Flanders; of his son Eri, then in the Pales- 
tinian gaol for the faith's sake; of the Calvinist doc- 
trine of predestination and the contrasting doctrine 
of man's free will: of the tendency of all socialistic 


revolutions to degenerate into etatism and tyranny; 
then of course of the need to raise a Jewish army 
forthwith, not only for the defence of Palestine but 
as an instrument to speed up the redemption of Eretz 
Israel and the founding of a Jewish State in the present 
cataclysmic circumstances when history does not move 
with the measured tread of a grandfather's clock, but 
advances with the seven league boots of a giant and 
with revolutionary shocks. . . . 

For that: Eretz Israel and the Jewish State in Pales- 
tine, that was his cause, his all in all, the sacred pas- 
sion which entirely possessed and visibly consumed 
him. In Jabotinsky the love of Zion was both an 
unquenchable, ecstatic fire and also the still and steady 
flame of grace which the sages called Hitlahabut and 
of which the Baalshem once said that it sanctifies 
every action in life with a holy significance. 

The healing of Israel through a normalization of 
its national and international status as a people, with 
a history, traditions, a way of life and a religion of 
its own, and therefore its need to live and work 
within walls of its own, that is: in its own land, 
master of its own destiny, not forced and twisted into 
the moulds of this or that alien civilization, but apply- 
ing its genius for justice to working out its own solu- 
tion of man's relationship with his brother as in the 
past it found for all mankind the way of man's rela- 
tionship with God, and so as an independent factor, 
in a personal-national sense, and in accord with its 
own character and talents and ethos a contributor to 
the sum total of civilization: that was Jabotinsky's 


vision of Israel's place and r61e and function in the 
ne\v7 humanity. 

In order to bring this vision to reality by trans- 
lating it into new covenants and into a new structure 
of, international relationships, to lead Israel at least 
part of the way along the long and weary road to the 
ideal, he poured out his whole heart, all his strength 
and his whole life. Jabotinsky lived Zionism. And it 
was the cause, too, that made of his life one of won- 
drous unity and singleness of purpose. 

Vladimir Jabotinsky came from that intellectual 
milieu in Russian Jewry which had fully absorbed 
Russian civilization. When he first began to write his 
feuilletons and poetry in the Russian language, he was 
hailed by the critics of Petersburg and Moscow. 
Maxim Gorki devoted an essay to the realism and 
style of the young Jewish author. The great Tolstoy 
himself welcomed in Jabotinsky "a new writer of 
promise at last" The road to glory seemed open to the 
budding poet. 

Then, without a word of warning, Jabotinsky 
stopped writing. His name disappeared from the 
columns of the literary journals and the journals of 
opinion to which he had but recently become a 

What had happened, what had brought about this 
sudden change of direction? It was the wave of 
pogroms that swept through his native land following 
Russia's defeat in the war with Japan in 1905, which 
had thrown the young writer completely off his track. 


Not unlike Theodor Herzl, scarcely a decade earlier, 
Jabotinsky had suddenly beheld for himself and had 
measured, as in some dread apocalyptic revelation, the 
full magnitude of the Jewish tragedy. He had become 
convinced of the permanent insecurity of the Jews 
in the Galut because he had seen the frustration and 
the futility of all their striving and that all their con- 
tortions and wrenching in all sorts of humiliating 
attitudes, physical and mental, in order to conform 
to another's way of life not only gravely damaged 
their own spirit and destroyed their human dignity, 
but that in the end the process would lead to the 
extinction of Jewish national culture and of Jewish 
life itself to the grievous detriment of civilization 
itself which would be the sufferer by the loss of the 
Judaic contribution. 

He saw the homelessness of the Jewish people as 
the mortal disease to which Israel must ultimately 
succumb, for his people's condition without land and 
without a state was not unlike that of a human being 
who has all his limbs and organs intact but whose 
bone structure is devoid of marrow and who is there- 
fore, though his outward appearance may be normal, 
as flabby, hollow and unreal as a putty doll. 

This was the realization that had dawned on the 
young writer, causing him to be struck with an im- 
mense lassitude and with a sense of betrayal of his 
own people if he should continue his devotion to 
Russian letters. 

He was to sum up the anguish of his soul and of 
the soul of Israel later in life, before the Royal Com- 


mission sitting in the House of Lords in February 
1937 with the words: "Three generations of Jewish 
thinkers and Zionists amongst whom there were many 
great minds . , . have given much thought to analys- 
ing the Jewish position and have come to the con- 
clusion that the cause of Jewish suffering is the very 
fact of the Diaspora, the bedrock fact that the Jews 
are everywhere in the minority. , . . 

"It is not the anti-Semitism of men; it is, above all, 
the anti-Semitism of things, the inherent xenophobia 
of the body social or the body economic under which 
the Jews suffer. Of course there are ups and downs; 
but there are also moments, there are whole periods 
in history when 'this xenophobia of Life itself takes on 
dimensions which no people can stand, and that is 
what we are facing now." . . . 

Yet Jabotinsky did not become a Jewish nationalist 
merely because he had gained an insight at an early 
age into the overwhelming tragedy of the Jewish 
people in the Galut He was a nationalist because he 
was an artist, a man of the world, a thinker of practical 
understanding and high critical judgment in inter- 
national political affairs, a man of the European spirit 
and of a world outlook and in the love of his Father- 
land and people: a man of action. His nationalism was 
a protest and in diametric opposition to the deperson- 
alization which is the goal and object of international- 
ism. He knew that only by and in asserting one's own 
particular and peculiar nature, talents and character 
one can best serve the general interest and that this 
applies to nations as well as to individuals. 


Nothing Jewish was alien to him except the cringing 
spirit of Schultzjudentum, the abject defence mecha- 
nism of assimilationism, and the eternal apologetics 
for the existence of the Jewish people. To those whom 
Zangwill once called the grand dukes of Judaism, the 
self-appointed leaders and stadlonim, his name was 
anathema. The professional compromise makers in 
Jewish life, who lock up their ideals in the cupboard 
under a layer of mothballs when there is a challenge 
or the prospect of battle, dreaded him as King Ahab 
dreaded Elisha, the adversary. 

Nor did the movement which he led know him as 
a light taskmaster, as a dreamer who contented him- 
self with visionary speculations and Zukunftmusik or 
as one who, like Eli, did not even look askance at the 
misdeeds of commission and omission of his sons. 
Jabotinsky's word could sear like a whiplash. He was 
a leader who imposed an iron discipline, who did not 
hesitate to ask for great sacrifices, the supreme sacrifice 
not excluded. But if Jabotinsky asked a great deal it 
was because he himself gave even more. 

Like the trtfe prophet he castigated because he loved. 
Because he wanted to see his people great and free, 
he denounced its faults. He tolerated no betrayal of 
values, national or spiritual. He always came back to 
the central truth: You Jews, you are a nation, a nation 
are you! for the renewal of Jewish life is only possible 
when proceeding from this central thought. It is the 
positivism of Prophetism which seeks the restoration 
of the central thought. And therefore all creative 


reforms proceed from prophetic action which never 
advances the slogan of a return to the past, but always 
seeks a break-through to the central truth in the 

Jabotinsk/s prophetism was social in character. 
What mattered personal salvation? His own life was 
but a flame that burned and consumed in order that 
the nation might be saved and led into new paths of 

Although frequently impatient in debate and in 
negotiations with his own, when opponents by tor- 
tuous argument sought to divert attention or concen- 
tration from the one essential, Jabotinsky never 
wearied in his advocacy of Jewish rights with the Man- 
datory Power and the governments who had sub- 
scribed to the sentiments and ideas of the Balfour 
Declaration. "I have appealed/' he told me once, "to 
their honor and to their sensibility, to their self- 
interests and to their own national cause, even to their 
innermost anti-Semitism wherever that existed. I have 
left nothing untried and I am ready to begin all over 
again tomorrow. For they must hear me. They must 
take heed. They must allow us to live/' . . . 

If it is objected, as it frequently was, that Jabotinsky 
was one-sided and repetitious, I would say that it is 
of spiritual and moral profit to us to have certain 
ideals put before us with intensity and one-sidedness. 
All-roundness and comprehensiveness cannot be ex- 
pressed with equal intensity. And balance prevents 


In the course of my long years of wandering to and 
fro on the earth, his path crossed mine again and 
again: in Antwerp, in Warsaw, in London, Berlin, 
New York, Paris and Vilna never, alas, in his own 
Jewish Fatherland whence a nervous British bureauc- 
racy, instinctively fearing "the Spirit that maketh 
alive," kept him permanently barred. But whenever 
and wherever, on his speaking and organizing tours, 
the chance presented itself, he would snatch an hour 
or so to sit still and discuss the plans and thoughts 
and dreams that always occupied his restless mind. 

In such moments his words, cast in a wondrous 
clarity and precision of speech, were revelationary of 
coming things and events. It was as if a light suddenly 
went up over the dying and decaying phenomena of 
the present. But he never played with flighty impres- 
sions, nor was he just a strong intellect and nothing 
more. In his talk there frequently crept a note of 
nostalgia to betray the melancholy behind the brave 
and realistic words: nostalgia for the highest fulfil- 
ment of his ideal, melancholy over the perverseness 
of a soulless contemporary environment 

Even so, no man eschewed sentimentality more 
than Jabotinsky did; he was diffident and cautious, to 
the point of shyness, in every expression of feeling, 
objective to the point of coldness almost. And yet he 
could also enter the house of mourning and sit with 
those who weep, that they might feel less lonely in 
the evening of sadness. 

When I sat opposite Jabotinsky one afternoon in the 


small office, on the second floor of the Rue Vineuse 
in Passy, where he published the Russian language 
periodical devoted to Jewish affairs called: "Rasviet/' 
the conversation drifted to the subject of Bergson's 
genius. In the course of that short hour he said with 
a smile: "Genius really means to be able to see and 
feel what will come to pass ten years hence/* That 
was in the early part of 1931. A quarter of an hour 
later, quite oblivious of his own earlier definition and 
totally unrelated with that part of the conversation, 
he sat calmly describing to me the conquest of Europe 
by a resurgent nationalist Germany, the refusal of the 
nations to stand together in the face of a common 
danger and the virtual extermination of the European 
Jewish communities. 

How fantastic that sounded then! An editor of a 
national magazine to whom I sent a synopsis of the 
interview with Jabotinsky cabled back: "Tell that 
Jeremiah that his calamities can never come to pass; 
the world is too civilized!" 

I once asked him in a mood of confidence why he 
should be so everlastingly kind in receiving me when 
it was convenient or not, me, a journalist whose voice 
assuredly did not carry very far in the world of men 
and events. "I surely cannot do a great deal/' I said, 
"to spread your views and ideas. My heart is yours, 
but my talents are extremely limited." . . . 

Jabotinsky waved his hand impatiently: "It isn't 
that/' he said; "it isn't that at all. I like to look at 
you while we speak, because your eyes and not mine 
will see a regenerated Jewish people taking up its 


national role in the community of peoples, in a truly 
free Palestine. It is for the reflection of that glory that 
I look in your eyes. And that reflection is there because 
you believe!". . . 

When he said that I thought back of my Uncle 
Kees, a Dutch landscape painter who, while strolling 
with me along a rural road in Brabant thirty years ago, 
made another prediction to me, this: "You, Pierre, 
you will see the day when the whole European kettle 
explodes and the debris comes tumbling down to bury 
this bourgeois world/' 

Even as that prediction is being fulfilled before our 
eyes today, so may Jabotinsky's blessed vision also 
come to pass! 

The fulfilment of his dearest wish: to withdraw 
from the tumult and the shouting in the marketplace 
into the stillness of the sanctuary in order to engage 
in dialogue with the God in his heart, was never 
vouchsafed him. He thought of it frequently and dur- 
ing the last months of his life he laid the basis and 
the outline for an ambitious work on the philosophy 
of Jewish nationalism. But that part of life which he 
called "the other world/' the world of action and 
endeavor ever and again claimed his whole attention 
and energy. His sense of duty did not allow him to 
say no. 

Like Moses at the Burning Bush he had once heard 
the call to service for his people. His entire life was 
spent in obedience to that divine call, through the 
years, never flinching, through pain and humiliation, 
through disillusion and doubt, through misrepresenta- 


tion and the hatred of the false prophets, against the 
very course of his personal interests, sacrificing career, 
glory and honor and happiness ... for the sake of 

the ideal. 

The greatness of Jabotinsky's spirit is revealed in 
his acknowledgment of a realm of values, which must 
assert themselves, which come to man with their 
ineluctible demands of loyalty and obedience, values 
which manifest themselves in a selfless human ideal- 
ism and which are themselves the content of culture 
and the meaning of life. 

What a tremendous thing it is when a man can 
sayright in the teeth of opposition and in defiance 
of the will of the world's mighty, diametrically at 
variance with his own profit and interest here I stand, 
in the Name of God. You may jeer at me as a fanatical 
fool You may smile at me with your official pity. 
You may lock me up as a dangerous revolutionary. 
You may taunt me with being a militarist and a terror- 
ist and even take my life nevertheless, here I stand in 
the Name of God! 

I have not willed this task. ... I have not sought 
it ... I have more than once turned aside from 
the call and pushed away from me as senseless the 
undertaking of speaking of God's greatness and of His 
right over man. . . . Tremblingly I have turned my 
ear when the voice came to me calling me to speak 
for my people. I felt myself too weak, too poor, too 
sinful to plead the cause of Israel. . . . 


Nevertheless, here I stand in the world, in the 
Name of God! 

You who build your empires on the tears of the 
poor, you who grow rich from the poverty of the 
oppressed, you who sow dissension and hate between 
brothers in order that your might will endure, you who 
declare your own power sacrosanct against you I lift 
my voice, against you and your pretensions I call to 
revolt, the holy revolt of Love. . . . 

I will not rest before my people has been called 
awake in the name of freedom! I will not rest until 
you let my people go! Even if I must go into battle 
with you and I must die: then yet will I preach and 
cry my cry of revolt: "Men of Israel, fight yourself 
free! Cast off the chains that bind you! the fire of 
God burns and His flames are the flames of free- 
dom! . . . 

What an unutterably tremendous thing it is when 
a man can honestly say: Here I stand, in the Name 
of God, I can do no other! 

In doubt, in pain, in death, yet through and through 
illumined with courage, standing in the Name of God! 

Thus stood the Prophets of old! 
Thus stood Vladimir Jabotinsky! 

Bronxville, N. Y., May, 1942. 





ON THE outbreak of the present war the author 
of this book signed an appeal to the Jews which 
contained the following statements: 

"A brutal enemy threatens Poland, the heart of the 
Jewish world-dispersion for nearly a thousand years, 
where over three million Jews dwell in loyalty to the 
Polish land and nation. 

"France, all the world's fatherland of liberty, faces 
the same menace. 

''England has decided to make that fight her own; 
and we Jews shall, besides, never forget that for twenty 
years, until recently, England had been our partner in 

"The Jewish nation's place is therefore on all the 
fronts where these countries fight for those very founda- 
tions of society whose Magna Charta is our Bible." 

Five months have passed since that was published, 
but it seems that there is no intention of treating the 
Jewish people as an Allied nation, nor the Jewish 
people's need as one of the causes for which the Allies 
are fighting. " 

With rare unanimity, all sections of the Jewish 



national movement have asked for the formation of 
Jewish military units for active service on all fronts. 
There was nothing unprecedented in these demands: 
a "Judaean" infantry regiment (jSth-^ist Royal 
Fusiliers) was formed in 191 y, and did good service 
in Allenby's Palestine campaign, and even before that 
there had been a Jewish transport unit, the Zion Mule 
Corps, in Gallipot. Now the offer was for service not 
only in the East but wherever required. The only 
conditional demand was that Jews should be allowed 
to fight as Jews; that it should be recorded in the 
annals of this war that the Jews were one of the 
peoples fighting for the common good cause. 

All these demands have so far been rejected. At 
the same time, a Polish army is being raised; Czecho- 
slovak troops are recruited; and Jewish emigrants or 
refugees from both Poland and Czechoslovakia are 
being, in some cases advised, in some cases driven, to 
enlist in these formations, regardless of the fact that 
the brotherly treatment of Jewish recruits in some of 
them cannot always be guaranteed. A double humili- 
ation is thus being inflicted: it is recognized that a 
destroyed nation is still a nation, and that its scattered 
members in exile should be given a chance to fight 
for their nation's reinstatement but the Jew has no 
place on this waiting list of admitted claimants; he 
must give his devotion, his enthusiasm, his very life 
to the restoration of communities which have never 
pretended to love him, while fully aware that his 
own community is not to be included. 
There is an obvious and deliberate policy behind 


this refusal to revive the Jewish Legion. Once a nation 
had received recognition as a partner in the fight, it 
could not be prevented, in due course, from present- 
ing and pressing its demands. In the councils of 
Allied statesmanship, the desire is lacking that the 
Jews should become entitled, now or later, to present 
and press any demands of their own, no longer as 
petitioners but as equal partners. 

The bitterness which this attitude arouses in Jewish 
minds can be measured only by the horror of the 
Jewish misery throughout East-Central Europe. In 
that zone of chronic yet acute antisemitism the Jews 
have, so far, paid in actual human suffering infinitely 
more than the Czechs, considerably more even than 
the Poles. But in the majority of British Press organs 
their plight is hardly ever mentioned: their eagerness 
to serve, the justice of their cause, and even their 
agony are simply "not on the map/' 

British statesmen commonly discuss their war-aims 
without any reference to the Jewish problem. This 
attitude is even more unwise from the general stand- 
point than it is hurtful from the Jewish. It overlooks 
the fact that the abscess of Nazidom has been fed 
above all, on Jew-hatred, and would never have at- 
tained to such maturity but for that ailment; and an 
operation that failed to remove the roots of anti- 
semitism would be no cure. 

On the infrequent occasions when Allied statesmen 
are reminded that a Jewish problem exists, they 
vaguely hint at equal rights for all in a future Europe 
democratized by the Allies' impending victory. Only 


one of them, Sir Archibald Sinclair, has had the 
courage, so far, publicly to warn the Jews that even 
after that victory no such equality could be effectively 
guaranteed; and what he said in public others must 
realize in private. They are no doubt genuinely deter- 
mined to enforce the recognition of Jewish equality 
in treaties and constitutions; but real equality for the 
Jews in that Zone of Distress unless a great exodus 
relieves the situation is doomed to remain a mirage; 
sullen hatred, boycott and starvation, with the threat 
of violence always in the offing, will be the rule as 
before; as the Allied statesmen surely realize. 

The worst feature of the situation is the tendency, 
when the problem cannot be altogether ignored, at 
all events to minimize its importance; to make a 
pretence of believing that there is no actual Jewish 
tragedy; that it is simply a matter of just some tire- 
some skin-deep wounds which can be repaired with a 
couple of stitches. Whereas the truth is that the 
tragedy has reached a formidable intensity of pain 
and doom which is without precedent in all human 
history; that to end it a colossal world-effort is needed, 
an effort equally without precedent; and that this 
effort will have to be made. 

In July 1938, Mr. Roosevelt made an endeavour to 
ensure international co-operation in the problem of 
initiating the great exodus; but as this means forcing 
a solution of the Palestine question, his effort the 
Evian Conference was cunningly frustrated, and his 
plan reduced to a futile patchwork. 
Palestine today is regarded as out of bounds even 


for fugitives perishing in what is worse than No Man's 
Landin the frozen No Man's Waters of the Danube 
estuaryfor Jews marooned on disused iron oil- 
tankers, with newborn babies among them; and as for 
the future of Palestine, it is the policy of the 1939 
White Paper the death sentence of Zionist hopes 
that now holds the field. 

So, if we summarize our outlook, it is this: No 
admission to the national homeland; nothing but the 
status quo ante in the chief centres of distress; not 
even the right to fight as Jews, nor the honour of 
acknowledgment as an ally in a cause for which we 
have paid and are paying more in blood and tears 
than any other race on earth. The Jewish people is 
the one and only people to whpm Allied victory is 
to bring no positive guarantees of welfare; nothing but 
the negative satisfaction of the Nazis' downfall. There 
is a short-sighted statesmanship that believes this to 
be quite enough: the Jews fear and hate the Nazis; 
they have no choice but to side with the Allies; why 
then trouble to offer them prospects of betterment? 
This is a poor wisdom. A thoughtful organizer of 
victory will want those who support his cause to pull 
their maximum weight. Supporters are of doubtful 
value when their sole incentive is hatred of the enemy, 
without a spark of constructive hope; when the only 
national anthem to suit their case would be a hymn 
to the lesser Evil! 

All the wholesome forces of the Jewish public in 
the Allied and neutral countries should join in a 
determined effort to smash the influences which are 


tending to obliterate the existence and the importance 
of a Jewish war-front. If that effort be strong and 
resolute enough, it will be victorious. They need have 
no patriotic scruples; the more rigorous the assault, 
the better for all concerned. Theirs is a struggle for 
the right to fight together and hope together; a 
struggle to overcome those who are obstructing the 
full scope of the supreme effort. 

In this war the Jewish people should count as one 
of the Allied nations. Long before they are through 
with it the Allies will have to make room for our 
troops on their many fronts, for our leaders among 
their governments, for the redress of Jewish wrongs 
and the erection of Jewish statehood among their 
war aims. 



IN THIS war (so it seems at the time of writing ) f 
it is not desired that the Jews should be "on the 
map": neither as active allies, nor as fellow-sufferers, 
nor as the subject-matter of any special Allied de- 
mands or war aims. 

Arthur Szyk, the gifted miniaturist who recently 
exhibited in London his brilliant and terrible drawings 
of tortured Poles and Jews under the German invader, 
has also a genius for finding the mot juste. To describe 
the attitude of the majority of the Allied statesmen 
and the greater part of the Allied Press to this "Jew- 
ish" aspect of the war, he uses the word pornography. 

"They treat us/' he says, "as a pornographical sub- 
ject. Pornography covers a most important depart- 
ment of life and nature; nobody denies it, but you 
cannot discuss it in polite society it is not done/' 

There is a sort of shamefaced conspiracy, almost 
entirely dominating Parliament, the Press,* t and the 

* There are a few exceptions, the Manchester Guardian among 

t The author is referring, of course, to Great Britain. Public 
opinion in the United States, however, has not exhibited greater 
responsiveness in this respect. 



public platform, to obliterate the Jewish war-issue by 
silence. The term "conspiracy" is not necessarily 
intended to suggest that there has been any explicit 
collusion on the subject between speakers and writers, 
or that all the newspapers have received a hint to that 
effect from some authoritative quarter. A "conspiracy" 
of this kind may be spontaneous and instinctive: then 
it is all the more deplorable in its callous unfairness. 

So far this is written early in 1940 of all the 
peoples attacked by Germany the one which has paid 
the greatest price of all in human suffering has been 
the Jewish people. No careful observer is likely to 
question this statement. True, the Czechs have lost 
let us hope only temporarily their independence, 
and the Poles have lost more than that: but in terms 
of actual human misery, hunger, torture and death, 
the Jews head the list, even in Poland. There are 
indications that the number of Jewish civilians who 
have died in Poland since the invasion is already in ex- 
cess of the combined casualty list of both armies, Ger- 
man and Polish. All this is not said to minimize the 
greatness of the Polish people's losses; they are surely 
greater than those which any other nation excepting 
one has ever suffered in modern times outside of the 
trench or the battlefield. That one exception is the 
Jewish people: the Jews still head the list, and are 
hardly ever mentioned as fellow-sufferers. 

For many months past it has been one of the 
writer's recreations to collect, from the Jewish Tele- 
graphic Agency's Daily Bulletin, those items which 


he did not see reproduced in any of the leading 
British newspapers, at any rate not in the London 
Press. Here, are a few samples: 

Every Nazi in Lodz is free to engage any Jew he 
meets in the street to do his own private work with- 
out pay. No branch of trade and no profession is any 
longer open to the Jews in Lodz. Even Jewish cab- 
drivers and porters have now been forbidden to carry 
on with their work. 

Ten Jews were executed by the Nazis in the town- 
ship of Nove Miasto, in the Warsaw district. The Jews 
were chosen at random and shot dead without any 
reason being given. 

In the township of Grojec, in the Warsaw district, 
the Jews were forced to set fire to their chief synagogue 
last Saturday. A number of Jews of the same township 
were shot dead by the Nazis while returning home 
from forced labour. 

Hundreds of Jews, including many women and 
children, were killed in the town of Bendzin, near 
Katowice, when the Nazis set fire to Zachodnia Street, 
which is inhabited exclusively by Jews. Any Jew trying 
to escape was shot dead. Altogether several hundred 
men, women and children died in the flames, or were 
shot dead by the Nazis. All the synagogues in Bendzin 
have also been burnt down. 

Wholesale executions of Jews by Nazis in many towns 
in the province of Lodz are openly admitted in official 
reports of Nazi police officers, extracts of which have 
been published in the Schlesische Zeitung of Breslau. 

In the township of Lask, the Schlesische Zeitung 
states in quoting one of these official reports: "one 


hundred Jews were executed for offering resistance to 
German soldiers who were searching their homes for 
concealed arms." The police also learned, the official 
report further states, that about a thousand Jews had 
surrounded the synagogue in Lask with the intention of 
preventing the Germans from entering it. The Jews 
were therefore fired on and "hundreds were killed on 
the spot." The synagogue was then set on fire. "The 
Jewish streets of the township/' the report continues, 
"have been closed and the Jews have been forbidden to 
have any dealings with the peasants of the neighbour- 
hood, whom they are trying to persuade to sell them 
milk, potatoes and cabbage," 

To conclude, here is an item which will remind the 
reader of Enver PashaV methods of "liquidating'' 
Armenians as described by Werfel in The Forty Days 
of Mnsa Dagh: 

Geneva, January i6th 

On Thursday evening, November 3oth, the Nazi 
authorities in Chelm ordered all Jewish men between 
the ages of fifteen and sixty to appear the next day, 
December ist, at 8.30 in the market square. 
About two thousand Jews appeared. They were sur- 
rounded by Nazi auxiliary police, Black Guards, and a 
small detachment of soldiers armed with machine- 
guns. A Gestapo officer then delivered a short speech 
to the Jews in which he informed them that, as Jews 
were responsible for the war and as all Jews were the 
mortal enemies of Geimany, the Chelm Jews had 
been sentenced by the Nazi authorities to be deprived 
of their civil rights and to be expelled from the town. 


At half-past twelve the Jews, surrounded by Nazi 
Storm-Troopers and soldiers on lorries and motorcycles, 
were marched off from the town along the high road 
in the directioii of Hrubilszow. 

A few kilometres from Chelm, near a military hos- 
pital situated in a wood, the party was stopped and 
told by the Nazis thatj because one of them had 
attempted to escape, twenty would be executed, and 
that for each further attempt of this kind fifty would 
be executed. Twenty Jews were picked out at random 
and marched off. 

The Nazi authorities in Hrubilszow issued a similar 
order to the Jews of the town on Friday night. At half- 
past nine they were joined by the Chelm Jews. 

Altogether it is estimated that there were in this 
party 1,100 Jews from Chelm and 850 Jews from 
Hrubilszow. Before being marched off, they were 
warned that if any of them returned home they would 
be treated as spies and executed. The Jews were chased 
across fields, woods and marshes from Hrubilszow to 
Mieniany, Cichoburze and Dolbyczow. Every five 
minutes the Nazis ordered those who were tired and 
unable to continue to stand aside. These were shot 
dead on the spot and their bodies left lying in the 
fields. The Jews were not given any food or drink 
during the whole of their dreadful march, and those 
who tried to help themselves to some water from the 
ditches were shot dead. 

When Dolbyczow was reached, the survivors were 
divided into two groups: one numbering about 500 and 
the other 400. 

From Dolbyczow the larger party was marched off 
in the direction of the frontier town of Sokal, and the 


smaller party of 400 to the frontier town of Belzy. 
The latter were the luckier ones, because only a few 
of them were shot dead by the Nazis, while about 250 
of the larger party were shot by the Nazis before 
reaching the bridge on the River Bug which divides 
the Nazi from the Soviet part of the town of Sokal. 
Thus a total of over 1,300 Jews from Chelni and 
Hrubilszow were massacred by the Nazis during the 
four days' forced march to the Soviet frontier. 

During their four days' march, the Jews were given 
only one loaf of bread a day, which had to be divided 
between thirty men. On the average, one Jew was 
shot dead by the Nazis every five to ten minutes of 
the march. From time to time the Nazis were heard 
to exchange notes with each other as to the number 
of Jews they had accounted for. One was heard to 
say: "I myself have already settled seventy-six," which 
brought the reply, "I have killed only sixty-three." 

Among the Jews killed there were many fathers and 
sons of the same family. The bookkeeper of the Hru- 
bilszow Jewish People's Bank, Isaac Lewenfuss, aged 
55, was completely exhausted and unable to carry on 
with his march when 15 kilometres from Hrubilszow. 
When ordered by the Nazis to lie down, which was the 
signal for his execution, his twenty-year-old son Mendel 
offered to die in his place, but his offer was refused. 
Mendel then declared: "Then shoot me together with 
my father." The Nazi Storm-Troopers merely said: 
"Oh, you are volunteering to die? Very well." Father 
and son were then shot together. 

In reporting this massacre about the middle of De- 
cember, the official German news agency stated "An 
attempt at a Jewish revolt in the Chelm and Hrubilszow 
districts was ruthlessly suppressed/' 


It is useless to ask how much of all this the reader 
has seen in the general Press. Yet these incidents are 
not the consequences of a remote earthquake, or a 
typhoon in the antipodes, "something which after all 
is no concern of ours/' from the standpoint of our 
sacro egoismo: they are the direct results of the con- 
quest of Poland, the country for which the Allies 
solemnly assumed responsibility. Under these condi- 
tions a conspiracy of silence is unforgivable. 

But the worst feature of this conspiracy is the 
inevitable suggestion that the Allies feel bashful of 
acknowledging Jews as fellow-sufferers. There is, both 
in England and France, a moral underworld which 
is for ever trying to "get at" the non-defeatist camp 
by the taunt of a "Jewish war." It is perhaps a much 
bigger underworld than some people imagine; it may 
have its colonies in every class of society; it may feel 
not repelled but rather attracted by the Nazis' treat- 
ment of the Jews. ("That's the stuff to give 'em!") 
All the more urgent, if this be true, is the duty of 
decent society to submerge and crush that underworld. 
But polite society also evidently shrinks from such 
"pornography." The result is that the Jewish fellow- 
sufferer is denied even the last and most elementary 
privilege of a sufferer: to have his losses registered in 
fair and proper perspective, so that he may at least 
hope, when the day comes for a general redress, resto- 
ration and retribution, to present his claims on equal 
terms with others. The only explanation of the con- 
spiracywhether instinctive or planned which the 
bewildered victim can conceive is that it is not felt 


to be desirable that the Jewish claim should ever be 

Even more disturbing is the silence as regards the 
Jews in practically all statements of war aims issued 
by certain British leaders. The writer will be forgiven 
for not mentioning names: to do so might be unfair. 
He does not wish to pillory them as callous, for they 
probably regard themselves as genuine well-wishers 
of the unfortunate Jewish race; they would probably 
repudiate, with sincere indignation, any suspicion of 
conspiracy, insisting that the demand for the resto- 
ration of Jewish rights was omitted in their statements 
of war aims merely because such things obviously go 
without saying, etc. (Talleyrand once replied to a 
diplomat who used the same argument for not men- 
tioning some "minor" item in a treaty: Si cela va sans 
le dire, cela ira mieux en le disant If that goes with- 
out saying, it will go better by being said.) 

Two prominent men shall, however, be quoted, 
for they at least have not forgotten to mention the 
Jews. Both are unimpeachably Liberal, and the inten- 
tions are unquestionably of the very best. The more 
depressing will be the conclusions which any Jew will 
be compelled to draw from their utterances. 

Sir Walter Layton (in Allied War Aims) is cou- 
rageous enough to quote Germany's behaviour in the 
Jewish question as one of the sins which "have made 
Germany an international nuisance": 

It has often been argued in the past that it is no 
concern of ours what system of government or political 


philosophy another country may choose to adopt. 
Events have proved that this is only a half truth. In 
the six years of Nazi rule . . . the persecution of the 
Jews has created for other countries a refugee problem 
on a scale hitherto unknown in history. 

Hypercritical minds, in weighing this charge, might 
remark that it is somewhat narrowly conceived: its 
formulation by Sir Walter Layton suggests that, had 
the Nazis only followed the example of Pharaoh, and 
had prevented the victims from escaping to "other 
countries/' there would have been nothing to. com- 
plain about. But this is not important: the main point 
is that the whole charge, in the opinion of the Liberal 
author, entails no consequences worth mentioning. 
When he comes to stating his war aims he demands 
the restoration of a free Poland and a free Czechoslo- 
vakia, a free plebiscite in Austria, and steps towards 
a federation of Central European States, with a "com- 
mon citizenship" which "should ensure certain fun- 
damental rights, such as freedom of speech, the right 
not to be imprisoned without trial, and freedom to 
move about and trade within the federation. The 
guarantee of such rights would go a long way towards 
remedying the grievances of minorities and removing 
racial distrust." That is all there is to be said about it. 

The other statement was made by Sir Archibald 
Sinclair, M.P. Speaking in the House of Commons 
on October i2th, he said: 

One of the difficulties with which some people have 
come to me about our present position I would like to 


tell the House quite frankly. They say to me, "One of 
our war aims is the destruction of Hitlerism; another 
is to assert the right of nations to choose their own 
form of government. Are those two aims consistent? If 
the Germans want Hitlerism, have we the right or the 
power to demand its destruction?" Surely the answer is 
this, that we recognize the right of a nation to govern 
itself in its own way, even to choose a dictatorship if it 
wants it. We may be horrified by the results. We may 
see the loathsome spectres of racial and religious perse- 
cution rearing their ugly heads. We may witness the 
horror of secret police oppression and of concentration 
camps. We have the right and the duty to condemn 
these manifestations of barbarism, but it is not for us 
to chastise another people for its own rnisgovernment 
or to go to war on behalf of Pastor Niemoller or the 
German Jews. The German people must find means of 
setting their own house in order and we must recognize 
their rights of self-government in their own country. 

It is only fair to point out that most of the other 
spokesmen and precisely the bashful ones who avoid 
the Jewish theme seem on the whole to be much 
more exacting in respect of internal arrangements in 
Central Europe after the Allies* victory. It is taken for 
granted that Germany, Austria, Poland and Czecho- 
slovakia will once again become liberal and demo- 
cratic States, and that there will be a reinforced League 
of Nations to look after the treatment of minorities. 
But in so far as the Jews are concerned, that does 
not appreciably change the picture. The prospect is 
extremely arid; it seems to be a case of "as you were." 


Sir Archibald Sinclair ought to be thanked for having 
said the only thing of essential significance in a welter 
of oratory: namely, that the actual and permanent 
supervision of internal developments in a sovereign 
country by outside organs is impracticable; that, in 
other words, the reality of any statute or treaty clauses 
as to equal rights will ultimately depend, in Germany, 
on the good will of the Germans; and in Poland, on 
that of the Poles. Roumania and Hungary, not being 
as yet at war, could not be mentioned, but the obvious 
inference is that in these two countries also the outside 
supervision of the Jewish position is out of question. 
This affects some 5,000,000 Jews who are still living 
in the zone which, for twenty years, has been the 
main theatre of acute yet chronic Jewish distress. 
Apart from political oratory, what they are really 
promised is the restoration of the status quo ante. The 
general public, and probably many Jews, are very far 
from realizing all the hopelessness of this prospect. 
It will be worth their while to examine it more nar- 
rowly in the chapters that follow. The reader should 
not grudge me their length. He may think that the 
horror of the status quo is so obvious that nobody is 
likely to propose its restoration, even in an amended 
form. This is a mistake: for after the war, a great effort 
will be made, both by Gentile Machiavellis and by 
Jewish dupes, to draw this red herring across the trail 
of our national demands. The main battle over Jewish 
war aims will be fought around the lie that the ghetto 
can be made comfortable. 



THE purpose of this book, which was written 
in January-February 1940, is to press a claim for 
the inclusion of the Jewish problem in the war aims 
of the Allied nations. 

Responsible people, it is true, are tending to lose 
patience with the claim that the "war aims" of the 
Allies should be extended until they finally include 
the redress of almost every imaginable grievance. They 
object that the proper "aim" of a nation at war is 
besides winning the war to remove those factors 
which have caused the war, and that it should include 
hardly anything else; while other grievances, however 
urgent, will have to be settled by some "other method. 

Such responsible people are perfectly right. Never- 
theless, if th<? causative factors of the war are to be 
abolished, the solution of the Jewish problem is un- 
deniably entitled to a prominent place among the 
genuine and urgent aims of the war. 

It is very desirable that we should realize that the 
many problems of reconstruction raised in connection 
with the war fall into two quite distinct categories: 
there are genuine "war aims" and there is what may 
be described as all-round "Revision/' Much confusion 


would be avoided if these categories were kept rigor- 
ously apart. A war aim is something for which a nation 
actually and obviously fights, and if that nation does 
not achieve this aim as an outcome of the war, this 
will mean that it has been defeated. For instance, if 
a repetition of such acts of violence as the invasion 
of Poland is not rendered impossible, the Allies will 
have lost the war; crushing the Nazi regime is, there- 
fore, a war aim. But such a purpose as for instance 
the restoration of free trade between the nations, 
excellent though it be, cannot be described as a war 
aim. A peace treaty signed without mentioning such 
restoration would still be regarded as satisfactory. 

But a peace treaty cannot be effective unless it 
sweeps away the obstacles to any effective reconstruc- 
tion; unless it excises the malignant ulcers which 
would prevent any real recovery. 

One such ulcer is the Jewish tragedy of Central 
Europe. It is impossible to imagine even a beginning 
of universal restoration unless that is removed. This 
operation is a war aim in the fullest sense of the term. 

The Jewish tragedy is, of course, not the microbe 
which has caused this war. It is only the culture- 
medium in which the microbe has grown to maturity. 

The mysteries of mass psychology, when both the 
author and the reader are laymen, can best be ex- 
plained, or at least illuminated, by metaphor and 
analogy; and no writer who means business need have 
any scruples as to mixing his metaphors. There are 
several metaphors which will help to illustrate the 


organic role of Jew-hunting in the growth and progress 
of the war-disease. It may be likened to the r61e of a 
spice or sauce which enables the masses to swallow 
a species of poison which would be too corrosive 
without it; or to that of a lubricant which speeds down 
a chute a load which otherwise might get stuck; or 
to that of the sticks which a housewife lights to induce 
the heavy log or lumps of coal in her big fireplace to 
catch fire. We may find it convenient to use all these 
metaphors and others too, though none of them quite 
exactly fits the case. After all, food can be swallowed 
even without the spice or sauce; a load can be pushed 
down a chute without a lubricant, etc.; but Nazism 
would never have grown to its present proportions 
without the help of antisemitism. "Culture-medium 
Eor the microbe" is perhaps the aptest simile of all. 
The man in the street may not be conscious of this 
intimate connection between the acuter forms of anti- 
Semitism and the war-peril. He may even think it a 
monstrous exaggeration to suggest that Jew-baiting in 
Nazi Germany, however objectionable, was in any 
way responsible for, let us say, the failure to heed the 
Ajiglo-French warning about Poland, which was the 
direct cause of the conflict. The man in the street 
will quite possibly dismiss such a suggestion as a symp- 
tom of megalomania: "These Jews imagine that every- 
:hing, down to the weather, and the climate, and 
earthquakes, depends on what happens to them. Of 
course, the Nazi programme and practice, beside the 
jreed for world-domination and the cult of violence, 
ncludes the persecution of Jews, but the latter is just 


a concomitant, an accompanying phenomenon, not 
the essence of the thing. Nazism would have been 
just as dangerous if there had been no Jews on earth." 

This is absolutely wrong. To destructive movements 
of the Nazi type, antisemitism is infinitely more than 
a "concomitant"; and "National Socialism" would 
probably never have achieved its rapid and sweeping 
conquests if it had not ridden the anti-Jewish horse. 

Everybody knows that in propaganda the appeal of 
love is slow and lumbering in comparison with the 
appeal of hatred. Hatred is the piquant sauce which 
accelerates both the swallowing and the digestion of 
ideas and policies. And the "sauce" can be fully effec- 
tive only if the object of hatred is close at hand, 
familiar to all, and easily and safely attacked. Had the 
Nazi propaganda been confined from the beginning to 
preaching rebellion against the Versailles peace terms 
and the wickedness of the English or the French or 
the Americans, its theoretical appeal might have been 
still powerful, but its actual progress among the masses 
would have been so gradual that it is doubtful whether 
it would ever have gathered enough energy for an 
explosion. A Versailles Treaty is not a tangible object 
of real and palpable hatred; the emotions of the 
masses cannot be stirred by an object which can only 
be seen at the public library. On the other hand, hat- 
ing the English or the Americans or the French is 
either a torture to the hater himself, so long as he dare 
not express his hatred by deeds, or a very dangerous 
enterprise, if he tries prematurely to translate his 
hatred into action. There is only one ideal object for 


mass training in collective hate, and that is the Jew. 
He is everywhere within reach; he can be pointed out 
at any street corner; and he can* be insulted or 
assaulted with only the minimum of risk, or with none 
at all. To foster a movement of the Nazi type with- 
out the daily use of Jewish targets would be like stag- 
ing a pageant without rehearsals. 

The world outside Germany does not realize to 
what an extent the Nazi movement has depended, 
through all the twenty years of its existence, on the 
hatred of the Jew for its vitality and driving power. 
Theoretically, a complete gospel of German National 
Socialism could have been composed without any 
reference whatsoever to the Jews: rearmament, the 
militarization of the Rhine district, the restoration 
of the colonies, the AnscMuss of Austria, and the 
annexation of the Sudetenland (to say nothing of 
that childish scheme of social reform devised in 1923 
by Feder, incorporated into the "immutable" pro- 
gramme of the party, and a little later abandoned). 
All these aims could have been preached every whit 
as forcibly had their authors never thought of Israel 
and Judah. But they evidently felt, from the very 
beginning, that none of these aims would "go down" 
properly with the masses unless they were duly sea- 
soned. So not a single spoonful of this witches' brew 
was offered without the spice of antisemitism. 

Only the foolish would seek to explain this infatu- 
ation by using the term "mania/' With a few excep- 
tions, the Nazi chiefs are as sane as any other govern- 


ment or party leaders in any other country. Nor is 
it to be explained by "sadism"; nor by any other 
abnormal urge rooted in the morbid subconscious of 
men, almost every one of whom, if cleansed of his 
war-paint and examined in the ordinary light of every- 
day reality, would probably appear as just an average 
human being. Some of these chiefs have been quite 
credibly reported as confessing how utterly "fed-up" 
they were with the necessity of always talking of Jews, 
Jews, Jews. One does not do such things for pleasure: 
one does them only because of necessity. They knew 
that their propaganda would not be accepted quickly 
enough and widely enough without the piquant sauce. 
It is only thanks to the sauce that it has won such 
wide and rapid acceptance. The word only is deliber- 
ately italicized in order to emphasize the fact that 
Jew-baiting is no essential ingredient of the Nazi prop- 
aganda, it is simply the lubricant without which the 
indigestible meal could never have slid down so 

All this is nothing new; at least, not to the Jews. 
As early as the eighteen-eighties, after a pogrom in 
the Ukraine, a Russian Socialist party published a 
manifesto which should have comforted all the friends 
of liberty by arguing that an anti-Jewish pogrom was, 
after all, not such a bad thing, being rather in the 
nature of a rehearsal; the moujiks (it was explained) 
had only begun by attacking the Jews; they would con- 
tinue by massacring the police, and would end by 
smashing autocracy. Years later,,again in Russia, it was 
a Jewish revolutionary who uttered the often-quoted 


formula: "J ew ^h blood is the best for oiling the 
wheels of progress." 

The success of the Nazi experiment has proved 
instructive. Now, in the light of the present confla- 
gration, the whole story of the last decade looks very- 
much like a vast shunting operation, in which the 
several nations have gradually moved into the one or 
the other of the two great camps about to clash. And 
it is a curious and significant fact that whenever any 
one of these nations has thought of joining the ene- 
mies of the Western bloc (even in a hesitating 
attempt, soon to be abandoned ), it has invariably 
begun by qualifying for admission in the same way- 
by administering to its people a dose of the "Jewish 
spice/' This was the meaning of the Goga intermezzo 
in Roumania: for a moment, at the end of 1937, ^e 
ruling circles of that country were on the verge of 
adopting the anti-Western orientation and the first 
visible symptom of this was the application of the 
usual lubricant, through a violently antisemitic cabinet 
and a broadside of anti-Jewish legislation. A few weeks 
later the anti-Western orientation was thought to be 
undesirable; M. Goga was dismissed, and his legisla- 
tion was quashed. If we recall this short-lived incident, 
it is only to point its moral, which is obvious, and 
which should not be forgotten.* 

* Roumania's expressed attitude towards the Jews following her 
abandonment of her Western orientation in July 1940, supplies un- 
questionable evidence to this effect. The violent wave of horrible 
anti-Jewish terror that swept the country, and the drastic antisemitic 
legislation that accompanied it, were by no means a result of direct 
Nazi pressure. They were purely Roumanian phenomenon: the nat- 
ural result of joining the Axis. 


As for the analogous behaviour of Italy, this was 
even more striking than the Roumanian episode. In 
Roumania there had always been antisemitic tenden- 
cies in all classes of the population, high, middle and 
low; so there was at least something for the gamblers 
to stake upon. But in Italy? It is not enough to say 
that its people, for half a century at least, had genu- 
inely forgotten the alleged necessity of discriminating 
against the Jew: they had actually lost all interest in 
the question of who was a Jew and who was not Yet, 
when the time came for swinging the country into a 
certain orientation, it was immediately felt in some 
mysterious way that the new course could not be 
followed without a dose of the usual lubricant. But 
in this case the lubricant was applied in half-hearted 
fashion, with evident reluctance, and many apologies 
as something a man does admittedly contre coeur, 
and only because he must: because, for this kind of 
job, the magical lubricant is indispensable. 

The author is neither a historian nor a sociologist; 
he does not profess to explain precisely why this lubri- 
cant of antisemitism should be indispensable. Like 
others, he has often asked himself this question: In- 
numerable wars have been fought in the past, yet it 
was not thought necessary to prepare for these wars 
by especial emphasis on the Jewish question. Why 
does it appear so necessary now? 

One explanation is perhaps almost comforting: It 
is because the world is, after all, progressing. The 
world has been moving on, despite all our scepticism. 


The masses can no longer be sent to their death 
simply by order: nowadays they need some kind of 
"religion" to die for. Those observers of the Spanish 
civil war may have spoken truly who affirmed that 
the programmatic difference, or the clash of real 
interests, between Burgos and Madrid was infinitesi- 
mally small: it was not so much a fight over tangible 
issues as a pure and simple guerre de religion. 

But a "religion" to fit Germany's claim to world- 
domination must be a formidable faith. Populations 
speaking German dialects and occupying contiguous 
territories in Europe count close upon ninety mil- 
lions, as against 40 to 45 millions each of Britons, 
Frenchmen, or Italians. There is an inherent sugges- 
tion of supremacy in these very figures: a suggestion 
not of ascendency or predominance or influence 
merely, but of actual subjugation, of power such as 
a slave-owner could wield over his negroes. The temp- 
tation to succumb to such suggestion can be curbed 
only by some powerful spiritual self-discipline: by that 
combination of complex traditions ethical, philo- 
sophical, religious, cultural, democratic which we call 
civilization, and whose end is progress. All these had 
to be swept away before a nation with such a literature 
as the German could be made to put the clock back 
a thousand yearscould be induced to accept a creed 
as primitive and cynical as this: "We Germans are 
the salt of the earth; our neighbours' land is our living- 
space; their human value can be acknowledged only 
in so far as it is useful to us; we may impose forced 
labour on their able-bodied men and women; we may 


drive them away from their towns and villages to 
make room for Germans. Such action will be just and 
proper, and any opposition to it will be criminal, and 
the means to be used in suppressing such opposition 
need not be weighed in any balance of ethics, but only 
in the balance of efficiency/' 

We cannot, of course, deny that a similar mentality 
was displayed in primitive conquestssuch as those 
described in the Old Testament; and also thousands 
of years later in Europe's colonial policy, since the 
days of Columbus, and even down to a couple of 
generations ago. It is idle to defend our ancestors, 
to apologize for the sins of Gideon or justify the 
barbarities of Cort6s. Such bygone instances have no 
bearing on our theme, for in those ancient times the 
mass-mind of humanity was still so liable to relapses 
of bestiality that there was no need to preface the 
relapse by any profound moral revolution. But the 
last century has brought such conceptions as humanity 
and equality home to the minds of countless millions: 
and to make a clean sweep of these conceptions, to 
clear the ground for the return of the beast, a formi- 
dable effort is required. 

And not only a formidable effort, but a formidable 
amount of training by rehearsal, by cheap and easy 
experimentation in corpore vfli. The dormant brute 
in the German soul seems to have been hibernating 
very near the surface, but even so it had to be trained 
in beastliness and cruelty by a gradual drill. Like 
Voltaire's deity, if the Jews had not existed they would 
have had to be invented. 


Our Western statesmen would be guilty of culpable 
blindness were they to disregard the historical truth 
of this statement When the Nazis across the fron- 
tiers, or their hirelings in Britain and France, yell or 
whisper that this is a "Jewish War/' they are perfectly 
right: the microbe of war would have died had it not 
been allowed to batten on the Jewish tragedy. 



rriHERE are two distinct forces at work within 
JL the general phenomenon called Antisemitism: 
the one is a subjective repulsion, strong enough and 
permanent enough to become anything from a hobby 
to a religion; the other is an objective state of things 
which tends to ostracize the Jew almost independently 
of whether his neighbours like or dislike him. We 
shall call the first category "the Antisemitism of 
Men/' and the second "the Antisemitism of Things/' 
For a study of the former, the best field of observation 
is Germany; of the latter, Poland. In the present chap- 
ter we shall deal with Germany. 

At the moment of writing, there are supposed to 
be some 200,000 Jews in Germany of the Versailles 
frontiers, 100,000 in Austria, 100,000 in Bohemia and 
Moravia, 130,000 in Slovakia and 2,000,000 in the 
parts of Poland occupied by the Nazis.* These figures 

* The number of Jews under Nazi domination has greatly in- 
creased since then. It comprises not only the entire Jewish population 
of Poland (3,250,000 in 1939), but also the Jews of the Baltic 
States (250,000), the Balkan countries (100,000), the Lowlands 
(60,000), Occupied France (approximately 50,000) and Occupied 
Russia (perhaps 2,000,000 the majority of Russian Jews). All in 
all, some 7,000,000 Jews the bulk of European Jewry are now 
under the yoke of Nazi oppression. 



are largely guesswork rather than reliable estimates; 
moreover, they are bound to be considerably affected 
by the transfers of population effected by the Nazi 
governmentsome already carried out, and others 
planned for the near future. Finally, some may "hope" 
that a considerable proportion of all these Jews will 
die out before the war is over, so that the problem 
facing the managers of the future reconstruction will 
be appreciably facilitated. Nevertheless, it is sure even 
so to present a formidable problem. 

The author assumes as an axiom that the war can- 
not end without the liquidation of the Nazi regime. 
Its collapse will probably be followed by the restora- 
tion of the sovereignty of all or most of the annexed 
territories, and by the establishment everywhere of 
constitutions as liberal and democratic as possible in 
accordance with the best Allied or American advice. 
And finally, the creation of something like a new and 
very much improved edition of the League may be 
expected. It would be futile now to attempt any guess 
at the details, even at the broader and more essential 
details, of that future; but the final political outlook 
may be described as essentially bright, and the writer 
very firmly believes in its reality. 

Furthermore, he believes that all these oppressed 
peoples, restored to security and sanity, will honestly 
try to devote themselves to sober reconstruction. He 
believes that they will cherish a suppression of war; 
he hopes that they will, for at least a generation, dis- 
card all thought of armed revanche; he expects them 
to give much more active support to the new League 


of Nations, or the European Federation, or whatever 
else it may be called, than was ever enjoyed by the 
old Geneva League. True, one point is not quite clear 
yet, even to a trustful believer, and that is, how the 
nations 'will settle all those prickly questions of eth- 
nically mixed provinces in such a way as to- satisfy all 
and to stamp out irredentism; but so fervent is his 
desire to believe that he prefers not to think of the 
prickles. Everything, in short, will somehow get ad- 
justed in time, with a great deal of labour, but without 
any further disasters. Some people may find this 
optimism absurd: but this the author denies; his most 
sanguine expectations are soberly and moderately real- 
istic. Credo, quia NON absurdurn. 

There is, however, one aspect of such optimism 
which even the most 'sanguine should discard utterly 
and ruthlessly: namely, the belief that the cancer of 
antisemitism can be cured by such means as liberal 
constitutions and League supervision. No doubt, all 
the suitable provisions will be duly included in these 
constitutions, and in the League's new Covenant, en- 
suring the inviolability of equal rights for all. But the 
enforcement of these constitutions will have to be 
left, in every country, in the hands of national gov- 
ernments; and democratic electoral methods will en- 
sure that those governments will be as representative 
of the true attitude of the masses as possible. It is 
therefore on the attitude of the masses that the actual 
operation of any clauses relating to equal rights will 
depend, so far as the Jews' rights are concerned. It is 
otherwise in the case of other minorities: they live for 


the most part in close territorial clusters, in districts 
or even cantons, and they can to some extent look 
after themselves. The Jews live scattered throughout 
predominantly Gentile towns and villages: at every 
step, in the street or in public or private life, they are 
exposed to the impact of the good or ill will of the 
local majority. To pretend that under these conditions 
any essential results can be ensured by law is childish. 
NON credo qufa absurdum. 

This aspect of the matter will be the better appre- 
ciated if the reader recalls that the principle of equal 
rights for Jews, even in East-Central Europe, is noth- 
ing new. On the contrary, in almost every one of 
these States the legal recognition of this principle is 
just as old as the State itself. Only Austria-Hungary 
was older than its Jewish equality law, which was 
inscribed on her statute book in 1867. When the 
German Empire was created in 1871 its imperial con- 
stitution established equality for all, irrespective of 
creed or origin. When the Treaty of Berlin (1878) 
definitely delimited the frontiers of Roumania, Serbia 
and Bulgaria, it was guaranteed by the same treaty 
that in all these countries all citizens would enjoy 
equal rights. When the peace treaties of 1919 created 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic States, special 
minority clauses were solemnly inserted to ensure 
equality, and the League of Nations was to supervise 
and guarantee their execution. To tell once again how 
all these provisions proved ineffective would be 
tedious; the only fact that may not be widely known 
is that pre-war Roumania, which never took the equal- 


ity clause seriously, and openly treated her Jews as 
"foreigners," never had any trouble on that account 
with any of the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin- 
one of whom was Great Britain and another France. 

Strangely enough, the formidable past history of 
German antisemitism seems to be rapidly sinking into 
oblivion. In the democratic countries a myth is being 
created to the effect that the evil has originated with 
the advent of a person called Adolf Hitler, who was 
bora in 1888, so that if he can be removed it will 
disappear. But the truth is that Hitler has just as much 
to do with the origin of this evil as Napoleon had with 
the invention of gunpowder. Napoleon did not invent 
gunpowder; he only made magnificent use of it; and 
when he was gone, others arose who surpassed him. 

Germany and in this respect Austria was one with 
her long before the Anschluss has ever been the para- 
mount workshop of modern antisemitism. There and 
not elsewhere was the discovery made, and the prin- 
ciple proclaimed, that the objection to the Jew is not 
religious but racial, and he must therefore be perse- 
cuted even if baptized. There and not elsewhere was 
antisemitism sublimated to the rank of a scientific 
philosophy. In no other nation was Jew-hatred as a 
mode of thought openly adopted by so many really 
prominent men, some of them even of the first emi- 
nence in the various walks of spiritual leadership: 
Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Duhring, Treitschke. Hous- 
ton Stewart Chamberlain, to achieve success in anti- 
semitism, had to settle in Germany. In Germany, too, 


not elsewhere, was the practical aspect of antisemitism 
modernized and perfected: what had been a mere 
tendency to desultory street-rioting was by German 
initiative promoted to a political system. Stoecker and 
Ahlward founded the movement in Berlin, bringing 
into the Reichstag, about 1893, the first bunch of 
deputies to be solemnly (and quite democratically) 
elected as the Antisemitische Partef; and in Vienna, 
two years later, Lueger triumphantly conquered the 
Vienna Town Hall on a platform whose main, or 
rather only "plank" was hatred of the Jew, was elected 
burgomaster amidst scenes of the wildest mass-enthusi- 
asin, and kept his seat for decades. Such things had 
been happening for three-quarters of a century before 
the Nazi Party was ever thought of. 

It is nonsense to pretend that the Germans are 
manifesting antisemitism only by order, so that when 
the order is annulled by the liquidation of Nazism 
they will forget all about it. Germans abroad, who run 
no risk if they choose to disobey orders from Berlin, 
have amply and repeatedly shown that Nazism can 
win them by its own powers of fascination, and not 
through their fear of the Gestapo. The clearest proof 
of this was the Saar plebiscite of 1935, held under 
ideally democratic conditions, with British police en- 
suring the fullest freedom of propaganda, of con- 
science and of franchise: out of 525,000 valid votes, 
477,000 were cast for incorporation in Nazi Germany. 
Perhaps even more significant are the impressive pro- 
portions of the Germans in Italy, Latvia and Estonia 
who have accepted the call to return to Germany: 


all but autochthonous, the descendants of conquerors 
and settlers of centuries ago, they left. their often 
comfortable homes and respectable social positions for 
the pleasure of breathing the Nazi atmosphere. To 
top it all, there is the record of the frank and vocifer- 
ous delight displayed by all classes of the Vienna mob, 
in the first weeks after the Anschluss, when "Jewish 
ladies in fur coats" were ordered to scrub pavements 
and ganz Wien flocked to watch and yell with joy, 
and mothers lifted their babies over their neighbours' 
heads so that they should not miss the lovely sight. 
"By order?" Of course there must be an order to 
unleash the innermost brute: but the main point is 
the presence of the brute underneath; and what a 
multitudinous brute! 

Antisemitism is traditionally and organically en- 
demic in Germany; not in Germany alone by any 
means, but in no other country more than in Ger- 
many. Here again, being neither a sociologist nor a 
student of psychology, the author will not attempt to 
explain the phenomenon: but only a fool or a liar 
would deny it. 

The collapse of Nazism can bring no essential 
remedy to this endemic disease. One must, of course, 
be realist enough to allow for the so-called swing of 
the pendulum: when Hitler goes, there may be some 
kind of popular scurry to atone for the antisemitic 
orgy, partly for opportunist reasons, but partly also, 
no doubt, out of genuine disgust at the sub-human, 
beastly forms which the persecution has assumed. 
Moreover, there will be those equality-clauses in the 


peace treaty and the new constitution. And further: 
there is not the slightest doubt that many Jews who 
were forced to leave Germany after 1933 will then be 
most eager to return, and ready to forgive and forget: 
some because of discouraging experiences while in 
exile, some out of genuine attachment to the German 
land and civilization. That much we all admit. But all 
superficial optimists should be warned that the result 
of this backwash will bealmost immediately, per- 
haps within a few weeks only of the new 6dit de 
Nantes which will have opened the new era a venom- 
ous recrudescence of the incurable evil. 

One shudders to think how venomous it would be. 
Apart from racial idiosyncrasies, sheer material interest 
will constitute a formidable charge of high explosive. 
The value of Jewish property in Germany which, in 
one form or another, has passed into German hands, 
is in the vicinity of 25 billion marks. At a conservative 
estimate, since 1933 in Germany and since 1938 in 
Austria, over 300,000 Jewish breadwinners of all kinds 
have been affected by the Nazi r6gime; most of them 
(and the proportion is constantly increasing) have 
been altogether deprived of their employment or pro- 
fession, while a dwindling minority are still clinging 
to some sort of job. All that they have lost has been 
grabbed by the "Aryans." That "all" includes myriads 
of commercial and industrial positions, from director 
to typist or shop-assistant, thousands of professional 
jobs from panel doctor to journalist, while a compara- 
tively important percentage of civil servants, from 
school teacher up to fudge and chief constable, were 


Jews. These were posts filled by the middle class, the 
intelligentsia, the haute bourgeoisie that is, by the 
most conspicuous, most vocal and most sensitive strata 
of modern society. To the members of these classes 
the return of the Jews would mean a vast influx of 
extremely dangerous competitors, in many cases far 
better qualified than the usurpers, and they would be 
faced, as a rule, with the alternative: "reconquer or 
starve." In all cases they would be morally entitled to 
the redress of an admitted grievance, an intolerable 

The kind of welcome which would await them may 
be imagined. I do not presume to foretell how soon it 
would rise to the pitch of direct persecution, or how 
the inevitable de facto denial of "equal rights" would 
be disguised to suit the constitution and the peace 
treaty: but it should be remembered that under a 
democratic constitution parliaments and governments 
are bound to be powerfully influenced, firstly, by the 
endemic idiosyncrasy of which I have spoken, and sec- 
ondly, by the menace of competition, more desperate 
than ever before. Nor should anyone be misled by the 
pleasant recollection that in the good old days of 
Bismarck and Wilhelm the Last, the principles of 
antisemitism were put into practice without any ugly 
and disorderly brutality, but with due restraint and 
moderation; so that the new after-war regime, under 
which all brutality will be strictly prohibited by proto- 
col, may in the end prove "not so bad," or at all events, 
not so bad for the Jews, who, after all, must not forget 
that they cannot be the choosers. . . . The recollection 


is irrelevant: in the interval the brute has been un- 
leashed and has tasted blood. 

To make the outlook yet clearer, one may ask the 
readersupposing him to be a Gentile to forget that 
beggars cannot be choosers, and to imagine that a 
similar prospect is offered not to us, but to him and 
to other Englishmen: the prospect of living at the 
mercy of a ninety-nine to one majority trained for 
generations to abhor the English, under the sole pro- 
tection of paper paragraphs and the supervision of 
Geneva, or the substitute for Geneva; and to work 
for the Allied victory with unfaltering zeal, though all 
it promises him is just this prospect 




GERMANY was the war-monster's favoured pas- 
ture, rich in the spicy fodder which it loves. 
Poland was its coveted hunting-ground, ever more de- 
fenceless and more tempting to the monster as the 
same pungent weed grew more rankly on its soil. 

Poland's part in the "Jewish" pre-history of the war 
is a drama by itself, which will be dealt with in later 
chapters; here the writer wishes only to point to the 
strange and tragic duality of her historical r61e during 
these twenty years of her renewed existence. This was 
a period during which the new world-war was hatch- 
ing; during which her government strove in many 
ways to prevent the war; and yet, after Germany her- 
self, Poland was, objectively, considered the main soil 
on which the war-microbe bred. 

A story is told of the late Marshal Pilsudski's inter- 
view with an important French envoy, soon after the 
Nazis had taken power in Berlin. The Frenchman was 
trying to persuade him to join France and England 
(plus, of course, Soviet Russia) against Germany. 
Pilsudski took his guest to a big wall map, where 
Poland was shown squeezed in between the U.S.S.R. 
and Germany. "If these two clash some day," he said, 



"all their battles will be fought on our soil. Now you 
just imagine that this soil is not Poland, but France, 
and tell me what would be your policy then!" 

From the moment of Pilsudski's accession to power 
in 1926, and perhaps even earlier, the policy of the 
Polish Republic was dictated by this paramount aim: 
no war on Polish soil. And this or so it seemed then 
was tantamount to "no war at all." Of all intensely 
and inherently peaceable nations Poland was probably 
the most genuinely anxious for world peace: not 
because of what is generally understood as pacifism, 
but because of something much more effective than 
pacifism namely, obvious and unmistakable self- 

At the same time the whole of the East-Central 
belt of Europe, extending from Riga on the Baltic 
down to Constanza on the Black Sea, was in the 
throes of the most pernicious kind of social fever: and 
the main focus of the infection, from which it spread 
to North and South, was Poland. It was, of course, 
the same old evil: the fever of antisemitism. 

Its origin was the statistical fact that the Jews con- 
stituted 10% of Poland's total population, and about 
one third of her urban population. This inescapable 
fact vitiated and perverted every civic value. "Democ- 
racy" in this atmosphere meant that in the town halls 
of Warsaw, Cracow, Lodz and every other important 
city, the Poles would have to share mastery almost 
evenly with the Jews: that was what it meant, or so 
people thought. "Equality of rights" in this atmos- 
phere meant that in every branch of economy which 


requires a little learning the long-urbanized Jew would 
overtake and beat his Polish competitor, the son or 
grandson of slow-witted peasants: or so people 
thought It is useless to speak of the moral beauty of 
fair play: the bare fact is that in Poland the Poles' 
jealousy and fear of the Jews were poisoning the very 
atmosphere of her public life. We shall see in other 
chapters how true it is that in some countries the de- 
cisive factor is not the antisemitism of men but the 
antisemitism of things. And here we have a first 
glimpse of this factual antisemitism. 

The result of this statistical fact was that for twenty 
years Poland was always on the brink of inner con- 
vulsion. I do not mean to suggest that the Jewish 
question was her only painful spot; she had other 
and perhaps more serious troubles; for example, the 
Ukrainian problem. But neither this nor any other 
internal difficulty of "Gentile" origin possesses the 
one special and accursed peculiarity of antisemitism 
its unremitting vitality, its power of accumulating 
social toxins. It was something like a bad chronic cold 
in the head, not a serious disease in itself but a con- 
stant invitation to all other kinds of disease. Party 
strife in that "pathological climate" became murder- 
ous hate; criticism degenerated into calumny; the 
temperature and temper of all public life was that of 
the proverbial bear with a sore head. 

Yet this was Poland, by her size and numbers and 
prestige the central rock of East-Central Europe. Had 
she been given, by God or fate, a chance of developing 
calmly and steadily, her influence would have stabi- 


lized the whole of that zone, and would have made of 
it a real "TTiird Europe," a cohesive force capable of 
sobering its German neighbours, despite their numer- 
ical strength (for East-Central Europe has a total 
population not far short of 100 millions). As it was, 
Poland's unrelaxing feverishness acted as a constant 
provocation to her predatory neighbours. 

The conclusion is clear: no restoration, in Central 
or East-Central Europe, will ever make for a durable 
peace unless the ulcer of antisemitism is excised. 
Among the factors whose interaction has produced 
this war, the Jewish bane was omnipresent. The war 
will have been fought in vain, the victory will be worse 
than a lie if that seed is left in the ground to poison 
the future. 



SOME Jewish readers may find these chapters too 
lenient with regard to the several Polish govern- 
ments which succeeded one another from 1920 to 
1939, and which, between them, should be held re- 
sponsible for the progressive economic degradation of 
Poland's Jewry, for the systematic stultification of its 
legal equality, guaranteed under both the Versailles 
treaty and the Polish constitution, and for the many 
recurrent and unchecked outbursts of brutal violence. 
The charge will be justified; but it is here the consid- 
ered intention of the author to pass over the guilt of 
human beings in order to examine what is much more 
important the objective reality, whose trend, in the 
central zone of Europe, is inherently and organically 
hostile to a scattered minority. The policy of govern- 
ments can affect this trend only to a certain extent; 
or it will perhaps be more exact to say that any govern- 
ment has it in its power to increase the hardship 
inflicted by this trend up to the limit of human en- 
durance, or beyond it, but it can do very little to soften 
or diminish the inevitable pressure, and nothing at all 
to remove it. 


It is unfortunately true that some of these Polish 
governments, especially in the period preceding Pil- 
sudskf s coup d'etat, did much to aggravate the pres- 
sure; and none of them, not even the best, can claim 
to have done its duty, or the smallest fraction of its 
duty, in respect of alleviating the situation. Nothing 
would be easier than to denounce them with the bit- 
terness they deserve, now that they are all defeated 
and swept away. A chapter of such denunciation might 
give a good deal of belated satisfaction to long re- 
pressed and outraged indignation. But the author con- 
fesses that to him it would give no satisfaction what- 
ever. He prefers to adhere to his chosen line of enquiry, 
which considers not the sins of men, but the tenden- 
cies of an elemental social process. 

Those men, ministers and officials, writers and 
priests, were often unforgivably guilty; and a long trail 
of Jewish tears, often tinged with something more 
salty than tears, leads up to their doors. If there is 
justice beyond this life, they will pay for their sins; 
if history be written by honest pens, they will stand 
condemned. But the purpose of this book is to force 
Jew and Gentile alike to realize that the fundamental 
curse of Jewish existence in the central zone of distress 
is due to something infinitely deeper than policies or 
ideologies or propagandas, whether anti or pro: and 
he would not have the attention of his readers diverted 
in the direction of easy and cheap emotion, from the 
necessary stern concentration on the essential and 
irremediable tragedy. 

The ghetto of East-Central Europe was doomed 


from of old. No government, no regime, no angel or 
devil could have transformed it into anything even 
remotely approaching a normal homeland. It is now 
utterly impossible to restore it as such unless the 
numerical and ethnical proportions undergo a drastic 

Some people are so sensitive on the subject that 
they regard it as disloyalty to the cause of Jewish 
emancipation if facts are adduced to prove that legal 
equality alone is utterly insufficient to ensure the Jews 
of even a minimum normal existence, least of all in 
East-Central Europe. One is reminded that the same 
sort of political prudery existed in Tsarist Russia: the 
Russian Liberals were so enamoured of "constitution" 
and "parliament" that they resented as political trea- 
son any hint that life in a country that was strictly 
constitutional and parliamentary was by no means 
immune from injustice, oppression, bribery, antisemi- 
tism and other troubles. But theirs at least was a justi- 
fiable ignorance; they had never lived under a con- 
stitutional regime. The excuse is not valid in the case 
of the Jews of East-Central Europe: they have all had 
experience of what legal equality is really worth; the 
Jews of Germany, Austria, the western half of Poland, 
and the Balkans, for three generations; and those of 
eastern Poland and the Baltic countries for twenty 
years. All these Jews, without single exception, are fully 
and absolutely convinced that legal equality alone is 
no cure for the disease which has poisoned their ex- 
istence, and will poison it again. It is unforgivably 
shortsighted now to withhold this experience from the 


notice of Allied statesmen, some of whom, if not all, 
may be genuinely forgetful of it, and sincerely deluded 
into imagining that to restore the "equal rights" 
clauses in peace treaties, constitutions and covenants 
would be an efficient and adequate solution of the 
problem. On the contrary: the most urgent need of 
the day is to drive it home to all concerned that in 
East-Central Europe the equality principle alone 
means no equality, but the same old chaos over again. 

To make this clear to outside observers, some bitter 
truths will have to be admitted and stated, however 
painful they may be to persons of exaggerated sensi- 
bility. These awkward admissions centre on the one 
essential and dominating feature of East-European 
reality: there are certain inevitable aspects in the 
normal social evolution of Eastern Europe (the words 
"inevitable" and "normal" should be emphasized) 
which are inherently, objectively, and organically fatal 
to the Jews' existence. 

The fact will be abundantly illustrated in the course 
of the following chapters: and here, as introduction 
to the subject, let us consider what is held to be the 
classical example of this incompatibility between the 
normal evolution of East-Central economy and 
the Jews' foothold within that economy. It is the co- 
operative movement among the Gentile population, 
especially in the rural districts. In Poland there were 
some 750,000 Jews living in the villages, where they 
constituted, on an average, 3.2% of the total rural 
population. These three-quarters of a million souls, 


with a few exceptions, lived by shopkeeping and ped- 
dling goods to the farmers. The co-operative move- 
ment began long before the Great War, but its maxi- 
mum development was reached during the last decade. 
In 1938 there were in rural Poland 3,207 -consumers' 
co-operatives (membership: 350,000), 1,475 ^ or ^ e 
marketing of dairy produce (membership: 626,000), 
and 453 for general marketing (76,000 members). 
This development was killing the Jewish traders en 
masse. The effect, remarkably enough, was most deadly 
in precisely the Ukrainian districts, where direct anti- 
semitic propaganda was much weaker than among the 
Poles, and where the government had much less rea- 
son for desiring to weaken the Jewish influence than 
in the purely Polish provinces: a proof that the phe- 
nomenon has little to do with any conscious will to 
harm the Jews qua Jews, but is rather inherent in the 
very nature of the development. It would oust the 
rural shopkeeper just as surely if he were an Armenian 
or a Chinaman; but he happens to be a Jew, who has 
nowhere to go. 

There may .have been a few Christian shopkeepers 
in these Ukrainian districts, and they too had to sur- 
render before the onslaught of the co-operatives. But 
the "broken" Christian trader, as often as not, is 
absorbed into the administrative machinery of the 
movement: being a valuable specialist among simple 
peasants, he will be employed by the co-operative. 
The Jew will not be so employed; it is so obvious to 
all that there could be no question of absorbing the 
displaced Jewish trader into the executive staff of a 


farmers' co-operative that no Jew would ever dream 
of asking for such an "absurdity/* Is this, too, to be 
described as antisemitism? The managers of the co- 
operative movement, most of whom are men of en- 
lightened views, would indignantly deny such a charge. 
It is "simply"~~they would saythat one has to look 
after one's own .people first. 

The same phenomenon, but in a much more serious 
form, can be observed in one of the Baltic States (or 
perhaps in all). Violent antisemitism is not tolerated. 
What actually goes on is a social process rather com- 
mendable in itself: the State, in one form or another, 
is gradually taking over the more or less direct admin- 
istration of all the valuable industrial or commercial 
concerns. The owners are paid fair value; or shall we 
say, more or less fair value. If the owners are Gentiles, 
they generally remain in charge. If they are Jews the 
case is different: they are gradually replaced by non- 
Jews. This, as a rule, is done without any harsh abrupt- 
ness, but nevertheless effectively. As one of the victims 
put it to the author: 'In Poland, when the govern- 
ment takes over a Jewish-owned factory, all the Jews 
on the staff have to go. Here there is no such indecent 
haste. Ninety per cent of my former staff were left in 
employment when it happened; that was three years 
ago. A year later only 70% were left; last year 50%, and 
now the end is in sight" 

A remarkable dictum is often quoted in that coun- 
try; it is said to have been uttered by quite exalted 
lips: "Never trouble to kill the flies: but leave no 
crumbs for them/' This aphorism is interpreted as a 

ct _ ?> . tc 


formula of deliberate if "polite" antisemitism; but 
there is no proof that it was ever really spoken, and 
it matters little whether it was or not. The crux of 
the matter is whether in the atmosphere of East- 
Central Europe a government engaged upon such an 
unquestionably progressive adventure as the nation- 
alization of pivotal industries would be allowed to act 
otherwise. The total population of the country is that 
of a London borough; but there is a university and a 
school for higher engineering, with several thousand 
pupils. Every year more and more of "one's own 
people/' fully qualified, line up for jobs mostly ex- 
cellent types of young manhood, keen, gifted, honest 
and efficient. How long would any government be 
tolerated if it kept them waiting while Jews continued 
to staff and manage what would now be State concerns 
though created by Jewish enterprise with Jewish 

A gross injustice! Of course; but mere disapproval 
is useless. The root of the trouble is not hatred of the 
Jewsthat could be combated, if not eradicated but 
something much more elemental and primordial: sym- 
pathy with "one's own people," an instinct which 
cannot be criticized, because, after all, it is as natural 
as preferring one's own childien to one's neighbour's 

The Antisemitism of Things, of course, is due in the 
last resort to a certain subjective attitude of human 
beings. The line here drawn between the two kinds of 
Judeophobia that of Men and that of Things is, 


however, not an artificial distinction. Human anti- 
semitism is an active enmity, a constant urge to harm 
the hated race, to humiliate them, to see them 
squirming and writhing beneath one's feet. Obviously, 
such an aggressive and sadistic mentality cannot be 
kept for ever on the boil in every average member of 
the community: it must have its ups and downs, its 
periods of eruption and of hibernation, and even at 
its strongest only a leading minority manifest it in its 
greedily acute stage; the majority just follow suit and 
mildly enjoy the fun. Being thus of a somewhat elastic 
nature, the "Antisemitism of Men" can sometimes be 
fought with a measure of success; the Germans, for 
instance, a nation endowed with a remarkable genius 
for collective obedience, might be expected to tone 
it down to order, if not exasperated by too great an 
influx of reverzants. 

There seems to be something pathological in such 
a volcanic heat of hatred. However strong the genuine 
racial repulsion, however appalling the sins of Israel, 
the subject obviously does not justify even a fraction 
of such a turmoil. The suspicion inevitably arises that 
this attitude is subconsciously based not only on re- 
pulsion but also on attraction: as is the case with 
sadism. A remarkable political feature of such volcanic 
antisemitism is its inability to appreciate the Zionist 
or other similar aspirations. Logically, the Nazis ought 
to be inclined to encourage any movements tending 
towards the evacuation of the Jews from Germany: 
in practice, they have done more than any other gov- 
ernment to stir up anti-Jewish trouble in Palestine, 


though it could only hamper the exodus. Should 
Uganda and Angola or Mindanao be declared a na- 
tional home for the Jews instead of Palestine, the 
Nazi attitude would evidently be the same. Sadism 
does not wish to lose its victim; the Biblical story of 
the Exodus was the first recorded instance of this curi- 
ous interplay of two opposite passions: one longing to 
exterminate the hated breed and one determined to 
prevent their departure. 

Other curious hypotheses have been suggested by 
observers of this morbid phenomenon. The most pop- 
ular one of these was revived, some years ago, by Henri 
Bernstein, in a play entitled Israel: it told the story of 
a young French aristocrat, a virulent enemy of the 
Jews, who lived to learn that his real father was not 
son cher papa, but a fashionable Jewish banker. The 
obvious suggestion is that all volcanic antisemitism is 
an abnormal infatuation, which must have some physi- 
ological basis, probably racial. Baron Etovos (pro- 
nounced approximately, "Etvesh" ) , a great Hungarian 
statesman, wrote almost a century ago: "An antisemite 
is a man who dislikes the Jews more than he should/' 
Why more? Why so excited? The simplest explana- 
tion is that he "has Jews on the brain," and that this 
mania is due to the presence of a drop of Jewish 
blood, which produces some mysterious and atavistic 
reaction in the hybrid psyche. According to this 
theory, any "volcanic" Jew-hater that is, a man who 
does not just dislike them "as much as he should" but 
who makes a fuss about it very probably has Jewish 
ancestors; they may be very remote, or hidden by bar 


sinister, so that no written record can reveal the fact; 
they may have left no trace on the shape of his nose, 
or even the form of his eyes, but that is not essential: 
the ''Jew-complex" itself is held to be a sufficient 
proof of racial atavism. 

This may be true or it may be mere guesswork. A 
specialist in collective psychopathology might well 
investigate the theory. The Jews will remain unmoved: 
they are not likely to be flattered by the revelation of 
Dr. Goebbels' Rabbinical descent, nor would the dis- 
covery in any way diminish or increase their troubles. 
The author's purpose in this digression is to empha- 
size the morbid, hectic, fluctuating character of what 
he calls the "Antisemitism of Men" as distinct from 
"Antisemitism of Things/' which is steady, constant 
and immutable, and therefore much more formidable. 

It derives from the instinctive discrimination which 
every normal person makes between his or her "own 
kind" and all outsiders. It need not be hatred; it need 
have nothing to do with actual repulsion. It may be 
dormant under normal conditions, and may remain 
dormant for generations, to awaken only when there 
is keen competition for some essential boon, when the 
choice is between one's own kin and the outsider, and 
the instinct of self-defence emerges. Even then it need 
not (though it may) flare up in an angry blaze: it may 
remain correctly polite, while inwardly merciless- as 
in the Baltic example; or it may run amok, as it some- 
times does in Poland. It is not the form that matters, 
but the spirit. That spirit is the inextinguishable 
awareness of every Gentile that his Jewish neighbour 


is not "his own kind/' and of every Jew that his Aryan 
friends are not "his own kind." There is no intrinsic 
harm in this awareness; it is no obstacle to decent 
neighbourly intercourse, to mutual help, even to 
friendship, so long as the social "climate" is favour- 
able. In the "climate" of East-Central Europe it be- 
comes the Jew's death-sentence. 



nnHERE is no evidence that "Antisemitisin of 

Men" has ever been an actual fixation in the 
collective Polish mind. The author has no intention 
of quoting any of the familiar and sympathetic refer- 
ences to the Jews in the works of the Polish poets 
and novelists, for they mean nothing; what he has in 
mind is the complete absence of any recordso far as 
he is aware of any conscious anti-Jewish movement, 
either in literature or in society, since the partition 
of Poland and approximately down to the year 1909. 

By this it is not suggested that there was no racial 
estrangement,, no occasional cursing or baiting or 
beating of Jews; but in this peculiar position the Jew 
learns to distinguish between the ordinary little fail- 
ures of national hospitality and such a special and 
deliberate phenomenon as a "movement/' 

Since 1909, however, and throughout the Great 
War, and after, Poland has been the theatre of unre- 
mitting attacks on every Jewish position; attacks de- 
livered by every imaginable means by words, fists, 
economic anathemata, and various kinds of Govern- 
mental action, falling short only of frankly discrimina- 
tive legislation. Inflicted upon a multitude of 3,300,- 



ooo Jewish souls, most of whom had been paupers for 
generations, these attacks resulted in indescribable 
economic misery, and an almost general stampede for 
emigration a "frozen stampede/' of course, for most 
of the outlets were closed. 

Poland has thus finally established, throughout the 
Dispersion, her title as the most tragic of all the 
ghettos; and the Polish ghetto shows, in this most 
complete and typical form, all the morbid and painful 
phenomena which result from existence in the ghetto; 
and above all, that process which is the natural cul- 
mination of such an existence: the automatic, eco- 
nomic eviction of a scattered minority by local majori- 
ties. We call it "automatic" because this eviction is 
bound to occur independently of any conscious 
"movement" against the Jews, or any anti-Jewish legis- 
lation. In the case of a movement the process advances 
more rapidly, in the case of legislation perhaps a little 
more gradually; but in either case it proceeds with the 
obstinacy of a moving dune. 

All Polish Jews (consciously or subconsciously, ad- 
mittedly or despite their denials) are aware of this 
automatism, this lack of any real causative connection 
between the doom that weighs upon their economic 
horizon and the mood of masses or ministers. The 
author has never found any trace of permanent resent- 
ment against the Polish people among Jewish emi- 
grants from Poland, nor even of resentment against 
the Polish State; whereas it cannot be denied that Ger- 
man-Jewish refugees are imbued with a profound and 
comminatory bitterness, not only towards Nazism, but 


towards the whole national environment which toler- 
ates Nazism. These exiles from Germany feel that it 
was some evil in the very nature of men, an evil ruling 
the men and women in the street, which wilfully trans- 
formed a decent country into a jungle. What the 
Polish Jew, sedentary or emigre, feels about the part 
played by human ill-will in producing the miseries of 
the ghetto, was once revealed to the writer in the wist- 
ful complaint of a Galician rabbi: "I wonder, if I were 
king, just how much I should be able to do to improve 
the lot of the Jews in this blessed country. It does not 
depend so entirely on what orders you give, nor on 
how many hooligans you put in jail. It is more like the 
falling of rain and snow." 

This attitude of indulgence toward governmental 
system under which Polish Jewry has suffered so 
cruelly is of great significance. The writer must confess 
that it gives him pleasure to dwell upon it, as proof 
of the instinctive fairness and decency of his fellow- 
Jews; a twofold pleasure, since it has recently become 
the fashion in a section of the Western Press to speak 
disparagingly of the defeated allies of yesterday of 
the Pilsudski school of statesmen, and even of Pil- 
sudski himself. Colonel Beck in particular, the late 
Foreign Secretary, is sometimes depicted as a species 
of reactionary, a pro-Nazi, a pupil of the Biblical 
Haman. Such references are not only in the worst of 
taste: they are also evidence of defective memory. 
And here, without seeking to write their apology, the 
author may without irrelevance say something of that 


unfortunate, long-foredoomed little company of pupils 
whom Pilsudski left in charge of his Poland. 

"His Poland." The writer never saw nor heard 
Pilsudski, but he believes that the impression which 
he gathered of the Marshal's brand of patriotic philos- 
ophy is essentially just. For Pilsudski patriotism was 
a stern, austere and ascetic religion, scornful of all 
emotionalism. There was a universally current myth 
that Pilsudski "hated the Russians as fervently as he 
adored the Poles": it was probably nonsense, for the 
man was organically impervious to such girlish senti- 
mentalities as worship of A and detestation of B. One 
wonders what he would have answered if he had 
been questioned on the subject. "Absurd," he might 
have said. "My attitude to all peoples is merely polite 
indifference, except as regards my own people; I may 
not be polite to them, because their shortcomings 
always get on my nerves." This is the only real cri- 
terion of authentic and unalloyed patriotism, which 
is a permanent state of dry, pragmatic concern with- 
out any "banjo stuff." Pilsudski was eminently prag- 
matic; he was always frowning upon some Polish 
shortcoming which got on his nerves, always building 
or repairing or tidying up. Strictly speaking he never 
had a "programme," in the usual sense of a string of 
paragraphs dealing with this and that; though for all 
we know he may have signed one or several in the 
earlier stages of his career. But his life's work is proof 
that he always possessed and followed a clear plan of 
action, a plan so direct and simple that one feels that 


it should be possible to express it in a few lapidary 
words. He probably never troubled about "hating" 
Russia (which is not to say that he was not con- 
cerned to guard against Russia's greed of encroach- 
ment): but he certainly feared the contagion of that 
semi-Asiatic untidiness, sloppiness and lack of thor- 
oughness which have always constituted Russia's 
charm and often her undoing. For Poland, Pilsudski 
would have none of the familiar ame slave nonsense; 
none of the mingling of golden dreams and prosper- 
ous lice; none of that profound mystical* rumbling 
which sounds like thunder and is actually only a snore. 
His Poland was to be tidy, clean, punctual, efficient, 
decent, "Western/' in short Perhaps one might say 
that his policy was to push Poland westward across the 
map nearer, say, to Switzerland, This does not imply 
that he was an unreserved admirer of all Western 
ways, but they were at all events preferable to certain 
peculiarities of the East as represented by Soviet Rus- 
sia. "I remember Russia/' Pilsudski once told a visitor; 
"interesting, but somewhat unwashed." He wanted 
Poland to wash properly, to be clean in every sense, 
material and moral. Among the stains that he wanted 
her to wash away was the degrading habit of Jew- 

Pilsudski was neither a friend of the Jews nor their 
enemy: he was politely indifferent "politely" at all 
events in public. One cannot help suspecting (though 
he never said so) that he would not have thought it 
regrettable had Poland had only 1% of Jews instead of 
10%; and as there were never enough jobs to go round, 


one may imagine (though he never mentioned it) that 
he wanted them to go to the Poles and not to the 
Jews. But pogroms and ghetto laws and such things 
were to him like a boil on the tip of the beloved's 
nose: Pilsudski would not have them in his Poland. 

How far he succeeded in cleansing the face of 
Poland of this particular blemish is another question. 
His efforts were not very effective, and one feels that 
he might have tried harder. 

One is certainly justified in bringing this charge 
against his successors: they assuredly could have tried 
harder. Some of them the author has met personally 
Colonel Beck, Marshal Smigly-Rydz, General Slawoj- 
Skladkowski, and a number of younger men, whose 
r61e might be compared with that of the famous 
"Lloyd George Secretariat" in 1917; and he has had 
other opportunities of gauging the general trend of 
their wishes and their efforts. None of them pretended 
to be a lover of the Jews though we should seek in 
vain, amongst our sincerest well-wishers in Western 
Europe, for any such intimate intuition as theirs, de- 
rived from centuries of close proximity, of the Jew's 
Weltanschauung, the atmosphere of the Jewish home, 
and the Jewish sou! But it would be hardly exact to 
class them as political antisemites. As acutely as their 
teacher, Pilsudski, they felt and feared the degrading,, 
besmirching vulgarity of pogroms in the street and 
pogrom-like pages on the statute book. But they had 
to face a host of elemental forces within the country, 
pressing for anti-Jewish legislation and breaking out 


into murderous rioting. There were moments after 
Pilsudskf s death when the only barrier left between 
the Jews and the crusade of all against the Jews was 
the Government and the small controlling group 
which supported it the Pilsudski clique, commonly 
known as "the Colonels"; a group small in number 
and isolated, with no proper roots in any social stratum 
of importance. The "Colonels" tried to stem the gen- 
eral clamour for brutal Nazi methods by offering a 
more dignified alternative: they sponsored efforts to- 
ward preparing an orderly scheme of voluntary mass- 
evacuation; in Geneva they intervened for more 
extensive emigration to Palestine; and they encouraged 
various projects for Jewish settlements in Australia 
and Madagascar. Many Jews who knew them would 
vouch for the sincerity of these attempts, though they 
could wish that they had been ten times as whole- 
hearted and forcible. But the relevant fact is that the 
onslaught which they sought to ward off was an offen- 
sive of formidable intensity, backed by members of all 
classes, and resisted by few of any class; it was truly 
"elemental," truly "a crusade of all against the Jews." 
As we have seen, in Poland (as distinct from Ger- 
many) the onslaught was not a movement based upon 
sentiment or conviction. Apart from the hooligan ele- 
ment, there was little actual hatred of the Jews in 
Polish society. Often enough, those who were ready 
to sign a petition for anti-Jewish legislation would 
swear that they were honestly sorry for the harm which 
their action was bound to cause the Jewsbut there 
was no other way out: "it's either my son or the Jew's 


son, for there is only one loaf/' This explains the luke- 
warmness of even the Polish Socialists in combating 
antisemitism: they too had to consider the inveterate 
attitude of organized labour. The Polish worker openly 
disliked the "intrusion" of the Jewish proletariat into 
the higher reaches of mechanized industry, and asked: 
'If they all come in, where shall I be?" 

It will take generations of research to discover ex- 
actly what was at the bottom of this elemental phe- 
nomenon. The reader has already been warned that 
the author of this study is only a layman. He can offer 
no solution; but of the various explanations which he 
has heard one strikes him as credible. It is based on the 
sociological peculiarities of the ghetto on one hand 
and of Poland's industrial development on the other. 

The same general conditions which, since the indus- 
trial revolution, have caused the great migration of 
villagers toward the towns in the Western countries, 
have been operative also in Poland, though they de- 
veloped much later and were less intense in their 
effects. About 1863, after the collapse of the second 
Polish rebellion in Russia, the national energy was 
concentrated on what was called "Organic Work" 
meaning mostly economic enterprise, commercial- 
ism and industrialization. The rise of Polish manufac- 
turers began from that date; and the Jews, constituting 
about one-third of the country's urban population, 
took their full share in this development At the same 
time, the Polish village began to pour its human sur- 
plus, in ever-increasing proportions, into the towns. 


But the arrival of that surplus, during the first four 
decades, did not necessarily produce any clash with the 
Jews, for the growing industries demanded ever- 
increasing numbers of labourers, and readily absorbed 
the village youths, leaving the Jews more or less undis- 
turbed in the exercise of their old callings; those of 
wholesale or petty trader, general go-between, or- 
ganiser, physician, lawyer, and so on, with the great 
class of unemployables, always a very conspicuous 
element of an Eastern Jewish community, clustering 
around the aristocracy of breadwinners. 

So matters continued peacefully until the decade 
before the war of 1914, when a new phase of industrial 
evolution began to ripen, though it arrived at full 
maturity only after that war. This new phase was the 
rise of the Robot, the advent of rationalization, and 
increasing horse-power, which was beginning to en r 
croach upon the interests of the human motor. Per- 
haps one should hardly call it a "new" iphase, for the 
workers in the West had foreseen it since the first 
riots against the earliest experiments in steam weav- 
ing; but for more than a century, even in those coun- 
tries which led the world in respect of technical 
progress, the workers' fear had proved premature. 
During that century, it is true, the productive power 
of steam-machinery had advanced in a steady arith- 
metical progression, but at the same time, thanks to 
the steamship and the locomotive, the markets for all 
products increased in what was more like a geometrical 
progression. Industry was still capable of absorbing 


the human surplus and of asking for more: especially, 
of course, in the backward East of Europe, where the 
progress of the Robot was naturally slow. 

But towards the dawn of the twentieth century the 
proportions were gradually reversed: it was now the 
power of machinery, driven by motors more efficient 
than the old steam engine, that began to advance in 
geometrical progression, while the growth of the mar- 
kets naturally slackened. The result, which did not 
become fully apparent until the nineteen-twenties, was 
the promotion of the unemployed from what used 
to be under normal conditions a comparatively 
moderate fluctuating reserve, to the rank of a perma- 
nent social class; and a class even under normal 
conditions of very great numerical importance. It 
now looks as though modern industry needs no more 
labour; and soon, perhaps, the question will arise, for 
how long is the "proletariat/' in the classical Marxian 
sense of the term, likely to retain its raison d'&re as 
one of the main factors of industrial production? It 
seems as though this tendency of social evolution can 
be checked only under abnormal conditions: in coun- 
tries technically advanced, including Germany, by a 
race of armaments; in a backwood waste like Soviet 
Russia, where a worker of average Western efficiency 
is called a Stakhanovist, in comparison with whom 
the average local worker is a slacker, by a hectic at- 
tempt to overtake "in a Five Years' Plan" what the 
West achieved in fifty: both stimuli being obviously 
ephemeral. Apart from these exceptional cases, the 


rule is that an influx of man-power is of no profit to 

the factory even in Poland. 

This, it may be suggested, is the main reason why 
in Poland, since 1905; and especially since 1920, eco- 
nomic positions which used to be regarded as "per- 
mitted to Jews'' began to be violently disputed. The 
village boy on coming to town no longer found 
employment at the loom, and had to try for other jobs 
-engaging at first in retail trading and hawking, in 
which illiteracy was no obstacle; only to find that these 
jobs were filled by the half-starved Jew. This, of course, 
was only one aspect of the automatic interaction that 
began to develop out of the situation: as one sector of 
the field encroached upon another, in the end a gen- 
eral and concerted claim of all the Gentiles to all the 
jobs held by Jews was bound to arise. This had nothing 
to do with theories or national idiosyncrasies. Had 
there been no Jews in Poland, the "crusade" would 
probably have been as violent; only in the absence of 
a clearly recognisable objective it would have assumed 
a less concentrated form, a struggle of "all against all" 
instead of "all against the Jews/ 7 The basic fact is this, 
that the Polish community has not enough jobs to go 
round, and the Jews, for a thousand and one reasons, 
are an ideally handy target for the old game which the 
French call dte-toi de la que ;e m'y mette. Among 
these many reasons, one is particularly effective: there 
are over three million of Jews, constituting 10% of the 
general population, and fully one-third of the popula- 
tion of the principal cities. 


This "mechanized" interpretation of the elemental 
character of Poland's Jewish tragedy may be com- 
pletely or partly correct, partly or completely errone- 
ous. The essential fact remains: a situation in which 
the "Antisemitism of Men" is a mere trifle compared 
with the inexorable anti-Jewish pressure of Things. 
Men may hate the Jews, or they may hate the necessity 
of ousting the Jews, as many of them probably do; it 
does not matter. Governments may prevent or punish 
hooliganism: they cannot change the "climate" of 
the social structure. That Galician Rabbi who doubted 
whether he himself, even if equipped with the widest 
powers of autocracy, could stop the ousting of the 
Jew, was right; certainly no Polish government can do 
it, or is likely to attempt it. 

Some Jewish Socialists, however (though not all), 
suggest that there is a remedy; Socialism throughout 
Poland would mean work and welfare for all, and no 
ousting of Jews or Gentiles. They would do well, be- 
fore propounding this solution, to discuss it privately 
with their Gentile comrades. The latter may not be 
antisemites, but this does not mean that their ideal of 
a Socialist Poland is a country with 30% of Jews among 
the urban population. Every sober and honest Polish 
Socialist will admit, if asked for his frank opinion, that 
Socialism or no Socialism, an extensive emigration of 
Jews could only improve the situation, and the more 
extensive the better. 

But this question is outside our present inquiry, 


which deals only with the Allied war aims. In the 
writer's judgment the fate of a scattered ethnical 
minority in a Socialist State is just as painful as in a 
non-Socialist State. Some will think differently; but 
what does it matter to-day. A Socialist revolution, in 
Poland or elsewhere, is not among the Allied war aims. 
On the contrary, what the Allies want is a restored 
Poland, "democratic" in much the same sense as Eng- 
land or France or the United States. This is the only 
prospect which we need discuss realistically. The con- 
clusion, from the Jewish point of view, is clear. 

At the close of this war there will evidently be an 
additional complication in Poland's Jewish problem: 
the question of the Lublin reservation. It is apparently 
the intention of the Nazi government to carve out a 
district around the city of Lublin in the south-eastern 
corner of German-occupied Poland and to use it for 
the compulsory settlement of Jews. There is some 
method in this choice: the Lublin province had the 
highest percentage of Jews among all provinces of 
Poland 42.9% in the towns, 6% in villages, 13% in 
all. A beginning has already been made in respect of 
the transportation of Jews to this district, but the 
scope of the project is uncertain. It is not yet known 
whether the reservation is intended for all the Jews 
under the control of Germany or only for certain 
sections or categories. It is impossible, at the time of 
writing, to ascertain what is actually happening there. 
It has already been rumoured that the plan has been 
abandoned; and again, that 90,000 Jews from Bo- 


hemia and Moravia, 100,000 from Vienna, and so 
on, would soon be transferred to Lublin.* The area 
of the reservation was alleged to be two hundred 
square miles, or two thousand, or five thousand, or 
more (the Polish province had an area of about 
10,000 square miles). All this may mean that the 
German government has not yet condescended to re- 
veal all the details of its plan, and we have no other 
choice but to rely on gossip and guesswork; and it also 
may mean that the German government has nothing 
to reveal that the plan is no plan, but a vague im- 
provisation. There is, by the way, a universal but 
foolish tendency to overestimate Germany's "plan- 
ning" abilities, which overlooks the very obvious fact 
that quite often, at crucial moments, both before and 
during the war, the Nazi government has gone to 
work without any definite design, political or strategic, 
has changed its schemes every day, and generally 
lives from hand to mouth. It is, therefore, quite pos- 
sible that the Lublin reservation scheme may be aban- 
doned, or that it may develop into something big, or 
may stop in the middle of this development. 

What the maximum of this development (if attain- 
able) would be may be gauged from the following 
computation recently made by the Manchester Guard- 
ian. "The Nazis," that newspaper says, "have not 
indeed revealed how big the reserve is going to be. If 

* According to the latest information, the Nazis have ceased to 
use the Lublin ghetto as a dumping ground for Jews, on account of 
its overwhelming congestion. An eye witness report of the inhuman 
conditions prevalent in Lublin was published in The Contemporary 
Jewish Record of March-April 1940. 


one generously assumes that it covers the|whole of the 
Lublin vojvodship it will have an area of 13,000 (?) 
square miles. Its present population is 2,464,600, of 
whom 259,500 are Jews. The Jews will stay, but the 
other inhabitants will have to leave for the Remainder 
State, for Germany, or for Russia, according to their 
nationality. In their place it is planned to send 
1,500,000 Jews from the Remainder State, 500,000 
from the Polish territories annexed by Germany, 180,- 
ooo from Germany and the Sudetenland, 65,000 from 
Austria, and 75,000 from the Protectorate of Bohemia 
and Moravia. In all, this province, already one of the 
poorest in Poland, would have to support over 3,000,- 
ooo people/* 

One thing is clear: in making any forecasts of the 
future of Poland's Jewish problem, the contingency 
must be very seriously taken into account that there 
may be found to exist, at the moment of restoration, 
an area of some importance to which hundreds of 
thousands of Jews have been transported from other 
parts of Poland. Two problems will immediately arise: 
first, the re-incorporation of that district into the gen- 
eral body of the republic, its administrative, economic, 
and above all ethnical assimilation with the remain- 
der of the country; secondly what to do with that 
agglomeration of Jews. If by then they have all starved 
to death, the problem will be solved; but one must 
allow also for the other eventualitythat by some mir- 
acle, perhaps by some magnificent effort of interna- 
tional charity, that easy way out will have been pre- 


vented, so that the problem will still exist: what to do 
with these Jews? 

Logically, the re-incorporation of the Lublin district 
into a democratic Poland where all enjoy equal rights 
can only mean that those hundreds of thousands of 
Jews would be free to disperse from the congested area 
and return to their former towns, or to towns in other 
parts of Poland. The correct application of this logical 
course would, however, threaten at once to upset the 
balance of economic interests (a precarious equilib- 
rium at best, during the first stages of a reconstruc- 
tion), to envenom the social atmosphere, and to force 
into the forefront a controversy which everyone would 
prefer, at least, to postpone. 

This will be only one of the many similar facets of 
the situation: not only the Lublin Jews but all the 
Jews will, in a sense, be "coming back" to recover jobs 
from which they have been turned out, even if their 
exile did not take them any farther than round the 
corner. But the Lublin reservation is likely to prove a 
concentrated and magnified and extremely suggestive 
illustration of the general tragedy. 



rTlHERE is, at the moment of writing, a Polish 
JL government in exile, with its seat at Angers, 
France. The writer is one of its genuine well-wishers; 
he has read with satisfaction its formal promises to the 
effect that in the restored Polish republic there will be 
equality of rights and no racial oppression, and has no 
doubt as to the subjective sincerity of such pronounce- 
ments. But it would be only hypocrisy on his part, or 
anybody's part, to overrate the practical effectiveness 
of such statements so far as future realities are con- 
cerned. A future democracy will eventually choose its 
leaders, and determine, by popular vote, its lines of 
inner policy. Those lines will be "popular" in the pro- 
founder sense of the wordautomatically true to the 
basic interests and fundamental idiosyncrasies of the 
nation. War-time undertakings, if they fit that na- 
tion's mentality, will be confirmed; if not, they will be 

No doubt a most excellent Polish treaty, probably 
linked with a whole chain of other excellent treaties, 
will be signed after the Allied victory, guaranteeing 
all the desirable things that have to be guaranteed. 
There is no need to insist on what the world knows- 



so well: that it may perhaps be possible to ensure by 
outside supervision the inviolability of regulations of 
an international character; but no outside supervision 
can permanently prevent a sovereign nation *from 
doing exactly what it likes inside its own frontiers. 
What Sir Archibald Sinclair so thoughtfully said of 
future Germany applies equally to future Poland. 
Paper safeguards, if incompatible with realities, will be 
swept away or "interpreted" r down to zero, possibly 
with the reluctant consent of the Supervising Outsider 
himself, under the pretext that "it can't be helped/' 
Restored Poland will deal with Jews left within her 
gates exactly as she pleases. 

There is every reason to fear that it may soon be- 
come politically awkward to insist on promises of real 
equality for the Jews in a Poland restored by an Allied 
victory. Nazi propaganda in the German-occupied sec- 
tion of the republic is sure to seize upon such under- 
takings as a useful means of making the Polish govern- 
ment in exile unpopular with Poles in Poland. One 
can almost anticipate the very wording of the broad- 
casts and articles which Dr. Goebbels' headquarters 
will devote to the subject: "They promise you restora- 
tion, but their first step is to be the reinstatement of 
the two million Jews in those economic positions from 
which the German victory has driven them, so that 
two million Poles will have to make room for these 
Jews and starve . . ." No matter how cynical, this line 
of argument cannot but impress the overwhelming 
majority of Poles in their present misery. This aspect 
of the situation should not be lost sight of, especially 


by the well-wishers of the Angers government, of 

Poland, and of the Allied cause. 

There was a time, long ago, years even before the 
Great War, when the author believed that Poland 
as a whole was responsible for the popular success of 
Roman Dmowskf s early experiments in antisemitism. 
But time and closer observation taught him how 
negligible is the guilt of the journalists or the ring- 
leaders or the masses, whether of omission or of posi- 
tive action, in the face of the dead pressure of objec- 
tive reality; and he said as much publicly, thereby 
disappointing and paining many a short-sighted but 
honest and patriotic Jew, and the movement to which 
he belongs paid a heavy price for that attempt to be 
fair to the Polish nation even when dealing with a 
Jewish tragedy. We did not grudge the price because 
we realized that the relationship between the Jews as a 
nation and the land harbouring the largest of our East 
European communities was too important historically 
to both to be allowed to degenerate into mere bitter- 
ness and resentment. 

The same feeling guides the author now. It is use- 
less to urge the Polish Government in exile to declare 
that a restored Poland can really enact, not on paper 
but in facts of social life, a regime of equal opportu- 
nity for a Polish Jewry "restored" in its former mil- 
lions; it is useless for Allied ministers or ambassadors 
or Members of Parliament to pretend that they believe 
in such a possibility. Probably the Polish people is 
essentially as decent as the English, but it was also a 
very decent Polish gentleman who wrote, many years 


ago: "I should like the Jews in Poland to be as happy 
as the Jews in England, provided the percentage of 
Jews in Poland be the same as in England." It is 10% 
in Poland, less than l /2% in Great Britain. Such a radi- 
cal reduction is hardly possible and hardly necessary; 
but the two aspects of the problem are closely interre- 
lated. Racial peace in Poland and not in Poland only 
will be possible only as a corollary to a very extensive, 
and very greatly accelerated repatriation of Jewish 
masses to whatever spot on earth they may consider 
their national homeland. There will be no equal rights, 
and no healthy social life generally, in the whole of 
East-Central Europe so long as these Jewish masses are 
not given a full and honourable opportunity to aban- 
don all those positions which they have irretrievably 
lost; and if that means the overwhelming majority of 
their former positions, the fact cannot be helped. 

Let this be clearly understood. It is the duty of a 
Polish government fighting on the side of the Allies 
to guarantee equal rights for all in future Poland. But 
it is equally its moral duty to warn those Allies that the 
burden of solving such a world-problem as the Jewish 
problem in Poland cannot be borne by Poland alone- 
it will have to be shared by other Powers, by the colo- 
nial empires especially, and above all, by Great Britain, 
the mandatory Power for Palestine. To sound this 
warning, the Polish Government in exile may have to 
risk the impatient frown of those who want the Jewish 
problem to be safely hushed up; but the gain in respect 
and dignity before the opinion of the world will be 
incalculable. This departure would also be in keeping 


with a noble tradition, for in 1863 the motto of the 
Polish rebellion was an appeal not to one oppressed 
nation, but to two. 'Tor our freedom and yours !" 
Enslaved Russia was indicated, but she did not re- 
spond or help. The Jews will do both. 

The following is the translation of a letter from a 
Catholic Aryan Pole: 

The day must inevitably come, and the sooner the 
better/ when those who speak in Poland's name will 
address the follo\Wng message to the world, the Allies 
and the Jews: 

'With all her heart, Poland wishes to ensure, in her 
public life of the future, real and full equality among 
all her citizens of whatever creed, race or language. 
Above all, she wants this rule tb apply in the fullest 
measure to her Jewish citizens. But she earnestly warns 
all concerned that, in the case of the Jews, the achieve- 
ment of real equality is threatened by an obstacle 
which, unless an exceptional effort is made to remove 
it, is~bo*uiid to defy the best endeavours of statesman- 
ship. This obstacle, a result of the historical injustice 
called the Jewish Dispersion, is the unique degree in 
which Poland's social life, and her urban life in par- 
ticular, is complicated by the omnipresence of ethnical 
polarities. There is no real parallel to this state of things 
in any other country. Poland's civilization, proud as she 
is of it, cannot spiritually assimilate a minority so strong 
and so ubiquitous; nor would the Jews' own national 
conscience, which Poland respects, agree to such as- 
similation. As long as this situation exists, Poland can 
only promise to strive for, not to achieve, real equality; 


and the result, whatever our efforts, will be hardship 
and injustice to all. 

It is therefore Poland's duty to remind her Allies, 
and the world at large, that the Jewish problem in 
Poland is only a fraction of the Jewish world problem 
as a whole, and that the former can be solved only 
by a parallel endeavour and a parallel sacrifice on the 
part of Poland, her Allies, and all the other peoples 
claiming the Allies' friendship. While Poland will do 
her utmost to enforce equality within her borders, a 
concerted effort of the most exceptional magnitude will 
be necessary to make possible the accelerated mass emi- 
gration from Poland of all the Jews who desire to 

This plan, however, cannot even be contemplated 
unless it is conceived in a spirit of respect, not of 
humiliation, for the Jewish nation. To press for a mass- 
exodus to a new Dispersion would be a crime against a 
people whose suffering is rooted in dispersion. The 
migration which Poland foresees can only be a volun- 
tary and dignified mass-repatriation to a Jewish State. 

The greater its scope, the more effective will become 
Poland's power to translate the principle of equal rights 
into a reality, and to ensure a normal civic atmosphere 
for all those Jews whom the Polish national organism 
shall prove capable, to their mutual benefit, of absorb- 

Poland's complete renaissance to freedom, both ex- 
ternal and inner, implies, therefore, two separate things: 
first, the restoration of Poland, and second, the creation 
of a Jewish State. 



THE apparently deliberate policy of keeping the 
Jews as a people at arm's length in the prosecu- 
tion of the war is providing the enemy with a power- 
ful weapon of psychological warfare against the Allied 
countries. It appears that the Allied governments 
have, since the beginning of the war, been preoccupied 
with what they regarded as the need to stultify the 
German effort to make the war appear as a "Jewish 
war/' By radio, press, and word of mouth the enemy 
has disseminated the legend that the German govern- 
ment harbored no hostile intentions against the Allies, 
and that it was only the Nazi "struggle against the 
Jew" that had induced the Allies to risk the blood 
of their peoples in order to save the Jews and wreak 
vengeance on the Nazis. This was the line pursued by 
the enemy. The only method the Allies have shown 
themselves able to find for countering it was to force 
the Jewish factor into the background and to suppress 
Jewish identity in the war operations. It seems that the 
Allies hoped, by withdrawing the Jew from public no- 
tice, to destroy the effect of the German propaganda. 

* Condensed from a memorandum submitted to the British Gov- 
ernment early in 1940. 



Despite the deliberate policy of Jewish extermina- 
tion pursued by the Germans in the occupied terri- 
tories, the Jewish angle has been almost completely 
suppressed in the Allied press and radio reports. Allied 
statesmen, while consistently referring to any and 
every aspect and phase of the war, with a studiousness 
that cannot be regarded as accidental, have carefully 
eschewed references to the Jew; every attempt to in- 
terest English political and military circles in the 
creation of Jewish military units has met with stub- 
born resistance. The general effect of this policy was 
to render Jews, so to say, non-existent for the dura- 
tion of the war. 

This policy fails wholly in its object. Indeed, it is 
designed to destroy the effects of German propaganda, 
presented for the consumption of the Allied popula- 
tions in a positive fashion. Germans state facts or 
inventions dressed up as facts. They declare that they 
have cleansed the Reich of Jews and Jewish influence; 
that they have compelled Jews to disgorge what had 
been robbed from the German people; that they have 
purified German blood of Jewish defilement; and 
that the only obstacle to peace with England and 
France is a domineering Jewry which has forced Eng- 
land into war out of desire for revenge. Instead of 
fighting this German propaganda by equally positive 
arguments and figures, Allied propaganda deliberately 
ignores this perilous web of fact and fiction, hoping 
that by simply suppressing the Jew as an entity it 
will render German propaganda innocuous. This hope 
proved to be futile. Among the general population in 


England, German propaganda, in combinatoin with 
anti-Jewish and anti-war agitation by certain groups, 
is producing a definite effect. Despite this conspiracy 
of silence around the Jews, the various grievances and 
dissatisfactions provoked by the war are prone to be 
directed in considerable measure towards the Jew 
as a culpable factor. Throughout the country one 
hears talk of the war as a "J ewis h war -" T* 16 g enera l 
population is fully aware of the brutally anti-Jewish 
policy of the Nazi regime. Therefore, it finds it easy 
to conclude that it is the Jew who would benefit by 
a British victory, and that it is consequently the Jew 
who must in one way or another be responsible both 
for the outbreak of the war and for its continuance. 
Proceeding on this basis, the man in the street looks 
for the Jewish contribution in what he has come to 
regard as a "Jewish war/ 7 He finds that there is no 
Jewish army in the field, that Jews as an entity are 
wholly absent from the various day-to-day operations 
which form the narrative of the war. This mental 
process is well-known to the enemy and to the anti- 
war groups who have set themselves the task of 
weakening national morale. With the progress of the 
war, the multiplication of casualties, and the inten- 
sification of personal hardship, they will be in a 
position to utilize it to the full. 

No less important is the effect of this set of con- 
ditions on the United States and neutral coun- 
tries. These countries are exposed to the full blast of 
propaganda and information from all the belligerents, 
as well as to knowledge gleaned from their own ex- 


perience. They are fully aware of the Jewish angle 
of the war. They have been witnesses to Jewish suffer- 
ing and the extent of the Jewish problem in general. 
To them the outbreak of war, its continuance and 
the manner of its conduct could not remain uncon- 
nected with the question of Jewish participation. 

In the United States, particularly, ideologies and 
ideals play a compelling role in the shaping of public 
opinion and policies. The people of ,the United States, 
which includes several millions of Jews with consider- 
able influence on the life of the country, are watch- 
ing the deployment of forces and the gradual 
evolution of the war aims with deep interest. For 
them, the brutal persecution of the Jews under the 
Nazi regime has served as a sort of subjective pig- 
mentation which has colored their attitude not only 
to that regime but also to the Allies. The British 
and French governments have known well how to 
make use of this American attitude, and it is no 
exaggeration to say that in the American mind the 
Jew therefore exists not o^ly as a target of German 
policy and action but also as a physical factor in the 
war. The exclusion of the Jew as a people from the 
war aims declarations by Allied statesmen, the sup- 
pression of the Jew as a factor in the war, and the 
effort to conceal Jewish identity in Europe under 
the headings of the various national legions of which 
they form a considerable portion are bound, as the 
war continues, to produce doubts and suspicions 
which cannot but prove deplorable. 

It is useful to explore the effect which a con- 


sidered policy on the part of the Allies to give the 
Jews as an entity a definite place in the conduct of 
the war would have on the American mind. First 
and foremost, there would emerge a fuller and more 
complete faith in the moral platform of Great 
Britain. The charge, of which German propaganda in 
the United States knows how to make good use, that 
the Allies are primarily concerned with the main- 
tenance of their own imperial and economic posi- 
tions and that the moral issue is a mere camouflage, 
would receive a decisive setback. If the Jew were 
given a place as a military Ally in the war, this would 
serve as a most effective assurance to the neutrals, 
and particularly to the United States, that the war 
is not being waged for the sole purpose of protecting 
British and French imperial interests. 

The establishment of a Jewish Army would be 
equal, in effect, to the physical adhesion of a new 
ally. It would automatically produce in every neutral 
country Jewish centres of pro-allied activity and re- 

The emergence of a Jewish Army in the field would 
stifle the vicious argument that the war was being 
fought in the interests of the Jews, while the Jews 
were wholly absent from the various fields of opera- 
tion. Jews would appear as an ally side by side with 
other allies, fully entitled to fight for a specific aim, 
in the same way as each of the other allies. This 
would provide the armory of Allied propaganda with 
an implement for the defeat of enemy propaganda. 

The existence of a separate Jewish Army would 


serve as an assurance, more effective than any verbal 
declaration could be, that the Allied Powers envisage 
a constructive settlement of the Jewish problem after 
the war. It would mean that the success of the 
Allies is connected with a policy of including the 
Jews in post-war adjustments and that the Jewish 
Army was the first concrete step in that direction. 




WE MUST not forget Roumania (1,000,000 
Jews) and Hungary (550,000). At the moment 
of writing neither country is at war, so that the Allies 
cannot really be saddled with any responsibility for 
what may happen to the Jews in the Danubian valley.* 
In this book, which deals chiefly with the Allies' war 
aims, a closer enquiry into this sector of the Dispersion 
would be irrelevant. But no one can deny, no one 
should forget, that both Roumania and Hungary be- 
long to the zone where the Jewish problem has long 
reached the stage of acute and painful incompatibility 
between the "equal rights" principle and the real situa- 
tion. In both countries, with the Jews forming about 
6% of the total population, that situation is somewhat 
like that obtaining in Poland; but only "somewhat 
like/' for both countries are incomparably richer than 
Poland in respect to their agricultural possibilities, so 
that the scramble for urban jobs is not nearly so acute. 

* Territorial changes both in Hungary and Roumania were accom- 
panied by a corresponding change in the size of their Jewish popula- 
tions. By the end of 1941 there were some 500,000 Jews in Rou- 
mania, and over a million in Hungary, Mass murder and eviction to 
occupied Russia has again somewhat modified these numbers, espe- 
cially in Roumania since that country entered the war. 


In Rouimnia, however, what we call "Antisemitism 
of Men" has been conspicuously endemic since at least 
the middle of last century. In Hungary its acute form 
is of recent growth, but it is now very intense. In both, 
the r61e of the governments in fostering the anti-Jew- 
ish trend of economic life seems to be of secondary 
importance: the main driving force in the process 
tending to oust the Jew from all such positions as he 
still retains is rather the unanimous pressure of all 
those social classes with whom the Jew happens to 
have any economic or social contacts. Whether or not 
these two countries, in the end, will be invited to 
reconfirm their adherence to the principle of equal 
rights for all (which has never been absent from their 
constitutions) is really immaterial. "Things" will de- 
cide, and only fools or hypocrites can doubt what the 
nature of the decision will be. 

The writer was born in Russia, in a generation that 
knew what Jewish inequality tasted like, and his youth 
was spent in the atmosphere of constant struggle for 
equal rights. In 1906, at Helsinki, in a conference of 
Jewish nationalists who came from all corners of the 
Russian empire, he was co-editor of what is known as 
The Helsingfors Programmea demand for perfect 
and absolute equality of civic rights: every Jew to be 
a citizen of Russia equal to all others, Russian Jewry 
as a whole to be recognized as a nationality equal to 
all others within the empire, its language equal to all 
languages, its religion equal to all other churches. 
Today he would be prepared to sign that programme 
again. But he would not be prepared to condone poli- 


cies which are bound to make of that programme, or 
even of a much less ambitious conception of equal 
rights for the Jew, a doomed list of cant and impossible 

There are two possible ways of envisaging a non- 
exodus solution of the Jewish problem, i.e. a solution 
founded on the assumption that equality can "work": 
the one calls for "assimilation," the other for "minor- 
ity nationalism." 

The first is an elastic idea, whose adherents have 
been known to give it different interpretations. Some 
favour assimilation in language and manners, but no 
religious apostasy and no mixed marriages; which, 
after all, and despite all rhetoric to the contrary, 
means the perpetuation of some kind of separate racial 
community held together by a collective ideology. 
Others, more radical, foresee or even desire mixed 
marriages, so that both the race and the religion might 
gradually disappear; the comforting feature of this 
creed is the "proud" assurance that both race and 
religion will prove an excellent manure for enriching 
the physical and spiritual soil of humanity. 

"Minority nationalism" is based on the theory that 
the essence of nationality is to be found in language, 
literature, music, philosophy, religion, and so forth, 
and that these can be preserved and cultivated with- 
out any territorial segregation. "Nationalities," accord- 
ing to this doctrine, are very much like churches, in 
that they can perfectly well carry on their separate 
forms of worship although their respective adherents 


are intermingled not only in the same district but in 
the same street. What is needed to save them from the 
drabness of mutual assimilation is not separate home- 
lands but a law called * 'national-personal autonomy." 
All Jews who so desire will be registered in Dispersion 
as members of their own national community, will 
have their own schools, use their own language in 
public life, and feel equal to anyone else. 

This is not the place to debate the practical worth 
of either of these two solutions; for argument's sake 
let us assume that both are excellent. Let us go a step 
farther, and agree in advance that should a third or a 
fourth non-exodus solution of the Jewish problem be 
invented tomorrow, they too may be excellent. But 
their efficiency will always depend on one condition: 
the equality of individual civic rights (which they all 
presuppose as the fundamental condition of normal 
existence) must be real and continue to be real Yet 
we have just seen that in East-Central Europe it can- 
not be made a reality without a great exodus* 

Assimilation especially is conditioned by exodus. 
Only when the bulk of the Jews have gone may the 
diminishing remainder hope to find a favourable at- 
mosphere for trying to solve its problem by the great 
final "merger": not an illusory merging as in the past, 
learning the language yet not the spiritual accent of 
the Gentile, but this time, perhaps, an effective 

For in the past the assimilation of the Jews has 
proved illusory throughout the whole of East-Central 
Europe. Real assimilation is not a solo performance: 


it is a duet. It is not enough for the Jew to feel con- 
vinced that he has become absolutely like his Gentile 
neighbour: what is more decisive is whether his Gen- 
tile neighbour has the same impression. Joining a new 
community or nation or class or set is not only a ques- 
tion of genuine endeavour, but above all of reception. 
Jewish assimilation in East-Central Europe has obvi- 
ously failed in this respect; by bringing Jew and Gen- 
tile nearer to each other, by making them rub shoul- 
ders in many walks of life where they never met 
before, it merely extended the area of possible friction. 
If assimilation as an escape from Jewish distress is 
really worth trying again, the attempt will have to be 
made afresh from the very beginning. But even its 
enthusiasts, if any such still exist, must have realized 
by now that they stand no chance of success unless 
racial percentages in East-Central Europe undergo a 
staggering change. 

A "successful" assimilation may or may not be 
worth while, may or may not be objectively possible: 
but in any case the preliminary condition is the exodus 
of the bulk of the Jews. 

Mutatis mutandis the same judgment applies to 
minority nationalism: whether practicable or not, the 
preliminary condition for its success is the exodus of 
the bulk of the Jews. 

It is by no means the author's intention to suggest 
that we should abandon all hope of ever securing a 
decent and normal existence for the Jews in this sector 
of Dispersion. On the contrary, he still believes that 


this can be done. But the preliminary condition for 
any such hope is the exodus of the bulk of the Jews. 

The question touches some intimate susceptibilities 
so closely that the author may advisedly make a few 
comments in the first person. 

I warn my fellow-Jews (if they still need the warn- 
ing, which I doubt) that equal rights are, at best, a 
very perishable kind of goods, infinitely prickly, to be 
handled and used with caution, moderation and tact. 
In Paris, for some ten years or more, I enjoyed the 
acquaintance of a Jewish gentleman whose French 
ancestry went back into the seventeenth century, and 
whose heart's Ten Commandments consisted of the 
word "France" ten times repeated. He never said 
"Juif," but only "Israelite": he firmly believed in what 
was known, two "Israelite" generations ago, as "the 
mission" theorythat it is the Jews' sacred "mission" 
to live scattered among the Gentiles and to help them 
to reach ever loftier ethical summits. Yet I never met 
any other Jew who so genuinely disliked any manifes- 
tation of Jewish prominence. When there were "too 
many" Jewish names at the head of what they call 
le Palmares (the list of successful candidates to one 
of the Grancifes Ecoles), he 'frowned. Somebody men- 
tioned in his presence the remarkable fact that the 
three most original thinkers of the period were Jews 
Bergson, Einstein, and Freud: "I regret," he said, 
"that I must add one more name the late Hermann 
Cohen, and the coincidence is extremely unfortunate." 
On another occasion, years before the Nazis' triumph, 
he called my attention to the pleiad of Germany's 


foremost novelists, pre-war and postwar: "But for the 
two brothers Mann, all that count are Israelites 
Schnitzler, Wassermann, Zweig, Werfel . . . mais ga 
finira mal." He was hurt and shocked when Leon Blum 
became Premier. I asked him, "Is it fear?" He denied 
it. "It is, my friend, a question of tact. This is too con- 
spicuous for good taste. I should equally disapprove of 
it on the part of Protestants/' 

But of course, it was fear; and of course it was by 
no means unfounded. The German economist, Wer- 
ner Sombart, who after all was neither a fool nor a 
sworn enemy of the Jews, gave them this advice at the 
beginning of the century: "Our German laws and our 
ethical outlook admit Jewish equality but if you Jews 
want to preserve it, do not take it too seriously. Always 
stick to the second place/' It would be childish to 
deny that 99% of Jews (and particularly the non- 
Zionist, "assimilationist" Jews to whom equality is 
alpha and omega) consider this a very wise maxim, 
regret that they did not follow it themselves, and 
would be very glad to see their children do so. 

But their children will not comply with this wise 
maxim, for such obedience is humanly impossible. Life 
is competition; equality of rights has only one concrete 
meaning an equal chance in every aspect of life's 
competition; the right to win if you are better 
equipped. Twenty centuries of lopsided urbanism 
have made the Jew, on the average if not on the sum- 
mits where genius dwells, better equipped for most of 
the ordinary competitions of modern life; there is no 


pride in stating this, for the advantage has long been 
a curse to us, a curse and a nuisance. Nor can the Jew 
help his success: as well advise a red-haired fellow not 
to be "conspicuous," or a tall man, or a fat man. It is 
beyond human nature that any man should compel 
himself, for the good of the community, to withhold 
the best that is in him, to write or speak worse than he 
could if he let himself go, to plead, build, diagnose, or 
act on the stage worse than he really can. True, I know 
of cases where Jewish statesmen, though they were 
legitimately as ambitious as their Christian colleagues, 
have offered to decline high office so as to avoid stir- 
ring up antisemitic feeling, but often enough their 
Christian party-comrades told them that it was their 
patriotic duty to accept; and only a Simeon the Stylite 
type could withstand this kind of pressure. So it is in 
every branch of civic, cultural, economic and social 
life: ordinary human beings are psychologically unable 
to reject chances of success and advancement when 
these are unimpeachably fair and legitimate. The re- 
sult is, inevitably, "conspicuousness," jealousy, resent- 
ment, and the rise or increase of what we have termed 
the "Antisemitism of Men": this is true even of 
wealthy countries, where conditions are not suffi- 
ciently strained to produce the other kind of anti- 
Semitism, the one inherent in the objective power of 

This is the fateful inner contradiction of civic equal- 
ity for Jews: it can be durable only if it is not enjoyed 
to the full, yet it is impossible to bring about a 
voluntary renunciation of such a privilege. 


There are, of course, outside remedies which may 
be applied in order to keep the Jewish advance within 
"moderate" limits: and such attempts usually take the 
form of the policy of the numerus clausus. This policy 
consists in limiting the number of Jews who may be 
admitted to a certain profession (or school, or enter- 
prise, or institute) to a fixed percentage of the total 
personnel. In Tsarist Russia, from 1888, it was the rule 
of all the universities and secondary schools that 
Jewish pupils were not to exceed 10% of the total 
in the Western part of the empire (the 'Tale of 
Settlement"), and 5% or 3% in other provinces. The 
most modern experiment on the same lines is the 
Hungarian law limiting the number of Jews in certain 
professions to 6% which is exactly the proportion of 
Jews in the total population of Hungary. 

Eloquent attempts have been made to justify the 
numerus clausus scheme as something not only con- 
sistent with the equal rights principle but actually 
based upon it. Why call it nurnerus clausus? Call it 
Proportional Representation of Races in all depart- 
ments of the State's economy. If a given race consti- 
tutes 6% of the total population, the soundest and the 
fairest arrangement (so it is argued) would be for the 
members of that race to form 6% of the peasantry, 
6% of the industrial proletariat, 6% of the doctors and 
lawyers and journalists. It is argued that this would be 
the surest antidote to antisemitisrn; and also the only 
way to straighten out and normalize the social structure 
of the Jewish people itself. The German Zionists, by 
the way, have been advocating for a generation the 


"reshuffling of classes" ("Umschichtung der Schich- 
ten") as the main ideal of Zionism, meaning under 
that formula the formation of a Jewish social organism 
subdivided in a manner parallel to that of the Aryan 
environment. In Germany, for instance, it would mean 
that 20% of the Jews would be engaged in agriculture, 
35% in industry and mining, less than 10% in trade, 
and still fewer in the professions. Aryan defenders of 
the numerus clausus argue that this is absolutely the 
same thing as proportional representation in the na- 
tional economy: that is, the numerus clausus. 

We are here not concerned with deciding whether 
this argument is right or wrong: what matters is that it 
is bound to prove irresistible in societies where Jewish 
competition is "conspicuous/' and yet the open nega- 
tion of the equality principle is felt to be undesirable. 
Well-chosen phrases are a great help in the smuggling 
of offensive ideas. In an enlightened Western country 
the author has heard the numerus clausus device de- 
fended from the standpoint of "social congeniality/' 
a term much more diplomatic than "racial purity." 
The harm of such phraseological disguises is in their 
insidious plausibility: they lend themselves so grace- 
fully to inclusion in a system in full accordance with 
liberal treaties and democratic constitutions. And yet, 
at all events in the case of the Jewish minorities, the 
actual introduction of "proportional representation in 
the national economy" is entirely impossible, even 
though the Jews should beg for it and the govern- 
ments decree it. To be real, such a redistribution would 
have to begin at the base of the national economy, 


which is agriculture. In Hungary, where half the popu- 
lation works in cornfields and pastures, 6% of all the 
available land would have to be cleared of the present 
occupiers (about 250,000 souls) to make room for the 
Jewish settlers; or some other way of squeezing them 
out would have to be devised, so that half the Jewish 
population could be duly normalized as ploughboys 
and shepherds. A similar operation would be needed 
in mining and industry in order to absorb the 125,000 
Jewish factory-hands required by the scheme. Only 
then could the numerus chusus in the professions and 
in commerce be justified as a step towards social nor- 
mality. All this is so obviously and preposterously im- 
possible that nobody really thinks of proposing it. Yet 
all talk of eliminating the Jewish tragedy by "re-in- 
stating 7 ' civic equality in East-Central Europe can only 
imply this: unless it implies nothing but lip-service 
and twaddle. 

And this, the author ventures to affirm, is precisely 
what it does imply. Any assertion that the cancer of 
antisemitism can be cured in its principal breeding- 
zone, East-Central Europe, by the ointment of "equal 
rights" without a preliminary exodus of the bulk of 
the Jews, is empty, thoughtless and harmful twaddle. 

Every man must be a king among kings, or life is 
not worth living. Equality is not only a state of things; 
it is also a principle. As a principle it has a tremendous 
value, no matter if translatable into everyday life or not. 
The Jews, if they are worth their salt, must fight to the 
last ditch to ensure that the equality principle, however 


unreal, shall be solemnly proclaimed in the statutes of 
every nation: this is a question of human dignity, 
something without which life would be morally des- 
picable, and the refusal of which would justify any 
form of retaliation against the offending State. But it 
is one thing to fight for your dignity, and quite another 
to pretend that this dignity alone will feed you. It is 
utterly dishonest to pretend that legal equality, re- 
proclaimed under the impact of Allied victories, can 
stop or retard, in that immense distressed area, the 
progress of the objective realities that are tending to 
oust the Jew from every economic foothold. To say 
that all that the Allies are aiming to win for us is a 
reaffirmation of civic equality, would mean that for us 
an Allied victory would have no value except as re- 
venge on the Nazis. We do the Allies a disservice by 
accepting such a restricted purpose. 



IN 1936 the writer, assisted by two friends, pub- 
lished in a Warsaw daily a pronouncement to the 
effect that the only reasonable thing for the Polish 
Jews to do would be to evacuate all those economic 
positions which evidently could not be maintained. 
As it was even then a matter of common conviction 
that no less than one-third of Poland's 3,300,000 Jews 
had already lost their "positions'* beyond any hope of 
recovery (while another million, hereditary paupers, 
had never possessed any positions), the solution was 
mass exodus. 

The term "evacuation" wounded many suscepti- 
bilities; it seemed offensive and humiliating. It is 
difficult to see what is wrong with it. In September 
and October 1939, both in England and France, chil- 
dren were "evacuated" from the areas of danger; but 
apart from war, whenever a dam threatens to burst or 
a house to fall in, the inhabitants are invited to "evacu- 
ate" the spot; the same thing happens if the plague 
breaks out in a block of buildings. And what was the 
Jewish situation in East-Central Europe in 1936? Not 
a hand was raised. Crumbling walls, bursting dams, all 
forms of antisemitic plague at every corner, not a sin- 



gle hand to defend the victims, and no plan for ade- 
quate self-defence, even among the victims themselves. 
At a conservative estimate, at least two-thirds of them 
ought to have been, if not evacuated, at all events 
earmarked for evacuation, even before any sensible 
scheme of salvaging the balance had been devised. But 
that was in 1936; they were halcyon days compared 
with the present 

The great advantage of the word "evacuation" is its 
implied suggestion of organized orderliness. No other 
term conveys that important quality: "emigration" has 
always meant a haphazard scramble (except when 
stopped); "exodus" inevitably recalls the pursuing 
enemy host, and it is always a risky proceeding, since 
but for a miracle not only the evil but also some of the 
righteous people may be drowned. "Evacuation," in 
modern times and under decent governments, has al- 
ways been associated with forethought, careful plan- 
ning, and decent accommodation at the end of the 
journey. The author does not renounce either of the 
other terms, but he prefers "evacuation." 

Mass evacuation is the only remedy for the cancer 
of Jewish distress. It may be superhumanly difficult, 
it may be atrociously costly, but as it is the only way 
to save Europe from being hustled into another catas- 
trophe, the difficulties and the expense will have to be 
faced: when it will, of course, be discovered that the 
operation, at its maximum, is infinitely easier and 
cheaper than a modern war, besides being a profitable 
investment, which a war can never claim to be. 

How many will have to be evacuated? The question 


is important, but it cannot be answered. To begin 
with, heaven alone knows how many Jews in the Zone 
of Distress will survive; and how far southwards, north- 
wards, eastwards and perhaps even westwards the Zone 
may expand before the crisis ends. Secondly: there 
probably exists, even in countries which are the home 
of acute antisemitism (objective or subjective or 
both), a certain level at which peaceful symbiosis be- 
comes normally possible between the Gentile majority 
and a Jewish minority reduced to a proportion small 
enough to be tolerable. To foretell exactly how deep 
on the scale that happy level lies is impossible. It will 
depend upon a whole complex of conditions: the 
character of the majority people, the natural resources 
of the soil, the upward or downward trend of its trade 
are only the most obvious factors, but not neces- 
sarily the most essential. The truth will become 
apparent only during the process of the migration, and 
it will probably conform to a kind of osmotic princi- 
ple: in other words, the area to be evacuated and the 
reception area will behave like two vessels separated 
by a diaphragm, each one with its own degree of 
pressure. The outflow will depend not only on the 
anti-Jewish factors in Europe but also on the attrac- 
tiveness of the new home. Theoretically, the outflow 
will stop when a state of equilibrium has been reached, 
e.g. when the Polish or the Hungarian or the Rou- 
manian state and society begin to feel that the Jewish 
exodus has reached its "useful" limit, and that its 
continuation would be a total loss; whereupon they 
might conceivably begin to offer the not yet evacuated 


Jews some kind of enticement or premium for remain- 
ing (history records even more incredible cases when 
Jews were offered premiums for entering the country). 
On the other hand, it is also theoretically possible that 
in spite of such a commendable change of heart the 
evacuation would still continue on account of the 
greater appeal, material or ideological, of the reception 

The only thing that can be said with certainty is . 
that calculations, to be sober, should incline to the 
maximum. Some approximate figures will be given in 
the chapter on the "Max Nordau Plan" (Ch. xvir); 
here it will be enough to say that a solid evacuation 
policy should reckon with an eventual "ceiling'* of 
some five million Jewish migrants within the ten to 
fifteen years following the war; and that the first mil- 
lion, taken from all the countries of the Zone, will have 
to be evacuated at once, at what the Germans would 
call "lightning" speed, by the same methods and at the 
same tempo which a modern army would apply to the 
transport of fifty divisions to a remote theatre of war. 

Some critics of evacuation fear that it would have to 
be "compulsory." This is hardly likely: it will, on the 
contrary, prove extremely difficult to keep proper order 
among the multitude of volunteers lining up for 
places on the waiting list. Other critics merely demand 
that the mass-emigration of Jews should be treated as 
something concerning the Jews alone, and no business 
of any government, Polish or Roumanian or Hun- 
garian. Not only should there be no hint of compulsory 


evacuation; there should be no application of pressure 
in any form; and if a national government should 
openly apply itself to organizing the emigration, that 
would be practically tantamount to pressure. The cor- 
rect attitude for such a government would therefore 
be, to pretend to ignore the fact that Jewish emigration 
existed, and especially, that it was necessary, etc. 

All this is foolish. There is no reason why govern- 
ment and parliament, or citizens, in a State which finds 
emigration a necessity, should feel bashful about it. 
On the contrary, it is the State's duty to help the emi- 
grant by every means in its power. Italy before the 
Great War was an excellent example of such sound, 
sober and perfectly patriotic treatment of the emigra- 
tion problem. Italy had no ethnical minorities to get 
rid of; all her emigrants were of pure Italian breed: but 
her government was always busy devising shipping 
facilities, credit facilities, training facilities for the 
emigrants, and negotiating with the Argentine and 
other overseas countries for their admission. When- 
ever it was felt that an Italian cabinet was not properly 
exerting itself in these directions, the Radical and 
Socialist opposition criticized it most severely for such 
dereliction of its true democratic duty. They were 
quite right: it is a decent government's duty to look 
after all the needs of all its citizens, and if among such 
needs there is that of migrating en masse in search of 
conditions which cannot be provided at home, a de- 
cent government must give its help, no matter whether 
these migrants be Gentile or Jewish. As a matter of 
fact, many Gentiles also will probably have to migrate 


from East-Central Europe after the war, though it is 
of course to be expected that the paramount phe- 
nomenon in the field of mass migration will be the 
Jewish exodus. But the touchy inferiority-complex of 
the non-Zionist Jew should not lead him to take 
offence at his government's solicitude in acknowledg- 
ing the existence of a social problem just because the 
problem happens to be predominantly Jewish. 

Neither success nor order can be ensured in the 
exodus unless it is an international enterprise assisted 
by every government concerned. The above-mentioned 
bashful or touchy Jewish politicians probably know it 
themselves, for they can hardly imagine that arrange- 
ments for the transfer of capital or the liquidation of 
property can be made privately while ministers look 
the other way. The exodus will have to be a solemn 
and official performance, undertaken with banners fly- 
ing; it will require not only administrative measures, 
but also special legislation, and above all, great inter- 
national treaties. This cannot be helped and there is 
no need to shrink from it. 

One understands, however, the reasons of this bash- 
ful shrinking. Tom and Dick have been roommates for 
years; there have been quarrels; now it is finally agreed 
that peace is to be restored, but Dick has decided to 
move to other quarters; the decision is absolutely 
voluntary, but there is nevertheless something in the 
very fact that it is Dick and not Tom who has decided 
to move away. Under these conditions Dick may pre- 
fer that Tom should leave him alone to do his house- 


hunting and packing; should Tom prove too solicitous 
to help, his solicitude might look like eagerness to get 
rid of him. . . . 

The prickly nature of the drama is obvious; yet the 
significant thing about the awkwardness of being too 
anxiously assisted to pack is that it is felt only if Dick 
is moving to another set of hired lodgings. Imagine for 
a moment that Dick has inherited a house, and a real 
freehold property, a thing he has long dreamed of: the 
whole psychological atmosphere would change, and 
all the awkwardness would disappear. 

This is no idle parable, but a cogent argument. 
When people who admit the inevitable necessity of 
"evacuating lost positions" still feel it necessary to 
insist with so much heat that the process must be 
absolutely voluntary, that no pressure must be applied, 
etc., they are simply beating about the bush. The most 
absolutely voluntary emigration may contain some as- 
pects of compulsion: it depends on what the emigrant 
expects to find overseas. Imagine the Italian emigrant 
of fifty years ago leaving Genoa for Buenos Aires: was 
he migrating of his free will or under pressure? If he 
felt that he was going into a dismal exile he was an 
exile; if he felt he was going to meet friends and make 
his fortune, he was a free adventurer. An exodus of 
Jews towards a new Dispersion would be equivalent to 
forcible mass expulsion, no matter how scrupulously 
the "voluntary" principle was respected and safe- 
guarded. Exodus to a Jewish State will, under all con- 
ditions, be spontaneous in the purest sense of the 


word, and the eagerness of the migrants will be hardly 
at all diminished by the fact that the new constitutions 
in the old countries promise civic equality. 

<r : 

On the contrary, the prospect of civic equality may 
be affected by the fact of evacuation perhaps very 
notably and favourably affected. The man in the street, 
on the average, is never altogether beastly. The impor- 
tance attributed in this book to the objective "Anti- 
semitism of Things" should help us to avoid over- 
estimating the malignancy of men: men may vote for 
anti-Jewish measures, men may boycott Jewish shops, 
and may still be decent kind-hearted fellows in other 
respects. It would do some Jewish leaders an enormous 
amount of good if they realized this truth once and for 
all, and drew some conclusions from it. The average 
human biped in the antisemitic Zone does not enjoy 
downing and harming the Jew; but he is quite willing 
to do so again and again if he fears that the Jew may 
crowd him out, economically, socially, or politically. 
Give the average man a concrete and tangible proof 
that an earnest endeavour is actually being made to 
thin out the ranks of his Jewish competitors, and he 
will probably relax his belligerency. This is not op- 
timism, just as the refusal to believe in the efficiency 
of equal rights under the climate of the Zone is not 
pessimism: it is just impartial realism, scornful but 
benevolent, taking Jew and Gentile at their true value, 
terre a terre. 

Is Man essentially good or essentially bad? Here is 
another parable, which answers this foolish and idle 


question. There was once a town of five hundred 
houses, and one day the Sultan sent to it fifty orphans 
and' appealed to the citizens' mercy to give each of 
these unfortunates a home. So the town carefully 
selected fifty of the most affluent and virtuous families, 
and placed one orphan in each. A month later the 
whole town was in a frenzy of irritation; fifty mothers 
complained that the orphans were lousy, bad-man- 
nered, and generally horrid. Then the town councillors 
got together again and decided to raise a public sub- 
scription to build an orphanage; and the people sub- 
scribed the required amount twice oyer, built a won- 
derful home for the orphans, and lived happily ever 

Mass evacuation applied to the Jewish -problem is 
not an alternative to civic equality: it is a corollary to 
equality, the indispensable condition of equality, and 
the only thing which can possibly make the latter a 
lasting reality for those be they few or many who 

But this is a side-issue. The essential r61e and value 
of evacuation is that it is the only cure for an evil 
which, if not removed, will continue to pervert hu- 
manity to commit further outrages: a thorough, clean 
and final cure. Also provided the reception area is a 
Jewish State it is a popular cure, a remedy which the 
overwhelming majority of men of all creeds regard 
with approval and respect; an ideal sanctified by the 
Bible and ennobled by the tradition of Zionism, whose 
consummation would be universally welcomed by all 


countries inside the Zone of Distress and most nations 
outside it, and by all Jews-both those who want to go 
and those who want to remain. 

What was said of the equality principle in Poland 
can be said of the equality principle in general-that 
complex of claims and dreams which our ancestors 
called "the Jewish emancipation'' can become a reality 
only under two conditions: the enjoyment of equal 
rights in every Gentile country, and the existence, 
somewhere, of a Jewish State. 

At this stage of our enquiry a question will prob- 
ably arise in the minds of readers: How far can this 
aspect of the solution here proposed be regarded as a 
"war aim of the Allies?" The war is against Germany. 
Wherever the area for a Jewish State may be reserved, 
in Palestine or elsewhere, it certainly will not be on 
any soil now held by Germany. How can this matter 
be the concern of a peace conference at which de- 
mands can be presented only to Germany? 

But the forecast contained in this last sentence is 
an error. The Versailles treaty (and incidentally, the 
author refuses to join in the great chorus of that docu- 
ment's detractors: it was, with all its defects, quite a 
fine piece of statesmanship for its time) the Ver- 
sailles treaty in its 225 pages did much more than 
merely settle accounts with the beaten foe. For in- 
stance, it established the League of Nations: what 
had that to do with the war? Well, it had everything 
to do with it, for at the time it was universally realized 
that some kind of permanent association between 


sovereign peoples might help to prevent further wars. 
The remedy has failed: and today the whole world is 
even more acutely aware that the only justification of 
the present conflict is the eventual provision of better 
safeguards against eruptions of the spirit of violence. 
Everything which is of value as such a safeguard is a 
proper war aim. Hardly anybody will deny that the 
uprooting of antisemitism, at least of its acute form, in 
East-Central Europe would be an essential safeguard 
against any further eruptions of brute aggression. 



THE official Allied attitude to the Jewish evacua- 
tion problem (in so far as the official Allied view 
admits the existence of such a thing, under the 
euphemistic name of the "refugee problem") is in 
contradiction to all our essential and vital interests. 
The essential and vital interests of the Jewish masses 
in the Zone of Distress, even if considered apart from 
their spiritual aspects, such as the appeal of religion or 
of Zionism, demand the recognition of two principles: 

(a) That there is no probability whatever that the 
need for Jewish mass emigration will cease after an 
Allied victory: that, on the contrary, the balance of 
probability points to an increased urge towards evacu- 
ation after the war; and that all international plans 
with regard to the future of the "Jemsli refugee" 
problem must therefore discard the cheap optimism 
which justifies neglect and adopt the forecast of the 
"greater need" as their basis of action. 

(b) The second principle is this: The territorial con- 
centration of Jewish emigrants, and, above all, no 
encouragement of their further dispersion as minor- 
ities among other peoples. 

No person of average intelligence will ask for an 

EVIAN 135 

explanation with regard to this second principle. It is 
by now clear to all that the formation of new Jewish 
minorities in countries or districts or towns where 
there are as yet no Jewish communities is bound to 
spread the germs of the antisemite cancer where they 
will proliferate in the future, perhaps the very near 
future. Any sane observer, whether friendly or indif- 
ferent or even unsympathetic to the Jews, will realize 
that the only sound policy is to look for some way of 
allowing these emigrants to create a homeland of 
their own. Theoretically speaking, there might be one 
homeland for all, or several homelands: though the 
author does not believe in the latter alternative. But 
the problem need not be analyzed here: the main 
point is the principle of the homeland. A homeland 
for the Jews means a land where they would dwell 
only among Jews, or would at least constitute a 
majority sufficiently overwhelming in numbers to 
eliminate the possibility of pogroms, or economic 
ousting, or even the uneasy distress of the unwanted 
lodger. Perhaps this does not necessarily imply full 
political independence; but it certainly implies a very 
considerable degree of internal sovereignty; above all, 
it implies the reservation for this purpose of a suffi- 
ciently extensive area (or, in theory, several extensive 
areas). That the task of finding such areas is not an 
easy one is obvious; but to look for "easy" ways out 
of a problem of such magnitude would be childish. 
When the plain man hears that intergovernmental 
conferences are being called and committees set up to 
devise schemes for settling "refugees" who are mainly 


if not wholly Jews, he expects the statesmen thus en- 
gaged to apply their efforts in the direction not of 
scattered but of concentrated settlement. 

The official Allied attitude, so far as can be ascer- 
tained, favours the scattering of the "refugees/ 7 it 
being assumed that after the Allied victory there will 
be no need even for that 

The Evian Conference (July 1938), convened to 
deal with the question of "refugees from Germany 
and Austria" and attended by delegates of some thirty 
governments, was due to President Roosevelt's initi- 
ative. His original intention was comprehensive: he 
wanted the civilized governments to provide an ade- 
quate solution not only for the plight of the actual 
refugees, but for the whole phenomenon which, by 
then, already promised to become a fixed feature of 
the European situation. The scope of his intentions 
embraced "all" refugees, present and future, those 
from Germany and Austria and those who were being 
daily squeezed out of other parts of East-Central 
Europe. There are some indications that Mr. Roose- 
velt's initial plan went even farther: relief was to be 
provided not only for those who were actually expelled 
or had fled, but also for those left behind in their 
agony; in other words, there was to be not only refugee 
relief but also preventive evacuation. It is of course 
unlikely that Mr. Roosevelt should have expected an 
initial conference to solve these problems in their 
formidable entirety; what he probably intended was 

EVIAN 137 

a full-scale beginning of the offensive, plus a complete 
and courageous outline of the tasks ahead. 

When his envoy, Mr. Myron Taylor, began to go 
round the European capitals, sounding their attitude 
to the President's initiative, it became evident at once 
that he was encountering serious obstacles that pow- 
erful interests were alarmed and displeased by the 
scope of Roosevelt's plan, and were bent upon re- 
stricting it to the narrowest proportions. The chief 
centre of this obstruction was official London. 

The spring of 1938, when Mr. Taylor was travelling 
on his exploratory mission, was the time when Foreign 
Office and Colonial Office circles were busily looking 
for some way of reducing Great Britain's Zionist obli- 
gations. It was the same tendency which a year later 
found expression in Mr. MacDonald's White Paper 
on Palestine. This tendency could not possibly have 
attained to complete precision so early in 1938, but 
its trend was perfectly clear: England's pledge to the 
Jews must be so interpreted as to leave her free to 
buy Arab good-will by stopping immigration to Pales- 
tine. Mr. Roosevelt's project was a most inopportune 
check to that tendency. An international body sum- 
moned to provide a really adequate solution of the 
refugee problem in its entirety would inevitably end 
in a quest for a suitable territory or territories, and 
the first object of its investigation would naturally be 
Palestine. This danger was to be averted at all costs. 
How? It would never do to offend Mr. Roosevelt by 
anything like an abrupt refusal to hold such a confer- 


ence. Mr. Roosevelt was to be let down gently and 
cautiously. First, the scope of the problem was to be 
drastically reduced: it would not include all the refu- 
gees from all countries . who had already escaped or 
were likely to escape in the future, but only those 
actual fugitives from Germany and Austria who had 
already escaped and were already such a burden to 
Germany's hospitable neighbours. In other words, it 
was a question of thousands, not of God knows how 
many eventual myriads or millions. Secondly, the 
problem thus limited would have to be treated as a 
question of international charity, not of international 
politics; no Jewish State proposals or the like were to 
be put on the agenda; and to drag in Palestine in this 
connection would mean embarrassing Great Britain 
and even making it impossible for her to attend the 

So far as is known, the same tactics were adopted 
at the second "refugee" conference at Washington 
in October 1939. Here again Mr. Roosevelt was the 
initiator, and he is. reported to have expressed the 
apprehension that after the war there would be many 
more refugees than before; indeed, according to some 
of the reports the American delegation went so far as 
to forecast a human flood amounting perhaps to 
twenty million homeless people of all races. Yet here 
again "some European delegates" firmly disagreed, 
and assured the gathering that, on the contrary, no 
refugee problem to speak of would be left in Europe 
after the Allied victory. Another report states, more- 
over, that it was decided to open a systematic enquiry 

EVIAN 139 

into the absorbent possibilities of a number of coun- 
tries, but that Palestine (at the demand of "some 
European delegates") was excluded from the scope of 
such enquiry. 

All this is no small matter. This is a deliberate 
policy of scuttling the chances of Jewish salvation; 
of discouraging our well-wishers and paralyzing their 
attempts to help us; a policy more than just unfriendly 
a policy of wrecking. Moreover, even a wrecker does 
not always act so wantonly as to rob a neighbour of a 
pound in order to save himself a penny. Half a century 
of Jewish endeavour, since Theodor HerzFs day and 
before, had been devoted to the one supreme purpose: 
to make the civilized governments realize that the 
Jewish hunger for migration is a world-problem, and 
agree on an international effort to solve it in all its 
magnitude*. At long last a powerful initiative had 
begun to move in this direction, at a period when the 
sympathy of all nations with the Jews' agony of home- 
lessness might (so we thought) be assumed to be 
, unanimous. The entire future of the race depends on 
the success of this step; and it is not only the Jews' 
one chance of salvationit is also Europe's chance. 
Here is a prospect of profound and lasting perhaps of 
permanentinternational and humanitarian value. As 
against this, there is the petty apprehension that if the 
Palestine question is reopened, a British Cabinet may 
be put in an awkward position and its Palestine policy 
jammed: a policy which most British leaders dislike, 
and which nine-tenths of their reluctant supporters 
accept only as provisional. There is something mean 


in this disproportion between the enormity of the 
harm and the puny cheapness of the advantage; a 
story of the Middle Ages, read in early boyhood, recurs 
to one's memory: "Yes, the village is burning, but do 
not sound the alarm lest you wake his Lordship . . ." 

The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, 
set up by the Evian Conference, has so far (February 
1940) published no results of its investigation. This 
is not a reproach: a geo-political enquiry extending 
over half the globe must be slow work under the best 
of conditions, and this particular work has lately been 
handicapped by the war. The result is that no proper 
review can be offered of the settlement possibilities 
discovered by the Committee for the refugees generally 
and the Jewish refugees in particular. 

A great many countries have been mentioned in 
the press as willing to accept a number of ref ugees, 
and various figures have: been quoted, denied, con- 
firmed, enlarged, or red ced. No reliance can be placed 
on any of this information until the official reports 
begin to appear. But even then, or rather especially 
then, the whole melancholy business of scattering 
fugitives among reluctant hosts will remain what it 
is now arid and hopeless, pregnant of nothing but 

This is not said in any spirit of disparagement either 
of the workers of the Intergovernmental Committee 
or of the countries that still agree to practise hospital- 
ity. They are deserving of nothing but respectful grati- 
tude. But the results of such hospitality would be as 

EVIAN 141 

melancholy as the present position. However great 
may be the ultimate total of Jewish refugees allowed 
to infiltrate here and there and everywhere, that total, 
in comparison with the millions who must be evacu- 
ated from the Zone of Distress, will be as a pebble to 
an avalanche. 

But the harm done will be great. Has anyone any 
illusion as to the universal atmosphere in which those 
kind-hearted people of the "Evian" Committee are 
trying to charm the governments into once more 
opening their gates to the Jewish tramp? 

The following string of news items has been gleaned 
at leisure from the London Jewish Chronicle files of 
1938 and 1939: 

According to a statement issued by the Government 
of Northern Rhodesia the elected members of the 
Legislative Council have unanimously opposed any 
immigration of Jewish refugees. The acting Governor, 
therefore, felt unable to advise the Secretary of State 
that the matter would be proceeded with further at 
the present time. (August 19, 1938.) 

It is stated that mass immigration into the Portu- 
guese colonies is strictly forbidden. (August 19, 1938.) 

President Vargas of Brazil has issued a decree pro- 
hibiting the establishment of communities of one 
nationality, fixing the annual quota of immigration 
at two per cent of the total number of immigrants of 
the same nationality during the last fifty years and 
establishing an immigration council. (September 2, 


A memorandum urging the prohibition of foreign 


immigrants into Cyprus has been submitted to the 
Municipal Council by local professional corporations* 
(September 16, 1938.) 

Refugees from European countries will not be en- 
couraged to emigrate to New Zealand, according to a 
statement made last week by Mr. Nash, the Minister 
of Finance. (September 16, 1938.) 

It is understood that the Government of South 
Africa is unwilling to contemplate any modification 
in the stringent provisions of the Aliens Act, which 
makes Jewish immigration virtually impossible. (De- 
cember 2, 1938.) 

It is reported that the Uruguay Government has 
instructed its consuls to refuse visas to Jews who are 
emigrating for racial or political reasons. (December 
23, 1938.) 

The Foreign Office of Ecuador advised consuls and 
agents in foreign countries not to issue permanent 
visas to aliens. (July 14, 1939.) 

The names of twenty more countries could be added 
to this list. The Jewish tramp is not wanted. When 
he is admitted, his acceptance is due to pity, cajolery, 
or friendly pressure: precarious visas all of them. Time, 
effort and opportunity are wasted, and the seeds of 
future trouble are sowntrouble for the refugees, the 
hospitable countries and the world at large. The only 
redeeming feature of the plan is its narrow range, 
which must remain restricted, as the peoples are be- 
coming ever more unwilling to grant hospitality which 
cannot be decently maintained. 

EVIAN 143 

Two distinct lines of policy are traceable In this 
chaos: the policy of individual infiltration and the 
policy of group settlement. (Sometimes instead of 
"group settlement" the term "colonization" is used.) 
The difference is twofold. Infiltration (to begin with) 
has characterized our overseas migration (except in 
Palestine) throughout the last fifty years: "immi- 
grants" have no ambition to create a new social or- 
ganism; they find one ready-made, and look for some 
unoccupied spots within it where they can find or 
build a foothold for themselves. "Colonizers" on the 
other hand, are people who migrate in groups to large 
empty areas in order to erect a new body social where 
there was none before. The second difference, more 
to the point in our case, is this: infiltration means the 
creation of new ghettos, while colonization or group 
settlement is a conception more or less related to the 
"territorialist" idea of a Jewish State, or a Jewish 
province, or several Jewish provinces. 

The only proper task for the Intergovernmental 
Committee so far as the Jewish "refugee" phenome- 
non is concerned is to discard the policy of infiltration 
(delegating it, if desired, to private institutions), and 
concentrate upon inquiry into the possibilities of the 
territorial solution. There are so far no indications to 
show that the Committee is working in this direction. 
At Evian, where it was first assembled, it certainly 
received no such commission; it may have obtained 
it from the Washington Conference, whose resolu- 
tions, it seems, have not been published; or it may 


have set out along this only practicable path on its 
own initiative and responsibility. It is to be hoped 
that it has done so. If it has not, it will have to; or 
some other body will have to be appointed for the 


Nothing can be more deplorable than the strange 
passivity of Jewish public opinion in this regard. Since 
Leo Pinsker wrote "Auto-Emancipation" sixty years 
ago, since Theodor Herd founded political Zionism, 
it has been the hope of all Jews that some day the 
civilized world would realize the international char- 
acter of the problem of Jewish migration, and that 
an intergovernmental organ would be established to 
study and to solve it. And now here is that very organ 
apparently wasting time, when all delay is disastrous, 
on stop-gap futilities. It is no secret that its most 
influential members are themselves convinced of the 
damnable uselessness of patchwork: their legitimate 
ambition is to produce something really adequate; it is 
only the ungenerous shprt-sightedness of one bu- 
reaucracy that appears to hinder them. A few months 
of concerted counter-attack by public opinion, over- 
whelmingly supported by the facts of the tragedy now 
being enacted in Eastern Europe, would sweep away 
this obstruction, and force the Intergovernmental 
Committee, to the Committee's own relief, to con- 
centrate on the problem of the Jewish State. 

To avoid misunderstandings, it should here be ex- 
plained that the Intergovernmental Committee as at 
present constituted is not adequately staffed for the 

EVIAN 145 

great purpose. It includes excellent brains, but has no 
real contact with the main forces of organized Jewish 
democracy. The defect is largely due to a weakness of 
the Jews which is partly their misfortune and partly 
their own fault: there is no united organ to claim the 
title of an Exilarchate, a "government" of the Jewish 
people in dispersion. This lack will be discussed in 
one of our concluding chapters: here it is mentioned 
only to explain that a committee of eminent Gentile 
well-wishers alone is not the competent authority for 
solving problems of Jewish history. When Pinsker and 
Herzl spoke of "international" efforts to solve these 
problems, what they meant was the efforts of the Gen- 
tile nations together with the Jewish nation. This 
co-operation, however, is bound to come. For if the 
present Evian Committee breaks its bounds and enters 
upon the only true path, it will of itself realize the 
inadequacy of its composition and demand to be 
enlarged. Perhaps even then it will be only a forerun- 
ner, and not the definitive assembly which will pro- 
nounce the final decision; nor does the author forget 
that the really "final" decision as to a people's fate 
can be pronounced only in deeds and not in formulas, 
and only by the people itself. But, all these reserva- 
tions notwithstanding, the Evian Committee of today 
is an important factor, a lever that can remove many 
obstacles: and it is deplorable that Jewish public opin- 
ion should neglect this lever. 




PART from Palestine, two or three schemes of a 
_ "territorialist" nature schemes for creating a 
Jewish State or provincehave emerged into promi- 
nence recently. One of these is the British Guiana 
project. Mr. Neville Chamberlain said in the House 
of Commons on November 21, 1938: "I turn now 
to British Guiana. It is not possible at this stage to 
give exact figures of the total area which could be 
made available to be leased for this purpose, but it 
would certainly not be less than 10,000 square miles, 
and probably more/' Sir Samuel Hoare, on the same 
day, "admitted that the territory envisaged included 
that which had proved unsuitable for the settlement 
of 5,000 Assyrians a few years ago/' (Sir John Hope 
Simpson, in his monumental "Refugee Problem" re- 
port to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
in a chapter dealing with the Assyrian tragedy, devotes 
only two lines to that little disappointment: "Search 
was made in many quarters of the globe, among others 
in Brazil and in British Guiana, but no suitable site 
for settlement could be found.") 

The Advisory Committee on Political Refugees ap- 


pointed by President Roosevelt dispatched a commis- 
sion of experts to investigate British Guiana. They 
spent a few weeks in touring various sections of the 
country and produced a report. The British Colonial 
Office hastened to publish it as a White Paper in 
May 1939, obviously to offset or soften the blow to 
the Jews dealt by the other (Palestine) White Paper 
which appeared in the same month. One homeland is 
closed, but here is another on the horizon. 

The Commission's conclusions are moderately op- 
timistic but cautious. The territory "is not an ideal 
place for refugees from middle European countries" 
and "could not be considered for immediate large 
scale settlement/ 7 but it is worth "a trial settlement." 
The trial should involve 5,000 pioneers; it would cost 
three million dollars and would take two years. (Both 
the cost and the time would probably be exceeded.) 
The points to be ascertained during the trial are: 
whether the actual area of fertile soil is as extensive 
as assumed; whether forests and savannahs (which 
undoubtedly are extensive) can be utilized; whether 
there is any opening for industries, heavy and light; 
whether any sort of road could be built at a reason- 
able cost in order to make the settlement accessible; 
and whether Europeans can work in such a climate, 
despite the fact that other Europeans have tried and 
failed. The query as to the possibility of a road can 
perhaps be illustrated by the information offered in 
respect of another South American country: "You 
can reach our interior from our sea coast either by 
plane or on mule-back: the former method is of course 


more expensive, but quicker." A reply to the final 
question seems to be indirectly suggested by the Com- 
mission in another connection in explaining why the 
fact that the same colony was found unsuitable for 
Assyrians need not imply its unsuitability for Central 
European refugees. The reason is that the Jewish 
refugee problem presents "a number of special fea- 
tures/' of which the first is ''the extreme urgency 
and necessity with which the refugees are being forced 
to find new homes/' In short: needs must where the 
devil drives. A useful line of inquiry, overlooked by 
the worthy commissioners, would be to ask whether 
the devil can be persuaded to wait until all the other 
questions have been answered by experiment in a 
tropical country of hills and primeval forests, with no 
roads to speak of. To obtain the factual replies to 
these queries would take, one may suspect, not two 
years but a generation. 

This should not be regarded as a criticism of British 
Guiana's fitness for close settlement The Colonial 
Secretary told us last September that some 'Voluntary 
organizations in Great Britain had been on the point 
of establishing a corporation to carry out the [British 
Guiana] scheme, but owing to the outbreak of the 
war, action had been suspended for the time being." 
"Action/ 7 we assume, implies both the small experi- 
mental settlement to begin with and the investigation 
of vaster possibilities for the future. Some day "action" 
in this sense may be resumed, and may quite possibly 
result in the acquisition of useful knowledge, even 
though it may be that Gentile and not Jewish colonists 


will ultimately profit by it. Speaking generally and 
theoretically, it is unlikely that any spot on God's 
earth is destined to remain unused for all eternity. 
With the progress of technique, in a hundred years 
or less perhaps, even the Sahara will be colonized, with 
the help of water brought from the Niger in pipe-lines 
five hundred miles long, or from underground sources 
five thousand feet underground. Countries like the 
Guianas, where the obstacle is rather the super- 
abundance of natural vitality than the opposite, will 
probably be inhabited long before that. Humanity 
is too crowded, space too valuable: they will not be 
allowed to lie waste indefinitely. Aeroplanes will an- 
nihilate distance, radio and television will permit a 
dweller of Central Africa to attend first nights of the 
New York Metropolitan Opera, and electricity will 
reduce the burden of labour. All our present reasons 
for herding people together will disappear; townsmen 
by heredity will long for the luxury enjoyed by the 
Boer roortreMcer, who felt crowded when he could 
see his neighbour's smoke; people will migrate overseas 
not because of hunger and persecution, but just for 
the adventure of space, which is perhaps as fascinating 
for most of us as the adventure of speed. Then all the 
waste places around the globe will have their settlers, 
including the Guianas, including even Biro-Bidjan. 

All this is .said to prove that the author does not 
wish to disparage either British Guiana or any other 
place which sensible people may suggest for mass- 
settlement by Jews. Some day all these places may be 
successfully settled by some people or another. But 


mass-settlement by Jews is not a vision of the radiant 
future when water, soil and climate will obey man's 
will The Jewish exodus is a need of tomorrow, a 
literal tomorrow; it has its inherent conditions and 
limitations, due partly to the nature of the Jew as he 
is today, partly to the nature of other peoples as they 
are today, and partly to the technique of mass-settle- 
ment as it is today; it is still an extremely difficult and 
uphill undertaking. It is very questionable whether 
British Guiana is of today. 

The most interesting of all the "territorial" projects 
is the proposal to settle not British Guiana but West- 
ern Australia. One of the most remarkable features of 
this scheme is that its advancement is due to the sole 
effort of one single man, and this man is neither young 
nor wealthy. Nor is he skilled in the kind of nuisance 
known as propaganda. His only secret seems to be just 
that calm obstinacy which still wants today what it 
wanted yesterday. His name is Dr. I. Steinberg. In 
Russia, long ago, he was a prominent member of a 
party with a formidable name the Socialist-Revolu- 
tionary Party;* S.R. for short. It was the non-Marxist 
wing of Russian Socialism. The Bolsheviks wiped it 
out. Before that happened Dr. Steinberg managed to 
hold a ministerial post in one of the transitional gov- 
ernments. Now he lives in London. At some time in 
the course of the last decade he formed, or perhaps 
only joined, a group called the "Freeland League for 
Jewish Territorial Colonization/' Last year he went to . 
Australia and actually converted a State of the Corn- 


monwealth to his views. The story is a striking one, 
for it shows that very important political results can be 
accomplished single-handed by one quite unofficial 
person, with little popular backing and no particular 
credentials, without any use of the witchcraft known 
as personal magnetism: simply by talking timely com- 
mon sense. 

That Dr. Steinberg has converted practically the 
whole of West Australia is undeniable. There is a vast 
waste territory lying along the northern half of the 
continents' north-western sea coast known as "the 
Kimberleys." The districts which the Freeland League 
has under consideration are Ivanhoe and Argyle in the 
Ord River region, which belongs to West Australia, 
and Newry and Auvergne in the North Australian 
territory, but these are probably not the final limits 
of the scheme. The whole area which could be claimed 
for colonization is probably larger than England and 
Wales. It is practically uninhabited. The West 
Australian, Perth's leading daily, voiced what seems to 
be the general opinion, admitting, in a lengthy edi- 
torial, that neither Australians nor British immigrants 
judging by all the experience of the last few dec- 
adescould be expected to make a success of opening 
up that part of the continent; and as Australia, for 
various reasons, including that of safety, ought not to 
tolerate any longer an unpopulated North, the Jews 
were greatly to be preferred to any other non-British 
stock. This view was supported by representative 
men and women of all classes; it even appears that a 
resolution was passed in the State's Legislative Assem- 


bly endorsing the scheme, and asking the Common- 
wealth authorities to consider it favourably. 

The full scope of the scheme has not been defined 
in precise figures, neither the number of square 
miles which would be needed ultimately, nor the 
number of immigrants ultimately to be brought in. 
Before the Perth Chamber of Commerce Dr. Stein- 
berg said that "if six to seven million acres could be 
obtained on Ord River, it would be possible there to 
establish a Jewish settlement backed with pastoral and 
agricultural activities/' As to the numbers of the im- 
migrants, he was always careful to insist that at first 
only some 500 to 600 young pioneers, men and 
women, would be sent out to test possibilities and 
methods. Later on he envisaged a settlement of about 
ten thousand. In another address he mentioned 75,000 
and 100,000 as a more remote aim, but he did not say 
that this was the final limit. In an interview "he 
visualized a new British province well established in 
ten to fifteen years." The ultimate goal of the Free- 
land League is of course a Jewish State roomy enough 
to absorb a real exodus. The Australian sympathizers, 
intelligent people and themselves descendants of im- 
migrant colonists, obviously understand this; more- 
over, as one of the reasons for their sympathy is their 
fear of a Japanese invasion, it is clear that in consid- 
ering colonization schemes they think not in terms of 
thousands, but rather of hundreds of thousands, at the 
very least. 

What is not so clear as the fact of Australian 
sympathy is the question as to whether the area is 


suitable for European pioneers. The West Australian's 
favourable editorial, in enumerating the causes of pre- 
vious failures, referred to "isolation, transport difficul- 
ties, stock pests and diseases, and an unfriendly 
climate/' But in the same article this half of the 
Kiinberley division of the State was described as a 
'Veil-watered area of large rivers and fertile valleys, 
almost unknown and completely unpopulated except 
by natives." On the other hand, Dr. Steinberg himself 
admitted in a speech to the Perth Labour Women's 
Organization that "the site picked was not exactly a 
pleasant place, and he was sure that Australians would 
never go there in effective numbers to work . . ." As 
to whether the new settlers could stand the climate, 
it was explained that "there are five winter months 
which are quite pleasant; two months are extremely 
hot and dry, and five months are hot and humid/' 
(The area is situated, roughly, between 12 and 20 
South.) In an interview with the Melbourne Age, Dr. 
Steinberg, referring to the water supply, qualified the 
optimism of the West Australian by stating that "in 
the wet season there were good streams and lakes in 
evidence, and water conservation would not be a 
difficult project" Mr. A. C. Angelo, of Carnarvon, 
an enthusiastic supporter of the scheme, also spoke 
guardedly of this aspect of the site: "there are miles 
of good water in the Ord River above the tidal limit, 
and thousands of acres fertile and easy to irrigate." 

All this, of course, would be taken into account 
if the scheme ever came to be finally entertained as 
practicable and officially accepted. No doubt it would 


be found to be bristling with difficulties, and would 
require as astronomical an outlay as any other similar 
project; but such difficulties cannot be avoided so 
long as the suitable territory is outside Palestine; and 
all such obstacles to colonization will surely be over- 
come in the more or less remote future. 

The real obstacle to the Freeland League's Austral- 
ian scheme lies elsewhere. That obstacle was men- 
tioned, without exception, in all favourable comments 
printed or spoken throughout Dr. Steinberg's cam- 
paign: not as an unsurmountable hindrance, but 
simply as a difficulty of secondary importance; and as 
such the Freeland League's delegate treated it in his 
replies as an apprehension which can easily be re- 
moved. In this respect, we fear, both sides were mis- 
taken. The obstacle may prove not of secondary but 
of primary and overwhelming importance; and of the 
only two means by which it can be removed, the Jews 
are not likely to accept the first nor the Australian 
Commonwealth the second. 

The nature of that obstacle had better be illustrated 
by a few quotations: 

The West Australian's editorial asks "whether the 
Jewish colonists, once admitted, will be content to 
stay in the settlement; whether there would be a 
serious risk of their migrating south in large numbers 
and attacking Australian industrial standards from 
the sheer necessity of earning a livelihood." 

Mr. A. Thompson, member of the Legislative 
Council, an expert on the Kimberleys and a sympa- 
thizer of the scheme: "It may be argued that the 


Jews might tend to drift southwards after experiencing 
the hard work of development I think that could be 
regulated easily by agreement and the issue of permits 
from the State or Commonwealth authorities/' 

Mr. Latham, also a sympathizer, the leader of the 
opposition in the State's Legislative Assembly, uttered 
a warning during the Address-in-Reply debate: "The 
Government must be careful, however, that these 
people did not come South and provide additional 
labour for a market which did not want them. Some 
agreement should be entered into with these people, 
by which if they left the settlement they would have 
to go overseas/' 

And so on, without one single exception. 

Dr. Steinberg seems to have fully realized the para- 
mount importance of this apprehension, and the 
necessity of allaying it. Whether the solution he pro- 
posed was a satisfactory one remains to be seen. In 
addressing the Labour women at Perth he "spoke of 
the suggested possibility that these new settlers might 
compete in the Southern areas for work. . . . He said 
that, first of all, this settlement would not be a sep- 
arate section but would be incorporated in the Austral- 
ian Commonwealth; and guarantees would be given 
to the Government that they would remain there for 
at least five years." 

The solution is anything but a happy one. The 
promise that the settlement area will be "incorporated 
in the Commonwealth" can only intensify the fear: 
for it would only make it easier for disappointed set- 
tlers to move to Perth or Melbourne or Sydney. Dr. 


Steinberg's remedy is simply to prohibit these settlers 
from travelling outside their reservation, at least dur- 
ing the first five years. They would have to be is- 
sued special passports before they could leave; the 
reservation's boundary would have to be watched; and 
the police in the southern cities would have the right 
to track offenders and send them back to the reserva- 
tion, oras Mr. Latham suggested make them "go 
overseas/ 7 There is nothing new in such an arrange- 
ment: essentially it is the system applied in the case of 
natives in the Union of South Africa, or mutatis 
mutandis -of Jews in Tsarist Russia, where they had 
to remain in the Pale of Settlement and were forbidden 
to enter the central provinces of the empire. 

Doubtless Dr. Steinberg and his colleagues on the 
Freeland League's executive, when they realize all the 
implications of such a "guarantee," will themselves" 
reject such a solution. Nor is any Australian Govern- 
ment, in view of the country's fine Liberal traditions, 
likely to agree to so dubious an experiment. 

The only other solution would be to promote the 
settlement area from the start to the dignity of an 
independent State, divided from the Commonwealth 
by an international frontier with a proper visa control 
on both sides. The settlers would then bear no stigma 
of civic inferiority; but the other drawbacks would be 
so serious that no one is likely to propose this solution 
to an Australian Government. 

This is no doubt the main reason why last January 
an official answer to an M,P/s question was given in 


the Commonwealth Parliament to the effect that the 
Government rejected the Kimberley scheme. 

Readers should not be surprised that so much space 
is given to this particular project. It deserves attention 
not only because of the honesty and devotion of its 
promoters, but also and more especially because the 
same sort of objections apply not only to Australia but 
to all "territorialist" schemes outside Palestine. 



THIS title is intended to cover all projects present 
and future, to find a "suitable territory" outside 
Palestine where a Jewish State or province could be 
established. On the termination of the war the Jewish 
State must be established by international action: 
the State itself, not a commission for geographical 
research. Research must precede the end of the war; 
and one may add, with grim satisfaction, that it seems 
likely that there will be plenty of time for such re- 
search. The Evian Committee is quite competent to 
carry out the preliminary geographical quest, and it 
could not do better to justify its existence than by 
preparing the solution of the only refugee problem of 
historical significance. 

The author does not believe in the reality of any 
"territorialist" projects for Jewish settlement outside 
Palestine; in his opinion, any search for other suitable 
areas will be hopeless. But the quest should neverthe- 
less be treated with the fullest respect, even by the 
most zealous and uncompromising Zionists. Logically, 
it is in their interest to encourage the closest scrutiny 
of all non-Palestinian schemes. 



There is a well-known Anglo-Saxon prejudice against 
the application of logic in politics; a mistaken preju- 
dice. Life is always infallibly logical. Logic, however, 
is a complicated concept, as tortuous as the concept 
"arithmetic/' There is a story of the Russian peasant 
who once propounded this mathematical theory: 
"Four and four make eight, with this I can agree; some 
say that five and three also make eight but that's a 
Jewish trick/ 7 He would be astounded to learn that 
629 minus 1,000 plus the square root of 625 plus 64 
plus 30 times nine plus 20 also makes eight. 

Still more involved are the methods of political 
logic. In this problem of a "suitable territory," in 
particular, one should be warned against lapses into 
simplified bucolic arithmetic. The chain of ideas with 
which life's logic in this case will have to operate is 
composed of three main links: 

(a.) Inevitability of the exodus. 

(b) No exodus possible except to a Jewish State. 

(c) No suitable site for the Jewish State but one. 

In this chain every link is of equal importance; 
should one of them break, it is the end of the chain. 
This is why it would not be wise to imagine that point 
"c" can be suppressed. Even Herzl and Nordau, the 
founders of modern Zionism, had to pass through the 
phase of looking for the Fata Morgana Land before 
Chey realized the objective inevitability of the one and 
pnly "site/' Today many Christian minds are going 
through the same process, and it would be a great mis- 


take to betray irritation or impatience because they 
have not yet reached the final stage. 

As to the outcome of the search, provided it be 
conducted in good faith, there is no need for anxiety: 
the outcome is pre-ordained. 

The first consideration which might make one 
sceptical as to the chances of such a quest is this: 
Seeing that so many territories are now being men- 
tioned as suitable for the Jews, why is it that no govern- 
ment ever thought of proposing one of them through 
all the years that have elapsed since the Great War? 

Jews as nation-builders were most prominently "in 
the market' ' throughout this period; and not a bad 
"proposition" either. All governments, and all readers 
of the Press, were infallibly aware of at least two facts 
about Palestine: first that for years Jewish coloniza- 
tion had been bringing to that country an unprece- 
dented influx of gold; secondthat all this time the 
Palestinian Jews were having trouble with the Arabs 
and friction with the British administration. In homely 
parlance, here was a case of a bride with quite an ap- 
petizing dowry, who, judging by all that one hearid, 
might safely be assumed to feel displeased with her 
fiance. This is a situation which invariably attracts 
attention in the matrimonial market and elicits other 
tentative offers. Why has nothing of the kind occurred 
in our case? 

The first fact the influx of gold was known 
throughout the world, especially to the governments. 
Between 1922 and 1936, above all since 1925, consuls, 


bankers, reporters and travellers had emphasized the 
fact in every language. The second factthe per- 
sistence of trouble was even better known, having 
been lavishly advertised, with sensational embellish- 
ments, in 1920, 1921 and 1929, and almost daily after 
April 1936. Why was there never a competing offer: 
Here is another territory, every bit as good as yours, 
or better (certainly not worse); why not change over, 
and bring your gold, and have no trouble? 

The only explanation, purely deductive but difficult 
to evade, is that there are no such "suitable" territories 
in the market: there is no territory combining in itself 
all those characteristics which are necessary to make 
it "suitable." This brings us to the question: what are 
those characteristics? 

A territory (outside Palestine) suitable for the 
establishment of the Jewish State must satisfy, at 
least from the Gentile's point of view, three essential 
requirements; from the standpoint of the Jew there 
may be other requirements; but here, in this chapter, 
the problem is examined pragmatically, with the strict- 
est elimination of sentimental idiosyncrasies. Briefly, 
the three requirements are these: 

(a) the territory must be empty; 

(b) it must be good; 

(c) it must be of no value to its present owners. 

The first condition must not be taken literally no 
land is absolutely "empty": but the population on the 


spot must be insignificant Where there is a consid- 
erable settled population the same trouble would be 
bound to arise as with the Arabs in Palestine. It would 
not matter who these natives might be: even if they 
were Haussas or Hereros, there would still be trouble. 
If they themselves were unable to write to the news- 
papers they would find white-skinned protectors (Eng- 
lish, most probably) who would take up the cudgels on 
their behalf, andquite justly confront the govern- 
ment with a difficult ethical problem: "If it is unfair 
to give the Jews a country sparsely populated by Arabs, 
why is it right to give them a country sparsely popu- 
lated by negroes?" 

The second requisitethe territory must be "good" 
means that it must be suitable for colonization by 
average Europeans. Greenland is empty, but so far, 
thank God, it has not been offered. An honest Chris- 
tian woman, Mrs. Franklin Roosevelt, recently said: 
"If a land is to be found for the Jews, it must be a 
land fit for white men to live in." Where other white 
pioneers have failed completely (and this, generations 
ago, when man was much less of a tenderfoot than 
now), Jewish colonists would obviously stand little 
chance, apart from all sentimental considerations. 
There may be quite a spate of preliminary nonsense 
about equatorial valleys and arctic ridges, but after 
serious scrutiny no government or commission will 
sponsor such an offer, simply because serious people 
hate making fools of themselves. Their belief in the 
Jews' genius for really rough pioneering is probably 
not excessive, and one may be sure that neither in 


Labrador nor in the forests between the Orinoco and 
the Amazon will they look for the suitable territory. 
They will look for something really "good." 

As for the third condition that it must be a terri- 
tory of no value to its present owners this can be 
taken literally. The Australian example is conclusive. 
The same apprehension is bound to arise wherever 
there is a common frontier between the owners 7 coun- 
try and the Jewish province. This is probably why the 
Guiana proposal is so popular with its British spon- 
sors: the colony is entirely isolated, so that the danger 
that the settlers would invade any British territory 
would be nil. But in every other case the State that , 
offers the Jews a territory must begin by renouncing 
it completely must make it an independent country 
from the start, not just virtually but formally. The 
Australians' fear of "failures coming South" is based 
on hard experience. In modern agricultural coloniza- 
tion there will inevitably be a large proportion of 
failures, and these must inevitably gravitate toward 
the large towns. In Australia this has been experienced 
over and over again: her cities are full of such deserters 
from stations in the bush. One of the latest disap- 
pointments was the settlement of Theodore on the 
Dawson River. It was started by the Government in 
1927. It had many advantages over the Kimberley 
project: it was not in the tropics, there was a total 
rainfall of 28 inches, water from the Dawson provided 
for nine irrigations a year, and the expenditure was 
eight thousand pounds per settler, which is a generous 
figure. Yet before long, more than half the settlers had 


failed: out of 264 in 1927, only 124 of the settlers 
were still carrying on in 1935 ("many of them in a 
state of poverty and discontent/' says Professor Grif- 
fith Taylor in Mr. Isaiah Bowman's report on Limits 
of Land Settlement, published by the American Coun- 
cil on Foreign Relations). Now the quitters are, of 
course, in Brisbane, Newcastle and Adelaide, or even 
in Sydney and Melbourne. As long, however, as they 
were Anglo-Saxons, the Australians did not mind so 
terribly. But to have their towns flooded with Jews 
would be quite a different thing (and the Jews would 
be full of complaints if Tel Aviv were similarly threat- 
ened by an Aryan wave). 

With the best will in the world, no friendly govern- 
ment is likely to grant the Jews a territory unless it 
can be cut off from the national territory cut off so 
sharply and completely that the boundary would be 
actually impenetrable save with a special passport, in 
special cases, and for a limited period. As the Russian 
method is evidently out of question, there remains 
only the other expedient: cession of sovereignty. The 
Jewish territory must become, formally and legally, 
a separate independent State from the outset of the 
experiment Not an "autonomous" province, not a 
"canton" in a federated commonwealth: for between 
the provinces of the same state, between the cantons 
of the same federation, the free intermigration of 
citizens cannot be prohibited without establishing a 
pariah class, introducing internal passports, and poi- 
soning and degrading the whole civic atmosphere. 
Entry can be forbidden, in a decent modern com- 


munity, only to "aliens," to people who come from 
"abroad/' The Jewish territory must be legally and 
politically "abroad/' 

There is nothing impossible in such a separation- 
provided the territory has no value in the eyes of the 
nation that owns it But that would be very strange 
in the case of a tract of land fulfilling the first two 
requirements. "Uninhabited" plus "habitable" is a 
value, and rather an enviable one. To look for a land 
combining such three mutually incompatible attri- 
butes as "uninhabited," "habitable," and "valueless" 
is not a hopeful quest. In the author's opinion there 
is only one such country, the Fata Morgana Land. 

"But does Palestine answer any of those three 
criteria?" is the question one expects at this stage. 
"Why should Palestine be preferred?" 

The "choice" of Palestine has nothing whatever to 
do with any such criteria. Zionists will joke freely 
about Palestine's natural drawbacks as a country for 
pioneers: they will readily confess that it is by no 
means the best kind of "colonial proposition," that 
there are countries much more suitable for the pur- 
poseand that all this does not matter in the least, 
and has no bearing on the question. Still more readily 
do they admit that the local Arabs* unwillingness to 
welcome the transformation is a very regrettable fact, 
and that things would be much easier if it did not 
exist; but since it does exist it will have to be over- 
come, however costly this may prove. This is an atti- 
tude that has nothing to do with any search or quest 


or choice. To "find" or "select" a country, one com- 
pares values, advantages and obstacles, and one ends 
without any parti pris by preferring that which offers 
the greatest attractions and the least resistance (and 
it is perhaps inevitable that the thing that "attracts 
and does not resist" cannot be anything but a mirage) . 
Palestine does not even pretend to compete with any 
other country in points of attraction, or ease of access, 
or cheapness of colonization. The author fully shares 
his generation's dislike of totalitarian patriotism, but 
there are desperate situations where no "choice" is 
left, and the only attitude for a decent man to take is, 
right or wrong my country. With much greater 
justification, a people foundering in chaos is entitled 
to say: good or bad, easy or hard, cheap or costlymy 

Incidentally, it will prove not so costly, not so hard, 
and even not so bad. 





WHY discuss Palestine? Is there not a truce? 
It would be empty hypocrisy to pretend that 
there is a truce in the debate on the proper interpreta- 
tion of the Palestine Mandate. There ought to be 
one until the common danger is over; there ought to 
be a firm determination to respect the legal status 
quo, bad as it is, with no attempts to steal a march on 
the opposition; there ought to be, but there is not. 

On the outbreak of the war, at one of those mo- 
ments when even experienced people are liable to be 
sentimentally trustful and confiding, the writer and 
his political associates frankly expected an immediate 
truce between the Zionist movement and the Colonial 
Office. True, they spoke of Palestine as the Jewish 
State in that appeal to world Jewry quoted at the be- 
ginning of this book: but that was a war-cry: it is in 
the usual tradition to proclaim one's highest ideal in 
calling for the utmost effort and sacrifice. We expected 
that soon the real business of the war, the efforts and 
the sacrifices, would begin for the Jews as one of the 
Allied nations; and above all, that Jewish troops would 
be raised on the precedent of the Great War. That 
so we thoughtwould make all verbal claims superflu- 



ous; a much stronger claim to a place "on the map" 
would be staked out in the actual firing line. A nation 
with soldiers at the front can afford to leave argument 
alone until negotiations for a settlement begin; in the 
meantime, the less her spokesmen say the more plainly 
will her soldiers speak for her. In September we were 
quite ready to plunge into war work and withdraw 
the political batteries: assuming, of course, that the 
batteries would be withdrawn by the other side also, 
and that our war effort was wanted. 

In both these assumptions we were mistaken. The 
Jews' war effort is not wanted; there is no desire to 
treat them as an Allied nation, or merely as a nation, 
or any sort of entity at all; and in Palestine the bom- 
bardment of the status quo from the opposite side is 
hotter than ever. For, even if there is quibbling as to 
what a status quo does or does not include in circum- 
stances complicated by three years' rioting, one thing 
is beyond a doubt: the legal status quo ante in Pales- 
tine cannot include active encroachments by a White 
Paper which has never been ratified, never even dis- 
cussed by the Council of the League of Nations. 

A formal attempt to elucidate this question was 
made by the writer and his political associates as 
early as September loth, one week after war had been 

declared, in a document: 


Calling the attention of ELM. Government to the 
fact that since the September session of the League of 
Nations Council had been postponed sine die, no legal 


validity could even provisionally be attached to last 
May's White Paper on Palestine. 

This view has already been submitted to the 

Colonial Secretary; but this matter, especially under 

war time conditions, obviously transcends the com- 

, petence of one single department and should be 

brought to the notice of the Government as a whole. 

. . . The Permanent Mandates Commission was 
unanimous in recognizing that the [White Paper's] 
policy was not in accordance with the interpretation 
of the Palestine Mandate hitherto adopted by the 
Council of the League of Nations. Even that minority 
of three, who felt that the Council might perhaps not 
refuse, at its impending session, to change its former 
view and adopt the White Paper's interpretation, also 
agreed that that would mean a change. 

It is obvious, now that the Council's meeting has 
been postponed, that the Mandatory Government has 
no authority whatever to make changes of such a scope 
in the interpretation of a Mandate whose only authori- 
tative interpreter (and the British Government admits 
it) is the Council. 

. . . The only correct way is to treat the White 
Paper as in English law one would treat a Bill approved 
by Ministers but not yet granted assent by King in 
Parliament; and, in the meantime, it is obviously the 
former interpretation which should form the basis of 

Some ten days later, the authors of this interpella- 
tion were informed, on unimpeachable authority, that 
it was the policy of the White Paper which was 
deliberately meant to hold the field. 


So it does, at least in the Mandatory Government's 
admitted intention. The restrictions on the sale of land 
to "non Arabs" in 94.8 per cent of Western Palestine's 
area announced at the end of February are bad and 
wicked enough in themselves; but their especial venorn 
is in the fact that they have been officially introduced 
as implementing the "Statement of Policy of May, 


This business deserves attention quite apart from 
the Palestine issue: it forms such a strange little dis- 
sonance in the solemn oratorio which declares the 
duty of the mighty to respect the Covenant and the 
supreme authority of the League, always to await 
Geneva's verdict, and never, by unilateral action to 
employ the trick of the fait accompli, least of all 
against the weak. . . . The dissonance might pass un- 
noticed in the roar of great events, except in the little 
corner which the weak inhabit: yet it is like one of 
those tiny squeaks which prove that somewhere some- 
thing is wrong in the great machine. 

In the field of administrative practice there have 
for long been many disquieting signs that the Pales- 
tine bureaucracy feels inspired, even without waiting 
for legal sanction, to treat the White Paper as its only 
guide-book. This tendency has been especially con- 
spicuous in two directions. The first is that of immi- 
gration. In all negotiations as to the numbers to be 
admitted or refused, the officials in Jerusalem and 
London openly quote the White Paper as their au- 


thority: the White Paper established that 25,000 refu- 
gees might be allowed to enter, with certain provisos. 
The White Paper definitely prohibited the increase of 
such and such quota. . . . The moral result of this 
conscious, deliberate, calmly assertive disregard of le- 
gality in exalted quarters will be what it always must 
be at the first opportunity: lawlessness beneath the 
surface, and in all directions. 

Some other practical results are already visible; 
results which, despite the reticence of the British Press, 
have become known and have produced a painful im- 
pression: but the actual experience has unfortunately 
been a thousand times more painful. Between October 
1939 and February 1940, over 2,000 Jewish refugees 
were detained on the Danube, marooned on four old 
barges. None of the four was fit to contain even fifty 
human passengers: they had to accommodate 500 to 
600 each, including many women and children. Before 
those people boarded the barges, probably at Bratis- 
lava, steamers had been chartered to take them on 
board at the Danube estuary and convey them "il- 
legally" to Palestine; so the barge trip was meant to 
last only a few days a trip downstream from Bratis- 
lava to the Black Sea shore, in the mild autumn 
weather of the Balkan plains. But "official influences/' 
the source of which is only too easy to identify, inter- 
vened at Ankara and Athensand the chartered steam- 
ers, owned by Turkish and Hellenic subjects, were 
forced to denounce their contracts and withdraw. To 
replace them proved for many months impossible, for 


apart from the official pressure from the readily iden- 
tified sourcefreights were mounting day by day to 
fabulous heights, partly on account of the privileged 
position of the Mediterranean in the war. What espe- 
cially drives the freight charges upward in the "illegal" 
immigration business is its own peculiar "war risk": for 
if such a ship is caught in Palestine's territorial waters, 
the captain and crew will go to jail and the vessel will 
be confiscated. So these 2,000 were stuck in the Dan- 
ube estuary, permitted neither to land, nor to sail on, 
nor to sail back. In the meantime winter came and the 
river froze. People who were allowed to bring food to 
the barges, earnestly and soberly report that some fea- 
tures of the refugees' plight were definitely worse than 
anything experienced in the Nazi concentration 
camps: for weeks and weeks on end in the horrible 
cold of this memorable winter, there was no possibil- 
ity of exercise, of even stretching the limbs, since the 
authorities on shore prohibited the refugees from land- 
ing, as their visas were only for transit via the Danube, 
which is an international waterway. One at least of the 
barges was a disused oil tanker, whose unpanelled iron 
walls sweated moisture which turned to ice. Two 
babies were born on that tanker. 

A significant feature is the action of some ladies of 
the Bucharest British colony, headed by Miss Boyd 
(headmistress of the English high school), Miss Gadge 
and Mrs. Wallie: they collected donations from 
among the members of the colony and provided 100 
beds for the babies and the old people, beside warm 


clothing and 75,000 lei. A stream of donations came 
from the Balkanic Jewish communities, and from the 
Jews of the United States and France and South 
Africa. At the time of writing this chapter, early in 
February, the marooned refugees have been enabled 
to leave: by how many steamers, of what tonnage, in 
what conditions, and at what cost all these details, 
probably as notable in their way as those of the Danu- 
bian stage of their adventure, will only be told when 
their wanderings are over.* 

The "closed door" policy which is the cause of all 
this misery has no justification either in moral con- 
science or in law.t 

From the moral point of view, Palestine should be 
the last country to reject Jewish war fugitives. So far 
she has been spared by the war, in comparison not only 
with the countries from which those refugees fled, but 
even with many a neutral land. She would only be 
"doing her bit" if she served as a refugee camp: even 
apart from all question of a National Home, it would 
be a great service to the Allies and to Europe. Lithu- 
ania, with not one-tenth of the financial resources 
which Palestine can summon for the purpose from all 

* These refugees eventually reached Palestine on February 14, 
1940. The author's son, who had been instrumental in guiding the 
refugees to Palestine, was imprisoned by the Palestine Government 
for this crime. He was still in prison when Vladimir Jabotinsky died 
in August 1940. 

t The "closed door" policy of the Palestine Administration was 
manifested in an even more drastic manner by the deportation of 
2,000 Jewish refugees who managed to reach the shores of Palestine, 
to the island of Mauritius. 


parts of the world, opens her gates almost daily to 
fugitives crowding over her so-called "green boundary" 
near Vilna, Why is Palestine exempted? * 

As regards the law if the Mandate is the lawthe 
Mandate prescribes that the immigration of Jews be 
encouraged "under suitable conditions." What condi- 
tions can ever be more "suitable" than those of the 
present day? Here are people uprooted by disaster; all 
civilized humanity sympathizes with their agony; half 
the world's governments are searching for regions in 
which refugees could be absorbed; half a million Jews 
in 300 settlements are eagerly offering to look after 
the newcomers, and the charitable funds of all Jewry 
are ready to help them. But the Mandate has been 
supersededby an illegal document. 

In another direction the governmental policy is even 
more disturbing: the attempt to paralyze the Jewish 
self-defence organization. There is unfortunately no 
other explanation for two recent events: forty-two Jews 
were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for 
armed drilling in November, and thirty-eight more in 
January. There is no precedent for this action in the 
history of Palestine under British rule since 1920. In 
that year, twenty-one Jews were sentenced to penal 

*"~* It is worth while to point out that Palestine was not "exempted" 
as far as non-Jewish refugees were concerned. It served as a welcome 
refuge for Polish, Greek, Yugoslav and other fugitives of war. Only 
for Jewish war fugitives did its doors remain shut. The recently re- 
ported fate' of the 768 passengers of the S. S. Struma, who were 
refused permission to enter Palestine and forced baclc into the Black 
Sea only to find there a watery grave, demonstrated that this "exemp- 
tion" with regard to the Jews is still in full force* 


servitude by a military court on a charge of preparing 
for armed self-defence; but the proceedings of that 
court were afterwards ruthlessly quashed by the Army 
Council. Since then no attempt had been made, either 
by the civil or the military authorities in Palestine, to 
hamper the development of the force. Its existence 
was known to the authorities; during the anti-Jewish 
riots of 1921 and 1929 the British police and military 
actually collaborated with what Tommies called "Jew- 
ish patrols"; during the 19361939 troubles this Jew- 
ish militia rendered invaluable service to the Govern- 
ment and the troops, both by providing trained men 
for the official auxiliary police and by autonomous 
action. Instances can be quoted when Jewish leaders 
were cordially thanked by the British military authori- 
ties. What has happened since then to cause this 
attempt to suppress "Jewish illegal drilling"? 

The only new thing that has happened since the 
outbreak of the war ought to have produced quite the 
opposite result an increase of mutual confidence be- 
tween the Government and the Jewish self-defence. 
One section of the latter, the "Irgun" (its full title is 
"the National Military Organization" ), had been held 
responsible for active mass reprisals against the Arab 
terror in 1937- 1939; it was the only section of the 
Jewish self-defence forces which could really be called 
"clandestine," and not merely unofficial like the re- 
mainder; and it possessed a secret broadcasting station 
in the country, which was used for warnings, an- 
nouncements and propaganda. A few days after the 
outbreak of the war, the "Irgun" broadcasted a declara- 


tion of loyalty to the Allies, of willingness to co-operate 
with the Government for the defence of Palestine, and 
on any other front, and of a resolve to "cease fire" and 
call a truce with the Arabs. In official circles this 
change of heart was acknowledged; one might even 
say that in some respects it was handsomely acknowl- 
edged. What has happened since to explain the fact 
that a few weeks later it was to be rewarded by some- 
thing that looks like a minor crusade? 

The thing is without precedent in Palestine or else- 
where. The only other country in which Jewish self- 
defence had ever functioned as a permanent institution 
was Tsarist Russia. In 1905, in Odessa, the author was 
present when the Oxford-blue uniformed gendarmerie, 
the Tsar's equivalent of the present Ogpu, invaded the 
flat of a Jewish family at night in search of revolu- 
tionary literature. Of that they found none, but they 
found a parcel of freshly-printed manifestoes bearing 
the name of a Jewish self-defence organization a per- 
fectly illegal bodyurging the Jews to arm and drill 
and resist pogroms. "This is none of my business," said 
the officer in charge, waving the parcel away; ''this has 
nothing to do with subversive political activity/' 

So matters continued until the fall of the Roman- 
offs. I do not recollect a single instance of a serious 
police attack on Jewish self-defence bodies or their 
modest arsenals. There was some queer strain of 
brigands' fair play in the psychological make-up of that 
police system: the police never stopped a pogrom, and 
were often suspected of staging one, but at least they 


felt that the Jews ought to be given a chance to fight 
the pogroms. 

After the Tsar's downfall, Odessa the largest Jew- 
ish community in the Ukraineduring two years of 
the civil war (1918-19) was garrisoned by a volunteer 
body called the Jewish Battle Company. It was uni- 
formed, lived in barracks, and was rather well armed. 
It was of course entirely illegal; but the thirteen gov- 
ernments that followed one another in occupying the 
city (the French, the Greeks, the White Russians, the 
Bolsheviks, the Ukrainians, etc.), all respected the ille- 
gal Jewish self-defence organization. Its organizer, S. Y, 
Jacobi, then a boy of twenty, settled subsequently in 
England, dreaming, some day, of repeating the experi- 
ence on a much larger scale, under the British aegis; 
but he died last November, and anyhow the British 
aegis does not seem to be available for the purpose. 

Neither the author nor anyone else would suggest 
that the regimes can be compared. But the fact re- 
mains that in Palestine the anti-Jewish terror had been 
allowed to drag on for years; there is no doubt that the 
Government genuinely wanted to stop it, and some 
may even admit that they "did all they could" to stop 
itbut apparently what they "could" was not enough. 
Why, then, should a decent administration fail to ob- 
serve an unwritten law which even Tsarism, even 
chaos, respected? 

The question was recently put, in formal writing, to 
the proper authority in London., The explanation 
elicited was to the effect that the competent authority 


is unable to admit that any justification exists for the 
illegal arming and military training of Jews in 

A curious attitude this, in the winter of 1939, after 
three years' experience had shown how little official 
protection can actually be given to Jewish settlements 
even in peace time; and less than ever is given now, 
when we are perhaps on the threshold of unpredicta- 
ble complications. More than ever now, preparedness 
for self-protection should be openly recognized as 
justifiable. In this attitude there is no logic, no justice, 
no elementary care for the safety of an exposed minor- 
ity: but there is method it is that of the White Paper 
policy, resentful of all things in any way reminiscent of 
the Jewish dream of Statehood. 

It would be ridiculous Quixotry for the Jew, who 
would have been the lesser partner in the truce, had 
there been a truce, to play the silly game of noblesse 
oblige when there is so obviously no truce. War or no 
war, the major partner has decided that the debate on 
Palestine's future shall continue, and we follow suit 



TO ACCUSE the Government of "stealing a 
march on the Jews" may not be complimentary, 
but that it is so engaged is the impression shared by all 
observers in Palestine, who are watching the inroads 
of the White Paper policy on the deteriorating status 
quo. Perhaps the most alarming aspect of this system 
of encroachment is its inevitable futility; for it is 
futile even from the standpoint of its authors and 
abettors. They produced the 1939 White Paper to 
placate the Palestinian Arabs; they are now showing 
the greatest eagerness to "implement" it, without even 
a show of legitimacy, and for the same reason in 
order that the Arab Nationalist party may be satisfied. 
These authors and abettors of the anti-Mandate policy 
attempt to silence all complaints by the same argu- 
mentthat this method can be relied upon to calm 
the Arabs and to keep them from insisting on further 

This optimistic outlook is illusory. The Jews have 
been deeply hurt and injured by the White Paper of 
May 1939, but it is not therefore safe to conclude that 
the Arabs have really been "bought" by its promises. 
Not a single Arab Nationalist in Palestine, no matter 



whether he be Husseini or Nashashibi, has ever for 
a moment been deceived into regarding the White 
Paper as in any way satisfactory except as a blow to 
the Zionists. He has never considered that it contains 
one single item of real and positive value in respect to 
Arab aspirations never regarded it as anything but a 
stepping-stone for tomorrow's renewed offensive. And 
in this negative appreciation, moreover, the Arabs, 
from their point of view, are perfectly justified: a blow 
to Jewish hopes, it is at the same time a blow to Arab 

It may be useful here to reproduce a short analysis 
of this White Paper as seen through the eyes of a 
group of intelligent Palestinian Arabs. It was conveyed 
to the writer immediately after the publication of that 
document, by reliable friends who are in close touch 
with Arab Nationalist circles; and its sound logic, 
which cannot but commend itself to the reader, is 
inner evidence of its reliability. 

From the Arab point of view, almost the only good 
thing in the White Paper is that it explicitly rejects 
the ideal of the Jewish State and promises to stop 
further immigration (or to make it dependent on the 
Arabs' consent, which amounts to the same thing) 
after 75,000 more Jews have been admitted over a 
period of five years. However, the decision to prohibit 
land sales to Jews, outside those districts which are 
already predominantly Jewish, is in itself a good thing 
although in this respect any law can easily be 
evaded. "No immigration" is a much more desirable 


boon: it is actually the main point, being even more 
essential than the rejection of the Jewish State princi- 
ple. Taking all three items together, this aspect of the 
White Paper policy is excellent provided it proves to 
be permanent. 

As to the permanent reliability of British White 
Papers on Palestine, the Arabs, judging by precedent, 
have no especial confidence. The official attitude to- 
wards the "Jewish State 7 ' claim, for instance, has been 
stated in quite a series of authoritative documents- 
each differing from the rest In 1922 the Churchill 
White Paper formulated the claim in five pages of 
prose so eloquent and so involved that no one could 
properly make out whether the government did or did 
not want to preclude the transformation of Palestine 
into a Jewish State: but later Mr. Churchill himself 
confessed to the Royal Commission that there was 
nothing in that text to preclude such a development. 
Then the Royal Commission found that the only way 
to fulfil the Mandate's obligation to the Jews was to 
give them a Jewish State somewhere in Palestine; and 
a 1937 White Paper, the Partition paper, was issued 
accordingly. A year later, the partition plan was dis- 
carded; and now, in 1939, there is a White Paper 
stating jthat the government is unequivocally opposed 
to the creation of a Jewish State. Very good; but one 
cannot help feeling uneasy as to whether this Paper is 
the last in what seems to be a series of contradictory 

For such it actually seems to be. Take the Legisla- 
tive Council issue. The 1922 White Paper "estab- 


listed" in Palestine a Legislative Council with an Arab 
majority; but another. White Paper, published also in 
1922, cancelled it. In 1930 the Passfield White Paper 
"established" it again, a Legislative Council with an 
Arab majority: and again it never came into existence. 
In 1935, the Wauchope White Paper promised it 
finally and definitelya Legislative Council with an 
Arab majority; and again nothing came of it; then the 
Royal Commission's Report stated that the scheme 
was impracticable; and now this new White Paper 
contains no promise of an elective legislature. Three 
White Papers wasted! 

Or take Jewish immigration. The 1922 White Paper 
promised to tone it down: at that time there were less 
than 100,000 Jews in Palestine. A few years later the 
number was doubled. Then, in 1930, the Simpson 
Report showed that no further immigration was eco- 
nomically permissible, the Passfield White Paper was 
published, and the Arabs hoped that the ''flood" would 
stop. At that time there were already 200,000 Jews. A 
few years later the number was again doubled: there 
were 400,000 in 1936, and there are nearly half a 
million now. One really must not be surprised if the 
Arabs sometimes think that "White Paper" and 
"waste paper" are synonymous. No doubt a White 
Paper gives a precise and genuine indication of what 
a government wanted when it was published; but that 
is no indication of what the government may want a 
year later. 

So, grateful as the Arabs were for all these good 
intentions, they would appreciate them much more if 


a White Paper contained a real guarantee that such 
intentions would not be abandoned at the next con- 
tingency. What constitutes a real guarantee? There is 
only one answer: an Arab government, and immedi- 
ately, before the wind has time to veer. 

This is only one reason why the Arabs wanted "an 
Arab government immediately"; even if only to 
"implement" the purely negative aspect of the White 
Paper the removal of the Jewish dangerit was, to 
them, indispensable. But this negative aspect of the 
matter was, of course, of only secondary importance. 
They are above all, patriots, and the paramount ques- 
tion to them is their positive ideal of the Arab State. 
This is what they had fought for during those difficult 
three years. They were diplomatic enough not to put 
it so bluntly as to speak of "Arab government"; their 
official formula sounded more moderate: "a govern- 
ment of Palestinians," in which the Jews would be 
invited to share, but in which the Arabs, of course, 
would be in the majority. But the main point was: 
this must come at once. The life of a White Paper is 
very short; when one has to deal with such fickle legis- 
lators one likes a cash payment. 

In this they were disappointed. The White Paper 
promises to grant Palestine "independence" what it 
calls "independence" only in ten years' time, and that 
only if the Mandatory government (of 1949) should 
find it advisable. Listen to this: "If, at the end of ten 
years, it appears to H.M. Government that, contrary 
to their hope, circumstances require the postponement 
of the establishment of the independent State" they 


will postpone it "with a view to achieving the desired 
objective at the earliest possible date/' Which means, 
say the Arabs, that if the Jews about that time begin 
to cry out that the Arabs are oppressing them, and 
provoke riots in a couple of towns with a few dozen 
casualties on both sides, and their friends in the 
House of Commons make the usual kind of speeches, 
there will be no "independence/ 7 From the Arab 
point of view, all this is a Jewish victory: the Jews 
always insisted that Palestine should become inde- 
pendent only when they should agree to it; and this 
is what the White Paper has promised them, in veiled 
but transparent terms. 

Still worse, from the Arab point of view, is the pic- 
ture of that independence itself if they ever live to 
see it as defined in the White Paper. Great Britain 
"will require to be satisfied that adequate provision has 
been made" for the following matters: 

(a) "The security of, and freedom of access to, the 
Holy Places, and the protection of the interests and 
property of the various religious bodies/' Every 
Palestinian knows what this means: administration of 
the walled City of Jerusalem and parts of Nazareth, 
Bethlehem and Hebron; control of the railways leading 
to these places; control of all arrangements regulating 
the relations between the various churches, including 
Moslem and Jewish. In particular, the Wailing Wall 
business will remain outside Arab jurisdiction. 

(b) "The protection of the different communities 
in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of 
H.M, Government to both Arabs and Jews and for 


the special position of the Jewish National Home." 
This means all the legislative and administrative activity 
regarding education, representation on municipalities, 
justice in cases where both peoples are affected, the 
rights of the two languages in public life, treasury 
grants to hospitals, and innumerable other items, cover- 
ing practically the whole field of public life in a country 
like Palestine. 

(c) "Such requirements to meet the strategic situa- 
tion as may be regarded as necessary . . ." In other 
words, military garrisons. 

(d) 'The interests of certain foreign countries . . ." 
In other words, a finger in Palestine's "independent" 
Foreign Office. 

For all this, the future constitution of Palestine will 
have to contain "adequate" safeguards. The Arabs 
think they know what this means. The British will say 
that, just as strategic responsibilities cannot be safe- 
guarded by paragraphs, but only by British soldiers, 
so all the other responsibilities can be safeguarded 
only by British officials. They will probably be called 
"advisers"; and every Arab knows what that means. 
They know that an adviser is a British official 
attached to a native minister, and without the ad- 
viser's signature no order of that minister is valid; so 
that the adviser is really the minister, and the minister 
not even an adviser. Judging by the number of mat- 
ters which will have to be safeguarded in this way, the 
Arab view is that, in comparison with this kind of 
independence, that which any provincial municipality 
enjoys would seem unfettered autocracy. 


The truth about the 1939 White Paper, from the 
Arab point of view, is this: it is an attempt virtually 
to annex Palestine to the British Empire for ever and 
ever, using the Jewish National Home as a justifica- 
tion. As it can always be claimed that the Jews are 
afraid of the Arabs (the Jews will claim it with pleas- 
ure, as long as they are in a. minority ), Great Britain's 
supervision would never cease. Whatever glorified 
name may be given that relationship alliance, for 
instance Palestine is to remain a British colony. This 
is the sense of the White Paper. Palestine will never 
be able to join an Arab Federationunless that Fed- 
eration too becomes "federated'' into the British 

It is obvious, from the Palestine Arabs' point of 
view, that this situation is entirely unacceptable. There 
has never been even a question of accepting it. Its 
only value in the eyes of the Arabs is its formal repu- 
diation of the Jewish State idea. As to the rest of the 
White Paper, the next step will be a concerted Arab 
effort to wipe out every line of it. 

The writer's interest is diametrically opposed to that 
of the Palestinian Arab Nationalists, and it is not his 
business to make out a case for them; moreover, as 
against the Jews he considers that they have no case 
at all, nor against a government firmly set on carrying 
out the Jewish National Home policy to its conclusion. 
But as against a policy aiming to bribe the Arabs by 
harming the Jews, the Arab case just quoted is unan- 
swerable; the bribe is not even illusory it simply does 


not exist. The White Paper has not satisfied, and 
could not have satisfied, the Palestinian Arabs. 

Which means, that at the first opportunity they 
can be expected to push their claims farther. This does 
not imply that the writer accuses them of disloyalty to 
the Allies: he prefers to assume that all the peoples in 
contact with Britain and France are united in one 
purpose, delenda est Carthago. India is so united; but 
India is pressing her demands at this moment, during 
the war; and the Moslems of India, being in a minor- 
ity, are alarmed. 

It remains for the Jews, then, to take up their side 
of the uninterrupted controversy. The future of Pales- 
tine is on the agenda of the day, by the will of factors 
for which we bear no responsibility; and no time 
should be lost in pressing the claim that Palestine, on 
both sides of the Jordan, is the only "suitable" site for 
that Jewish State which, being the only remedy against 
Europe's cancer, is the world's urgent need. 



THE late Max Nordau, Head's collaborator in 
founding political Zionism, was probably the most 
revolutionary thinker of the fin de sBcIe generation. In 
1919 he was old and ailing, his bitterly contested yet 
world-wide literary fame was half forgotten, but he 
was still a great intellectual force, with a rare wealth of 
erudition at his command. That was the honeymoon 
period of the Balfour Declaration, and Max Nordau 
came forward with a plan which should make the best 
use of it once and for all. It was a plan for the im- 
mediate and simultaneous transportation to Palestine 
of the first half million immigrants from the East 
European ghettos. 

The leading Jewish circles of the period did not 
respond, and the plan was forgotten. Now the time 
has arrived to revive it as the only practical and reason- 
able way of coping with a situation incomparably 
more urgent than that of 1919. Max Nordau's projects 
were concerned with Palestine only; so, in their true 
intentions, are the suggestions of the present writer; 
but for the sake of formal convenience, the following 
outline may be expressed in terms applicable to any 



"suitable area/' provided the area is to become the 
Jewish State and to absorb the great exodus. 

Adapted to present conditions, the Max Nordau 
Plan can be summarized as follows: 

(a) The whole exodus to take about ten years. 

(b) The first million settlers to be transferred within 

the first year or less. 

(c) All planning to be done during the war, so that 

work can start on the morrow of the peace con- 

Expressed in a form less abrupt, it would mean: 

(a) The transfer to the Settlement Country of all 
the Jews of East-Central Europe who may voluntarily 
register for the purpose shall be effected within a 
period not exceeding ten years. 

(b) The first million settlers, assembled and sum- 
marily trained, shall be transferred simultaneously, at 
the very outset of the migration, within the minimum 
time indispensable for the technical operation of trans- 
port, which shall not exceed one year. 

(c) All preliminary planning as to the methods of 
settlement, financial arrangements, and any other rele- 
vant matters, should be accomplished as far as possible 
during the war, by the Intergovernmental Committee 
on Refugees, reinforced through the addition of Jew- 
ish representatives, or by another suitable body to be 
established for the purpose. 

The actual transportation of the First Million to the 


Country of Settlement shall begin within the shortest 
possible interval after the close of hostilities, as soon as 
the necessary international loan has been raised and 
the draft of settlers ready for transporting completed. 

It is not the author's intention here to attempt a 
systematic presentation of the Max Nordau Plan. A 
good comprehensive outline, with almost more figures 
than text, was published by Dr. S. Klinger.* In the 
following paragraphs only some of the less specialized 
aspects of the scheme will be indicated. They are: 

(a) the tempo; 

(b) manufacture, not agriculture, as the basis of mass 

immigration economy; 
, (c) the method of planning; 
(d) the financial scheme. 

Twenty-one years ago, the criticism of Max Nor- 
dau's idea was based on the assumption that mass 
colonization "must" be a very slow process. This was 
then regarded as a "scientific" truth admitting of no 
exception. It can hardly be so regarded now, after all 
the experiences of the quick displacement of human 
masses since the Great War. The Greek exodus of 
700,000, so often quoted, is not the only example: be- 
tween 1919 and 1924, 2,450,000 persons in all changed 
places between the Balkans and Asia Minor, with re- 
sults which neutral observers hold to be much more 
satisfactory than the position that existed before the 

* The Ten Year Plan for Palestine, New Zionist Press, London, 


migration. Those masses were not only moved quickly 
they were very quickly absorbed in their new coun- 
tries' economy. 

Yet even if we accepted the alleged "rule" that the 
economic absorption of immigrants is a slow process, 
their actual transfer to the Country of Settlement can 
obviously be accelerated at will: and this is the essence 
of the Max Nordau Plan. 

Its advantages, quite apart from the Settlement 
Country, will be many and far-reaching. The tension 
in East-Central Europe will immediately be reduced. 
Roughly, 300,000 Jews will be at once assisted to emi- 
grate from Germany and Austria, 500,000 from Po- 
land, and 100,000 each from Hungary and Roumania. 
Still more effectual will be the assurance, inherent in 
the very essence of a Jewish State, that the process will 
continue: an assurance which will go a long way to- 
wards paralyzing racial strife. Weighed against this, all 
the hardships of an overcrowded Newland are a trifling 
matter, especially to people who, just recently, have 
known worse hardships. 

This effect of the exodus on the inter-racial atmos- 
phere in the Antisemitic Zone must be further 
strengthened and perpetuated by the rule that the best 
age for the First Million pioneers is the age of maxi- 
mum fertility. Among the Jews of Eastern Europe this 
is, approximately, from twenty-five to forty for men, 
from twenty-three to thirty-seven for women. The 
Zionist prejudice in favour of sweet seventeen will have 
to be discarded: at least two-thirds of the First Million 
will have to be in their early maturity rather than in 


their early youth. People of this age are quite adaptable 
for pioneer tasks in a not too exotic climate; and, as 
they are chiefly responsible for the nation's birth-rate, 
it is most important that they should not be left be- 
hind to refill the gap, but should do their best in the 
new country. 

In dealing with mass-migration of this character, 
one traditional premise of political economy must be 
disregarded: namely, the axiom that the basis of so- 
ciety is agriculture. That may be so, but it has no 
bearing on our mission. Here a different axiom domi- 
nates: the sinew of mass-migration economy, in our 
day, is industry. It is obvious that in a colonizing 
enterprise of such magnitude, especially when speed is 
imperative, agriculture, as an absorber of large immi- 
grant masses, is of only secondary value. The economy 
of mass immigration depends, above all, on manufac- 
tures and house-building; in a much less degree, on 
trade and transport; and least of all, on farming. 

This has nothing to do with the future of the 
colony: even if it is desired that the Settlement Coun- 
try should in the end become a predominantly bucolic 
community, yet in the beginning precedence will have 
to be given to industry, allowing agriculture to come 
last, and to grow slowly and conquer pride and place 
if it can. 

This rule is of predominant importance to every 
aspect of our colonization. 

It overrides the traditional attitude to soil and 
water. A flourishing industrial city, feeding thousands 


of people, can be built on stony soil where no farmer 
could thrive. Water of the poorest quality, unfit for 
the irrigation of fields, can be used in boilers to drive 
steam-engines. In agriculture it may not pay to carry 
the water in pipelines over long distances or to sink 
reservoirs for rainwater deep enough to reduce evapo- 
ration: but what is too expensive for the slow con- 
servative profits of cereal cultivation might prove worth 
while if it helps to produce manufactured goods. 

Geographical planningi.e. mapping out the sites 
on which the future centres of population shall be 
established also becomes much easier. It need no 
longer, in a country with few perennial rivers, be 
subordinated to the results of slow and uncertain 
borings for underground water: the suitable sites can 
be chosen for reasons immediately visible because 
they are near the coast, or because they are convenient 
as a marketing centre for a number of existing villages, 
or because there is a cross-roads, or a quarry near by. 
State-planning, when approached from this angle, be- 
comes almost akin to town-planning: future cities can 
be rationally marked upon the empty map of the State- 
area just as future green areas can be indicated on the 
uncompleted map of a projected town, and highways 
be traced with the same logical forethought as main 

Basing our calculations on the supremacy of indus- 
try has also another advantage: modern society spends 
incomparably more on the consumption of manufac- 
tured goods than on the consumption of agricultural 


produce. Immigrants concentrating on industry can 
supply a much larger proportion of the new Settle- 
ment's needs than if they devoted themselves chiefly 
to agriculture. 

The calculation, expressed schematically, is very 
simple. One million people will need a very large mass 
of non-agricultural and non-pastoral goods. Certain 
components of that mass will have to be imported, 
because the Settlement Country cannot supply them 
(e.g., raw materials or the heavier kinds of machinery) . 
But the balance can be provided locally, and the larg- 
est possible proportion of the whole must be provided 
by the First Settlement forces themselves. In other 
words, the scheme will be to let the First Million feed 
and clothe and house the First Million in the maxi- 
mum measure of possibility. 

This method of computing the First Settlement's 
economy will always retain very largely the nature of 
an abstract and schematic framework, and will have 
to be readjusted to realities. Nevertheless, the frame- 
work will prove most useful in helping to solve the 
fundamental problem of all new communities '''how 
will the people manage to live by taking in each other's 
washing?" All humanity lives' by "taking in each 
other's washing," without any outside financial help> 
as there is no other planet able to supply such help. 
The Jewish settlement will have the advantage of con- 
siderable outside assistance, represented by the Inter- 
national Loan, and subsequently, by the yearly income 
nities. But the basis of its initial economy must be an 
of national funds raised among the Western commu- 


attempt to approach as nearly as possible a provisional 

This indicates the character of the enterprises which 
should be started immediately: house-building, road- 
building, transportation, and all kinds of light industry 
to provide elementary consumers' goods simple cloth- 
ing, simple furniture, simple crockery and all other 
primary needs that can be satisfied "simply" by local 

A brief period will in practice elapse between the 
conclusion of the peace conference and the actual be- 
ginning of transportation: probably not less than a 
year. This period could be utilized to give the First 
Settlement candidates opportunities for rough train- 
ing in the rudiments of those branches of labour 
(mainly industrial and building) in which they are 
likely to engage after arrival in the country. Their 
output will be very poor at first, and therefore un- 
economical: but this, weighed in the proper balance, 
is a matter of little moment 

A very large international loan will have to be raised. 
The writer will not venture to guess how large it will 
have to be. In Dr. Klinger's outline, the total sum 
required for the settlement of the initial million is 
estimated at 47,500,000, including 18,000,000 of 
private investment by individual capitalists: but this 
estimate was made in January 1938, when conditions 
were very different from those that may be expected to 
exist at the end of the war* The amount which will be 
needed to finance all the aspects of the Max Nordau 


Plan will probably be much in excess of Dr. Klinger's 
estimate. How large a proportion of it will come from 
private investments will depend on whatever may then 
be left of the resources of the Jewish capitalist class, 
taken as a whole throughout the non-ruined areas of 
the Dispersion. 

The international loan will have to finance the 
following operations: 

(a.) Liquidation and transportation of the emigrants' 
property. Special organs will have to be established, 
probably banks, for granting the emigrant advances 
against any kind of property he may leave in their 
hands for liquidation. 

(b) Transportation. The only reasonable way to 
cope with the transportation of such masses will be for 
the Jews to found one or several big shipping com- 
panies of their own. The Settlement Country will need 
a commercial fleet both during and after the rush; and 
a new field of employmentmanning the ships will 
be opened to thousands of young Jews. 

(c) The actual settlement: house-building for the 
initial camps and the new town sites; building of high- 
ways, aqueducts, storage tanks and all public works 
in general. 

(d) Establishment of factories (as far as not pro- 
vided for by private capital); but probablyunless 
Western Europe and America also are ruined the 
bulk of this development will be financed by private 
capital alone. 

(e) Health, schools, public security. 

(f) Administrative expenditure. 

The repayment of this international loan, principal 
and interest, will probably be regarded even by the 
most hard-boiled of business men as reasonably safe. 
The charge will, of course, be borne entirely by Jews, 
mainly by the new Settlement itself. Various collateral 
securities can be suggested: the one most obviously 
able to guarantee the regular service of this Public 
Debt will be the Customs revenue of the Settlement 

Another source may be discovered if the enemy 
countries, under the future peace treaty, are required 
to pay indemnities. The indemnity clauses of Ver- 
sailles have left a bad taste, and there is at present a 
strong prejudice against the usual catchword "Let the 
enemy pay/' But this attitude must not be pushed too 
far. Mr. Norman Angell has no doubt most convinc- 
ingly proved that making the enemy pay for his con- 
querors' war losses is a transaction ruinous to those 
conquerors themselves. But damage inflicted by the 
enemy on private citizens in Poland, as well as in 
Germany and Austria itself, is quite a different mat- 
ter. It will hardly be found unfair that the perpetrator 
of the damage done should at least have to accept a 
share of the Public Debt incurred to save his victims. 

Yet another possible source of income for such pay- 
ment would be the introduction of a special tax by 
the Western Jewish communities. The idea need not 
be regarded as startling. The right of compulsory self- 
taxation by religious communities was recognized in 
Germany and Austria when these countries were still 
perfectly respectable. West-European and American 


Jews have always raised considerable funds for relief 
in Eastern Europe and for Palestine, and will no doubt 
continue to do so: but when it has to be done by 
propaganda, a large proportion of the sum collected is 
unavoidably swallowed up by the expenses of the 
campaign. It will be to everyone's advantage if all 
these rather troublesome and not always very elegant 
methods are replaced by honest, clean taxation. At the 
same time, if some part of that taxation could be ear- 
marked for the service of the Jewish Settlement Debt, 
this would increase the impression of its stability, and 
would very favourably influence the conditions of the 

The technique of building a new country under 
such conditions is not a matter on which the layman 
can express an opinion. It will take many months of 
planning by specialists: but the whole framework of 
the plan ought to be completed, as far as possible, 
during the war. Only the finishing touches of the 
technical plan, the actual launching of the loan, and 
the appointment of those to be in charge of the work, 
should be left until after the peace conference. 

One thing, however, can be foretold as regards the 
technical plan: it will probably deal with the First 
Million only (subsequent repatriations, being slower, 
will be more like an ordinary migration, needing per- 
haps no special planning); and there will be three 
stages to consider the initial camping of the new- 
comers; the construction of the new centres mostly 


industrial centres on the appointed sites; and the 
first production of goods. 

The first stage would present a formidable difficulty 
in a country where there were no Jewish colonies. In 
a land where there are already Jewish towns, Jewish 
quarters in the cities, and some 300 Jewish villages, 
large and small, scattered over a considerable area, the 
task is much simpler. Theoretically and schematically 
speaking, where 500,000 people are domiciled (not 
uncomfortably) another 500,000 could at once be 
provisionally accommodated by the rough and ready 
method of billeting. In our case, however, billeting will 
probably be an exception: as the influx of newcomers 
is to be a permanent feature, it will be worth while to 
build barracks or huts. There will be a shifting popula- 
tion, batch after batch of immigrants, going off to 
other places; during the influx of the First Million 
probably over one-third of this number will need some 
kind of hutment accommodation. This gives us an 
outline of the first item of the scheme: to construct, 
in the neighbourhood of the existing Jewish colonies, 
barrack accommodation for some 300,000 to 400,000 

The second step, to begin on the morrow of the 
first arrivals, will consist in building all those widely- 
distributed workshops which will play a twofold part: 
they will supply as much as possible of the First Mil- 
lion's needs, and employ all the First Million's bread- 
winners, probably some 600,000 in all. Some will be 
dispatched to build the highways, leading as yet from 
nowhere to nowhere, but the chief arteries of tomor- 


row; some will be told off to lay water-pipes, dig cis- 
terns and sink wells, before there is anyone near them 
to drink the water; some will have to put up corru- 
gated iron sheds where later on machinery will be 
installed; some, but not so many, will be sent to 
plough and sow. There will be a section in the techni- 
cal plan for the production of furniture: a million 
people will need a million chairs to sit on; that means 
so much horse-power and so many hands; the total 
might be so distributed as to form twelve factories in 
different localities. There will be another section for 
butchers, another for dentists, another for lorry-drivers, 
complete with numbers and places as in an army 
mobilization plan. One of the most fascinating fea- 
tures of human planning is that things never turn out 
just as they were planned; but if the plan is good its 
unforeseen modifications will always, in the end, prove 
to be still better. 

The third stage will be the actual beginning of pro- 
duction, the delivery, storage and sale of the goods, 
and the manifold individual activities which all this 
entails, and the sum of which constitute a nation's 
economy: in other words, the birth of the nation. 

All this is how a layman imagines an achievement 
which the experts can formulate more clearly: but the 
thing envisaged by both will be the same splendid 

Now the pseudonym can be dropped, and we can 
return to Palestine as the only "area" in which this 
achievement is destined to be realized. 


Palestine is a country which enjoys a tolerable cli- 
mate, and presents a by no means exceptional mixture 
of natural advantages and still greater natural draw- 
backs. The absorptive capacity of such a country de- 
pends less on those natural features than on the kind 
of men who will inhabit it: on their intelligence, skill, 
endurance, will-power, resourcefulness, financial 
means, and international connections, making for 
financial aid and promoting trade. 

One would like to treat the colonial experts with 
respect, but it is a fact that the many experts who 
have, in recent years, made pronouncements as to the 
prospects of settlement of Palestine have all contra- 
dicted one another. Their judgments are somehow 
lacking in reality; they do not sound "scientific"; they 
have not the appearance of finality. Sir John Hope 
Simpson, in 1930, found that the only really cultivable 
land in Western Palestine was the land actually then 
under cultivation -8 million dunams out of a total 
area of 36 millions. The Royal Commission's Report 
(1937) dismissed this verdict by admitting frankly that 
there was no reliable information as to whether the 
waste area was cultivable or not, and that the first 
requirement was a geophysical and hydrographical 
survey, which should be extended to Transjordan. As 
to Transjordan, the 1935 Report of the Mandatory to 
the Mandates Commission estimated that only about 
5% of its area could be regarded as cultivable.* Five 
per cent of Transjordan's area is 1,150,000 acres, or 
4,600,000 dunams. But two years later, in August 
* Schechtmann, Trans/ordamen, Vienna, 1937, p. 171. 


1937, Mr. Ormsby Gore, the Colonial Secretary- 
afterwards Lord Harlech~~disagreed with his own ad- 
visers. In an address to the Mandates Commission in 
Geneva, he was recklessly optimistic in respect of 
Transjordan, quoting the opinions of other experts. 
"One of our most experienced agricultural officers/' 
he stated, "says he is confident 100,000 families could 
be settled in Trans Jordan alone'' (Minutes of the 32nd 
Session, p. 22). As he spoke of settling Arabs, not 
Jews, in the country, and as the Government's idea of 
an average lot viable for an Arab family is 140 
dunams,* this expert obviously implied that there are 
in Transjordan about 14 million cultivable dunarns 
over and above any areas already exploited by the 
inhabitants. But the Woodhead Commission, which 
studied the question in 1938, did not confirm this 
expert's finding. . . . 

The chief problem (from the standpoint of agricul- 
ture, but not from that of mass colonization) is water 
for irrigation. The Woodhead Commission's Report 
devotes a careful chapter to this matter, only to show 
that nothing is really known on the subject, and next 
to nothing has been done to learn anything about it 
The report says that "the Beersheba sub-district has an 
area nearly equal to that of the whole of Palestine," 
and quotes Sir John Hope Simpson to the effect that 
"given the possibility of irrigation, there is practically 
an inexhaustible supply of cultivable land in the Beer- 
sheba area." Yet, in order to investigate so vital a mat- 

* Woodhead (Report of the Palestine Partition Commission), 
10,38, p. 2p: "The average for taxable crop land, 140 dunams." 


ter, only sixteen borings all told have been made in 
this area, at a total cost of ^6o ? ooo. The results have 
been "mostly disappointing." Perhaps: but that was 
no exhaustive survey. A government really concerned 
with constructive issues, especially when its treasury 
has for years shown a comfortable surplus of revenue 
over expenditure, ought to spend half a million pounds 
and make many hundreds of borings in an area so 
extensive and so important for the purposes of settle- 

The question of Palestine's agricultural possibilities 
still awaits a really serious survey; so far nothing has 
. been done in that direction which would justify a final 

But agriculture, as we have seen, must not be re- 
garded as the main basis of immigrant economy. For 
the past century and longer the growth of a country 
has no longer been dependent upon its agriculture. 
Countries with the greatest density of population show 
the smallest percentage of people living by the plough 
and the pasture. Germany (density 360 per square 
mile) has 24%; Holland (618 per sq. m.) 20%; Bel- 
gium (702 per sq. m.) 16%; England and Wales (703 
per sq. m.) 8%. Western Palestine's total rural popula- 
tion today is about 650,000; by the standard of Ger- 
many this population, without any increase in the 
number of farmers, would form a sufficient agricul- 
tural basis for a total population of over 2,500,000; by 
the Dutch standard, for a total of 3,250,000; and by 
the English standard, for a total of 8,000,000 souls. 
These figures, of course, do not claim to be of serious 


value, but they certainly serve as a reminder that the 
absorptive capacity of a country as a whole has very 
little to do with the absorptive capacity of its farmland. 
Far more important than soil and irrigation, from 
the standpoint of immigration policy, is the other 
"natural advantage"-the geographical position of a 
country. Nearly all the main sea routes between West 
and East traverse the Suez Canal; the main air lines 
cross it; and so will the main land routes of the future, 
linking Cape Town to Damascus and Peking. That 
corner of the Mediterranean in which Egypt and 
Palestine are waiting for their chance is the site of the 
most important cross-roads of the future. Its real hin- 
terland is not Arabia: it is the whole of that south- 
eastern corner of Asia where dwells one-half of the 
human race nearly one thousand millions of human 
beings. Their foreign trade, imports and exports to- 
gether, averages today about ^3 per head annually. In 
Denmark it is ^40 per head. Those countries will 
develop, and their requirements will increase; before 
long their overseas trade may have doubled itself, and 
at some remoter period it may even reach the Danish 
level. The imagination staggers at the thought of the 
monstrous avalanche of goods which will then be car- 
ried to and fro, by sea, air and land, between the two 
halves of humanity: practically half of it passing over 
that corner of the world in which Palestine and Egypt 
await their future. Crossroads districts are populous 
districts. Palestine will one day be among the most 
densely populated countries on earth. That day is in 
the remote future, but every decade brings it nearer. 


Palestine on both sides of the Jordan has an area of 
about 40,000 square miles. Its total population today, 
to the west and east of the river, is 1,600,000, Jews 
and Arabs together. At the density of France it could 
hold over 8 million inhabitants: and France's density 
of population is one of the lowest among the indus- 
trialized countries of Europe. 

But even a high density means a large population 
only if the land is big enough. To absorb the Jewish 
exodus Palestine must inevitably include Transjordan. 
Western Palestine contains only 10,000 square miles, 
Transjordan 30,000. The population west of the Jor- 
dan is 1,300,000; but east of the river only 300,000. 

We are discussing a matter of business in this book; 
eminently grave business, the business of the health 
and sanity of Europe and of all the world; and in this 
spirit will the question of Palestine be discussed at the 
peace conference. The area needed to save Europe's 
stepchildren must be large enough to house them. 
This is not a question of a spiritual centre, of a slightly 
enlarged and glorified Varsity quadrangle where the 
Jews could parade their cultural excellence: this is a 
grim matter of numbers, of hunger and need, of square 
inches to stand upon and cubic feet of air to breathe. 
A reception area covering 40,000 square miles, with an 
average density of 40, can be reasonably considered for 
the quick reception of several millions: but not an area 
which is only a quarter that size, with 1 30 inhabitants 
per square mile already on the spot. 

All this is very palpably obvious, and any reticence 


can only lead to mutual deceit. Nor is there really any 
need for reticence. A curious atmosphere of taboo has 
been created around the name "Trans Jordan": a sort 
of myth or superstition to the effect that precisely 
Transjordan, in Arab eyes, is an especially sacred por- 
tion of Palestine's soil, infinitely more valuable and 
more inaccessible than the Western strip; that if the 
Arabs begrudge us the acres of Sharon and Galilee so 
stubbornly, their reaction would be incomparably more 
violent if we laid hands on Gilead! This is fiction. It 
is only Western Palestine that contains Moslem 
shrines, in Jerusalem and Hebron; Transjordan has 
hardly any place at all on the pages of Islam's classic 
tradition. What is equally important is the fact that 
there are 900,000 Arabs (Moslem and Christian) west 
of Jordan as against only 300,000 on the east; the great 
feudal families, the intelligentsia, the industrial and 
commercial bourgeoisie of the Palestinian Arabs, what- 
ever their number and value, dwell almost exclusively 
west of the river, and regard the handful of Bedouins 
across the stream as primitives. Should any Arab 
Nationalistand this not only in Jerusalembe or- 
dered by Allah to choose which he would prefer to 
keep, as the other must be given to the Jews, he would 
certainly rather give the Jews Transjordan. 

It is very important to disabuse public opinion, 
Jewish and Christian, of this delusion as to the com- 
parative degree of our neighbours' and cousins' jealousy 
with regard to the two parts of Palestine. This delusion 
has always affected the energy with which we and our 
friends have pressed for the opening up of Transjor- 


dan, as though we feared to tread on delicate ground. 
But the ground is much less delicate here than in the 
first instance. Arab opposition to Jewish claims on 
Transjordan once these claims are really pressed 
will prove much weaker than that which we have 
encountered in the long-drawn battle for Western 

Nor is the legal position under the Mandate so 
formidable as some people imagine. These are times 
when hardly anyone is much concerned about the 
legal aspects of international issues, least of all about 
a Mandate which the Mandatory Government itself 
treated as "unworkable" in 1937 and worse than that 
in 1939. The author, however, is old-fashioned enough 
to retain some interest in the legality of treaties; and 
he thinks, moreover, that a moment will soon come 
when this old fashion of respect for legality will again 
become the only reliable thing left on earth. It is there- 
fore worth while to remember that in the Palestine 
Mandate the term "Palestine" embraces also Trans- 
Jordan, and that this meaning has never been revised. 
One of the Mandate's articles (Article 25) merely 
provided that "in the territories lying between the 
Jordan and the Eastern boundary of Palestine" the 
Mandatory "shall be entitled to postpone or withhold 
application of such provisions of this Mandate as he 
may consider inapplicable to the existing local condi- 
tions." Two months later the Council of the League 
of Nations passed a resolution stating that the Zionist 
portions of the Palestine Mandate "are not applicable 
to the territory known as Transjordan." There is not 


a word in that resolution to specify whether this means 
"withholding" the application of the provisions of the 
Mandate or only "postponing" it; and omissions in 
such cases always indicate that the legislator foresaw, 
and prepared for, the contingency that the measure 
might some day be revoked. The very title "resolu- 
tion/' in comparison with the title "Mandate," clearly 
emphasizes a lesser degree of durability. In other 
words, it is perfectly reasonable and lawful to assume 
that the intention of the resolution was simply to 
"postpone" the application of the Mandate's Zionist 
clauses to Transjordan in view of "existing local condi- 
tions"; and what has been postponed can now be 
enacted without any breach of the Mandate.* 

The real difficulty, of course, is not the "resolution" 
but the existence of a certain dynastic fact. It might 
seem rather embarrassing, in the middle of this twen- 
tieth century, that we should have to discuss dynastic 
facts of such an obviously artificial origin as though 
they were decisive factors in a situation involving the 
fate of peoples. It is perhaps more practical to leave it 
undiscussed; as, for different reasons, we have refrained 
from discussing how a Max Nordau Plan could be 
fitted into the framework of an existing Mandate. 
Where there is goodwill, anything can be fitted into 
anything. What is perfectly clear to all concerned is 
that where the serious business of the world is to be 
done, artificial titles cannot stand in the way. 

* Schechtmann, Trans/ordanien, Vienna, 1937, p. 259. 



THE transformation of Palestine can be effected 
to the full without dislodging the Palestinian 
Arabs. All current affirmations to the contrary are 
utterly incorrect. A territory of over 100,000 square 
kilometres settled at the average density of France 
(87 inhabitants per square kilometre) would hold over 
8 million inhabitants; at the density of Switzerland 
(104) over 10 million; at the density of Germany or 
Italy (140) about 14 million. It now holds, counting 
Arabs and Jews and Transjordanians and all, just over 
one million and a half inhabitants. There is margin 
enough left for Palestine to absorb the better part of 
East-Central Europe's ghetto the better part of five 
million souls without approaching even the moder- 
ate density of France. Unless the Arabs choose to go 
away of their own accord, there is no need for them 
to emigrate. 

Another fallacy is the assertion that if the Arabs 
were in the minority in a State predominantly Jewish, 
they would be persecuted and oppressed. The last peo- 
ple to repeat this fallacy ought to be the authors of 
the 1939 White Paper. Since they assure us that the 
Jews, condemned to remain a one-to-two minority in 



Palestine, would not only not be oppressed but would 
even enjoy the delights of a Jewish National Home, 
what grounds have they for suggesting that it would 
be disastrous for the Arabs if the position were re- 
versed? It would be much more logical for the authors 
of the White Paper to offer the Arab minority the 
same safeguards which they consider to be sufficient 
to ensure the welfare of a Jewish minority. 

It is absurd to assume that an ethnical minority is 
always and everywhere an oppressed minority. The 
assumption is untrue. The Scots who have left Scot- 
land and the Welsh who have left Wales live scattered 
all over England, yet it has not been suggested that 
their rights are curtailed. Consider the position of the 
Catholic French-speaking minority in the mixed prov- 
ince of Ontario, Canada; they are anything but op- 
pressed. Soviet Russia has been guilty of many sins, 
but no one can deny that her ethnical minorities enjoy 
a very reasonable equality of status in so far as any- 
thing can be "enjoyed" in that political climate. 
Czechoslovakia was a model state in this respect; as is 
Finland today, where the Swedish minority enjoys a 
position even better in some respects than that of the 
Scots in Great Britain. Nothing, of course, is perfect 
on this earth, and there is no doubt that it is pleasanter 
to be in the majority than in the minority, even under 
the best conditions imaginable; but that does not 
mean that the status of a minority is everywhere and 
always a tragedy. Every great people has its outlying 
fragments which form minorities in other countries: 
the English in South Africa, the French in Canada, 


Belgium and Switzerland, the Germans all over the 
world. Their position depends on the regime. Under 
a decent r6gime a minority can live in reasonable con- 
tentment The world has no right to assume that Jew- 
ish statesmanship is unable to create as decent a regime 
as that created by English, Canadian or Swiss states- 
manship. After all, it is from Jewish sources that the 
world has learned how the '"stranger within thy gates" 
should be treated. 

There is only one circumstance in which it is a 
tragedy to constitute a minority: it is the case of the 
people which is only a minority, everywhere and always 
a minority, dispersed among alien races, with no cor- 
ner of the earth to call its own, and no home in which 
to find refuge. Such is not the position of the Arabs, 
with four Arabian countries on the east of the Suez 
Canal, and five others west of Suez. Some of these 
lands are already independent, others are not so as yet; 
but in each of them there is no question of any but 
an Arab majority; each of them is already an Arab 
national homeland. 

It would be an idle pastime, at this present stage, 
to devise draft constitutions for the Jewish Palestine 
of the future. But it may be that some people are 
genuinely worried as to what would happen to the 
rights of the Palestinian Arabs if the country became 
a Jewish State. The author can at least give them 
some idea of what Jews themselves intend to do in 
this respect when they are in the majority and when 
Palestine is a self-governing State. It may reassure such 


persons to learn how not the moderate but precisely 
the so-called "extremist" wing of Zionism visualizes 
the constitution of the Palestine of the future. The 
following extracts are quoted from a draft worked out 
by the Revisionist Executive in 1934, so it might be 
said that this tells us "the worst that can happen" to 
the Palestinian Arabs. The draft is not an official pro- 
gramme, and the writer is not prepared to defend it in 
all its aspects. Still, it was the result of much careful 
labour; a wide range of precedents had been studied, 
and documents consulted which were regarded with 
the utmost respect in the days when the intelligentsia 
of East-Central Europe which then included Russia- 
was infatuated with the theories of the Austrian So- 
cialists' Natiorzalitaeten-Staat: Rudolf Springer's 
books, the minutes of the Bruenn congress of the 
Austrian Social Democratic Party, the excellent Hun- 
garian law of 1868 on the use of minority languages 
in civil service communications, and even the truly 
remarkable old Turkish legislation as to the autonomy 
of the various ethno-religious communities, whose offi- 
cial title was Millet = "nations": Millet-i-Roum, Mil- 
let-i-Ermeni, Millet-i-Moussevie (Greek, Armenian, 
Mosaic). Only a few sections can be quoted here: 
those dealing with civic equality, languages, so-called 
"cultural autonomy," the Holy Places, and the land 
laws. Only the broad issues will be touched upon. 
These quotations will bear out the statement made by 
this writer before the Palestine Royal Commission: 
that the Jews are ready to guarantee to the Arab minor- 


ity in a Jewish Palestine the maximum of the rights 
which they claimed but never obtained for themselves 
in other countries. 

In reading this draft it should be remembered that 
according to the principle which is the alpha and 
omega of Zionist Revisionism, Palestine can be pro- 
moted to independent Statehood only after the con- 
stitution of a Jewish majority. On the other hand, the 
Revisionists' idea of an independent Palestine was then 
(1934) a Dominion within the British Empire, as it 
still is to many among them. 


1. Provided nothing be done to hinder any foreign 
Jew from repatriating to Palestine, and, by doing so, 
automatically becoming a Palestinian citizen, the prin- 
ciple of equal rights for all citizens of any race, creed, 
language or class shall be enacted without limitation 
throughout all sectors of the country's public life. 

2. In every Cabinet where the Prime Minister is a 
Jew, the vice-premiership shall be offered to an Arab, 
and vice-versa. 

3. Proportional sharing by Jews and Arabs both in 
the charges and in the benefits of the State shall be 
the rule with regard to Parliamentary elections, civil and 
military service, and budgetary grants. 

4. The same rule shall apply to mixed municipalities 
or county councils. 


i. The Hebrew and the Arabic languages shall enjoy 
equal rights and equal legal validity. 


2. No State law, proclamation or ordinance; no coin, 
banknote or stamp of the State; no publication or in- 
scription produced at the State's expense shall be valid 
unless executed identically in both Hebrew and Arabic. 

3. Both Hebrew and Arabic shall be used with equal 
legal effect in Parliament, in the Courts, in the schools 
and in general before any office or organ of the State, 
as well as in any school of whatever degree. 

4. All offices of the State shall answer any applicant, 
orally and in writing, in the language of his application, 
whether Hebrew or Arabic. 


1. The Jewish and the Arab ethno-communities* 
shall be recognized as autonomous public bodies of 
equal status before the law. 

Should the Christian Arabs, or any other group of 
citizens reasonably justified in claiming autonomy, also 
demand a measure of independent recognition, Parlia- 
ment shall be entitled to grant the request. 

2. The following matters shall be delegated by the 
State to each ethno-community with regard to its 

(a) religion and personal status; 

(fa) education in all its branches and grades, es- 
pecially in the compulsory elementary stages; 

(c) public relief, including all forms of social assist- 

* The word used in the original is the Hebrew equivalent of 
"nationalities." As in English the term denotes State allegiance 
rather than ethnical allegiance, the word is translated as above. 


(d) settlement of ordinary law cases arising out of 
the above-mentioned matters. 

3. Each ethno-community shall elect its National 
Diet with the right to issue ordinances and levy taxes 
within the limits of its autonomy, and to appoint a 
national executive responsible before the Diet. 

4. A permanent Minister of Cabinet rank, independ- 
ent of all parties, shall represent each ethno-com- 
munity in the country's government. 


1. The relevant areas within the Old City of Jeru- 
salem, to be delimited under the authority of the 
League of Nations, shall enjoy the same measure of 
extra-territoriality as that universally recognized in the 
case of embassies. 

2. Each of these areas shall constitute a municipality 
under a council appointed by agreement between the 
ecclesiastic authorities concerned. 

3. A similar regime shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
other holy sites within the country. 

4. Except in war, pilgrim permits of sufficient dura- 
tion shall be freely granted to nationals of any State: 
subject only to genuine requirements of hygiene, traffic 
and public safety, and provided any paupers among the 
pilgrims shall be maintained, and in due course repatri- 
ated, at the expense of the respective ecclesiastic 

5. A delegate of the League of Nations, with the 
status of Ambassador, shall be appointed to represent 
the interests concerned. 


5. LAND 

1. A Palestine Land Court shall be formed including, 
among other members, judges and agricultural experts 
belonging to both ethno-communities. 

2. All the waste lands, as well as all lands inade- 
quately cultivated in the opinion of the Court, shall be 
requisitioned (under fair compensation in the case of 
the latter) to form the State's Land Reserve. 

3. After improvement at the expense of the State, 
reclaimed areas of the Land Reserve shall be divided 
into allotments to be granted, at fair prices and easy 
terms of credit, to individual applicants and groups. 

4. Allotments shall be distributed under the Land 
Court's supervision to Jewish and Arab applicants and 
groups indiscriminately. 

5. Each applicant shall have to satisfy the Land 

(a) that he owns no other land; 

(b) that he possesses a reasonable minimum of capi- 

tal or equipment for working that land, no 
matter whether his own or supplied by sup- 

(c) that he will work the land personally. 

Whether the Arabs would find all this a sufficient 
inducement to remain in a Jewish country is another 
question. Even if they did not, the author would refuse 
to see a tragedy or a disaster in their willingness to 
emigrate. The Palestine Royal Commission did not 
shrink from the suggestion. Courage is infectious. 
Since we have this great moral authority for calmly 


envisaging the exodus of 350,000 Arabs from one 
corner of Palestine, we need not regard the possible 
departure of 900,000 with dismay. The writer, as he 
has already said, cannot see any necessity for this 
exodus: it would even be undesirable from many 
points of view; but if it should appear that the Arabs 
would prefer to migrate, the prospect can be discussed 
without any pretence of concern. 

Since 1923, when within a few months at least 700,- 
ooo Greeks were moved to Macedonia, and 350,000 
Turks to Thrace and Anatolia, the idea of such migra- 
tions has been familiar and almost popular. Herr 
Hitler, detested as he is, has recently been enhancing 
its popularity. Of course, his critics very strongly dis- 
approve of his policy in removing Germans from the 
Trentino and the Balticum and planting them in fields 
and houses robbed from the Poles: but it is the rob- 
bing of the Poles, not the moving of the Germans, 
which really elicits the censure. One cannot help 
feeling that if only Germans, on the one hand, and 
Italians and Baits on the other were concerned, the 
operation might in the end prove not so bad for their 
common welfare. When Mr. Roosevelt foresees the 
existence of 20 million potential refugees after the 
war, he is doubtless considering that the position of 
all minorities may have become untenable in many 
countries, so that some radical solution may have to 
be found. Nuisantia, which, as we know, is situated 
between Andivia and Hedulia, and populated by a 
potpourri of both races, has a majority of the An- 
divians, so in 1918 it was adjudged to Andivia, The 


result? Andivia has now a minority of 300,000 Hedu- 
lians, who are causing trouble. Perhaps, then, we had 
better annex the province to Hedulia? But then 
Hedulia will have a minority of 500,000 Andivians, 
with the same result. Majority rule is perhaps not such 
a perfect panacea, even where political parties are 
concerned, but in the case of nationalities the medi- 
cine simply does not work except as an irritant; and 
the alternative, minority rule, would be still worse. 
One really radical remedy would be the Graeco- 
Turkish precedent of 1923. The writer frankly doubts 
whether that would be feasible; at all events, other 
solutions which cannot be examined heremight be 
given a trial. But theoretically the idea of redistributing 
minorities en masse is becoming more popular among 
''the best people/ 7 and there is no longer any taboo 
on the discussion of the subject 

There is, moreover, one great ethical difference be- 
tween the case of Palestine and that of all the other 
poly-ethnical areas with regard to this particular ques- 
tion of allowing the minority to migrate. In all the 
other areas friction is caused by ambition: one section 
wishes to dominate, or so at least the weaker section 
fears. Such an ambition may be, or seem, justifiable or 
excusable, in the sense that it is an expression of in- 
herited vitality, so strongly dynamic that only the 
most angelic self-restraint could keep it always on the 
leash: but even so it is, after all, only an ambition, not 
a real need; a healthy 'appetite/' not a "hunger." In 
Palestine any inconvenience to the native population 
from the influx of immigrants arises from the tragic 


necessity that these immigrants must find a home. It 
has nothing to do with ambition, nothing to do with 
the will to dominate over anyone; in many individual 
cases it may have little to do even with a personal 
desire to immigrate, for in any mass migration there 
must be hundreds or thousands who would have pre- 
ferred to remain in the old home if they could. The 
cause is genuine hunger, the nostalgic passion of 
people who have nowhere else where they can make 
a home for themselves. Should the Arabs prefer to 
migrate, the very fact that they can do so would prove 
that they, on the contrary, have a "somewhere else" 
where they can build a new home. This contest be- 
tween "nowhere else" and "somewhere else" would 
only be an echo of a universal feature of our modern 
age, the inevitable settlement between the "have nots" 
and the "haves." No "have not" need feel guilty be- 
cause the scales have been levelled as they ought to 
have been long ago. 

One thing seems certain: any Arab country which 
should find the courage and the acreage for inviting 
such an immigration of trekkers would reap enormous 
material advantages. It would immediately have un- 
limited sums of capital and the world's best experts 
at its disposal for the most ambitious schemes of land 
reclamation and irrigation. The Arab trekkers, more- 
over, would probably migrate with donkeyloads of pelf. 
All the problems connected with the evacuation of the 
European "zone" would become incomparably easier. 
Who knows? 


But this is an aside; it has nothing to do with war 
aims. Palestine, astride the Jordan, has room enough 
for the million of Arabs, room for another million of 
their eventual progeny, for several million Jews, and 
for peace; for so much peace that there would then 
be peace also in Europe. 



SA matter of cold and objective justice, the 
_ first of all Jewish war demands ought to be ad- 
dressed to the Jews themselves: the demand for a 
united front. This they ought to have formed or at 
least, they ought to have set about forming it long 
ago; but now, since the war, the eleventh hour has 
really struck. 

A united front means, above all, one single agreed 
formula of demands to be presented to the future 
Peace Conference: this is even more essential than 
one single national authority. In theory it might even 
be more impressive if a dozen different Jewish dele- 
gations, appearing one after another before the Peace 
Conference, repeated exactly the same demands; or on 
the contrary, it might prove to be much less impressive 
than irritating. But that does not really matter, as the 
theory is unreal: an agreed programme, if there is any 
sanity in the people, would mean a united representa- 
tion before the Peace Conference. 

Yet even this a single Jewish delegation before the 
conference tablefalls far short of our needs. The 
historical hour demands a Jewish delegation at the 
table of the Peace Conference. In the next chapter, 



spokesmen of the Jewish Agency not only do not in- 
tend to resist such loss of "face/' but will deliberately 
invite it. Its chief spokesman's recent statement in 
New Yorkobviously an agreed "programme" speech, 
for its gist is being echoed by other spokesmen else- 
whereis significant. His main point was: "Conserva- 
tive estimates of the number of Jews that could be 
absorbed annually would confine themselves to the 
existing opportunities: they would not take into ac- 
count larger territories, like the Negeb and other 
regions, where tens of thousands will no doubt some 
day live and prosper, or the new horizon that may be 
opened up by soil research and new discoveries of 
water. But even within the limits of such a purely 
pragmatic point of view, Palestine is capable of absorb- 
ing approximately 50,000 new immigrants a year for 
years to come." 

This means bidding for certain failure. 50,000 a year 
(even to those who believe in the "pragmatic" reality 
of this figure) is, under the present circumstances, a 
candid admission that Zionism raises no claim to solve 
the tragedy. Arithmetically, at this rate it would take 
twenty years to save from hell even one single million; 
actually, there would be hardly any evacuation at all, 
for under the "selective" system of the Jewish Agency, 
the bulk of the emigrants would be green youths, so 
that the age classes of maximum fertility (approxi- 
mately, in the "Zone," twenty-three to thirty-nine) 
would be left behind to replace the losses. Before a 
Peace Conference concerned if at allonly with what 
can be done to evacuate the ruined Zone, this is an 


attitude calculated to make a Zionist Palestine just 
one of the partial and inadequate remedies that may 
be proposed. 

One of the most inadequate, in fact. Taken even as 
"group settlementsin the sense of a settlement cer- 
tified as capable of becoming an all-Jewish territory if 
it is successfulthis programme is obviously insuffi- 
cient. British Guiana and the Kimberleys are a mirage, 
but there at least the first five thousand settlers, if 
they managed to remain, would build up a purely 
Jewish province, with no neighbours to cause trouble. 
But it would take a long generation to transform even 
Western Palestine alone into a country with a Jewish 
majority at the rate of 50,000 immigrants a year; and 
in the meantime well, every member of the Peace 
Conference will know what would have to be faced in 
the meantime. Given only such a patchwork remedy, 
admittedly one of the several on the market, Palestine 
is really not an attractive business proposition. 

Especially as no one at the Peace Conference is 
likely to accept the figure of "50,000 a year/' The 
statesmen around the conference table are not likely 
to forget that there has been prolonged and conspic- 
uous disagreement on this point, to say nothing of a 
statement of policy by the Mandatory, making 50,000 
the final total of all the immigrants whom Palestine 
will ever accept. In order to transform "50,000 in all" 
into "50,000 a year," the British, and especially the 
Arab opposition, would 1 have to be beaten down; 
otherwise a "conservative estimate" of all that Pales- 
tine can offer is very little immigration, and the ever- 


present threat of trooble. But British Guiana, San 
Domingo, the Kimberleys, Mindanao and all the rest, 
whether promising success or doubtfulwhether fu- 
ture "territories" or areas of "infiltration," whether 
examples of big patchwork or small patchwork have 
at least this one advantage: the good will of the re- 
spective governments, no immediate prospect of fric- 
tion with the people of the country, and in some cases 
no such people at all. . . . 

Palestine as one of many palliatives has no chance 
at all of being preferred, or even of being seriously 
considered by the future Peace Conference. Of all 
possible stopgap propositions Palestine is, politically, 
the most difficult, hampered by obstacles which can 
be surmounted only at the cost of considerable daring. 
Of course, it is not impossible to overcome the Arab 
obstruction and Great Britain's reluctance, bufr'to do 
so a decisive effort .will be required. Efforts are made 
only when it is worth while making them: when the 
prize is great and unique, and not a mere pittance 
which can more easily be secured elsewhere. 

Palestine as a war aims problem has no locus standi 
unless it can be presented as the full solution of the 
Jewish problem, the only practicable theatre for a 
Max Nordau plan, the only complete remedy for the 
European cancer. Only as such can the Palestine claim 
be defended before the councils of such a world as 
we shall find on the morrow of a great cataclysm, 
facing the necessity of tremendous solutions, with 
neither time nor patience for trifles and trimmings: 
only if it is urged as a scheme unique in its material 


and humanitarian range, exclusive and intolerant of all 
rival schemes, and indeed dwarfing all its competitors, 
and making their promise valueless in comparison. 

The Jewish demand at the future Peace Conference 
should be an amalgam of the two dominating ideas of 
our people's modern history: the Jewish State for 
those who want it, and real equality for those whom 
Eastern Europe will not release. The amalgam is indis- 
soluble, for without the Jewish State the second de- 
mand is unreal. It is, in fact, not an amalgam but a 
bi-atomic entity. This oneness of the Jewish war de- 
mand must be recognized by the entire collective 
authority of world Jewry, and it must be presented at 
the world's board of settlement by a single Jewish 
embassy in the name of a single world-Jewish leader- 

The writer is not quite sure if the old debate, as 
to whether the Jews are a nation or just a religious 
community, is still proceeding, or whether it has been 
dropped. But even if there still are people who "feel" 
about it one way or another, that should have no bear- 
ing on the question of a headquarters. One may 
favour a world-organization for the whole of scattered 
Jewry without committing oneself to the view that 
Jewry is a nation in dispersion. Churches in dispersion 
can also unite oecumenically. The late Nathan Birn- 
baum, a very fertile and penetrating thinker, who- 
after many ideological peregrinations finally became 
converted to the view that the core of Israel's identity 
was not nationhood but religion, fervently advocated 


the creation of a 'Vorld-Kehillah" a universal con- 
gregation or synagogue, democratically elected 
throughout the globe, and ''governing" in all matters 
of mutual assistance and mutual defence. This is not 
the author's conception, but it would be waste of time 
to argue the matter here. What is needed is the recog- 
nition of a paramount common interest and a single 
headquarters to defend it: "Senatus Populusque 

This is perhaps the hardest of all points of resistance 
on the road to Jewish redemption. The last few dec- 
ades have produced in our scattered people a rich 
growth of organized efforts for self-help, and some 
of them have attained a really remarkable degree of 
moral and material power. They are vividly conscious 
of their excellent records of social service, justifiably 
proud and jealous of their personality and independ- 
ence. In addition, they mostly have an ideology of 
their own, or at least one whose wording is quite 
different from that in which the same ideas are ex- 
pressed by their rivals, so that any proposal to accept 
even one single new phrase may sound to them like 
an invitation to apostasy. An amalgamated pro- 
gramme, plus a supreme 'headquarters, which would 
supersede all these sectional sovereignties, is a plan 
certain to be resisted tooth and nail. The writer has 
no illusions on the point The formula "a united front 
of all Jewry" is not unpopular in itself; it can even 
be heard not infrequently in some of these very 


sovereign quarters; but somehow (and the writer 
means no offence) it is like the outcry for a pan-Arab 
Federation, to which all the Arab kings render courte- 
ous lip-service, while not one of them would listen 
for a moment to a concrete scheme involving a limita- 
tion of his prerogatives. The writer frankly doubts if 
a supreme headquarters of world Jewry can ever be 
formed by agreement between the existing organiza- 
tions, the Big Four or the Big Five. It is equally 
doubtful whether the amalgamation of programmes 
can be accomplished by consent between the parties. 
Some of them (not all) may agree to the construction 
of a joint platform by the mechanical process of join- 
ing "plank" to "plank" until everybody's favourite 
plank has been included: provided none is allowed to 
claim priority, so that the same weight is attached 
to say lifting the ban on Jewish doctors in Tristan 
da Cunha, and the colonization of Palestine; and pro- 
vided, of course, that no such terms are used as "Jew- 
ish State" or "mass-exodus," nor any such heresies 
proclaimed, or even hinted at, as the alleged connec- 
tion between the reality of equal rights in the new 
Poland and the proportion of Jews that can be as- 
sisted to migrate from the new Poland. In other words, 
we should have the old prescription, but no effective 
remedy for the cancer, no message likely to stir the 
imagination. But a really united formula of Jewish 
restoration, short and sharp and clear and single- 
minded as Chanteclair's morning call, to which sunrise 
is the answer, seems as unlikely to emerge from the 


self-sacrifice of the parties as a really united leadership 
is likely to result from the voluntary submission of the 
Central Committees. 

This book is not the place for a consideration of the 
ways and means by which the united front will have 
to be achieved; but as surely as our people must be 
saved, so surely the united front of world Jewry must 
be achieved. Life presses in this direction: public 
opinion is slow, but in the end it also will follow in 
this direction. Then it will also "discover" the ways 
and means or rather realize that there is nothing to 
"discover/' since there are hundreds of instructive 
precedents, sound, simple and effective. When unity 
cannot be established by the abdication of sectional 
majesties and highnesses, democracyif still alive and 
resolved to live onmust intervene and set up its own 
authority, superseding all other powers. A World- 
Jewish Elected Assembly is years overdue: it should 
have been called into being when Polish Jewry was 
still free to act. Just as Canada holds an election in 
March 1940, there is no reason why a Jewish refer- 
endum cannot be organized in most of the countries 
concerned. This war-time Assembly would, of course, 
be a truncated body, but it would none the less be 
an expression of some among the most powerful forces 
of the race; and its generation by a plebiscite held 
under universal suffrage might well constitute an 
impressive manifestation in all the free and civilized 
countries which still exist on earth. 

This short paragraph is quite inadequate for the 
exposition of so vast a subject. The problem will prob- 


ably have to be solved by long and heated internal 
debate; but it is an internal problem and does not 
properly "belong" in a book which attempts to state 
the Jewish claim vis-a-vis the Gentile world. We shall 
leave it at that, only remembering that there will be 
no chance even of voicing such a claim unless a single 
world-Jewish "government' ' be elected to voice it. 



f 1 1HE Jewish war demands are: 
JJ_ (a) A Jewish army on the Allied fronts. 

(b) Recognition of a world-Jewish civil Authority, 
with a seat on all international organs dealing with 
migration or reconstruction problems, and on the 
future Peace Conference. 

(c) A Covenant on civic equality as a war aim of 
the Allies. 

(d) The Jewish State as a war aim of the Allies. 


The Jewish Regiment was formed by the War 
Office in August 1917. It was at first officially known 
as the 38th to 41 st Royal Fusiliers, but was afterwards 
granted the name of "Judaeans" and a special badge 
(the seven-branched candlestick, familiarly described 
under canvas as the toasting-fork). Its full strength 
on the register at Hounslow was probably over 10,000, 
but only half that number could be trained in time to 
reach Palestine. Of these, about 1,300 came from the 
United Kingdom, 1,000 from the southern part of 
Palestine which Allenby had liberated a year before 
the final conquest, about 2,500 from the United States, 

2 34 


and the balance from Canada, the Argentine, and 
from among the Jewish prisoners of war at Alexandria, 
Egypt, who volunteered for such service and succeeded 
after several refusals from the War Office. The com- 
manding officers of battalions in the field were J. H. 
Patterson, a Protestant Irishman; Eliezer Margolin, 
an Australian Jew, in his early youth a Palestinian 
pioneer; F. Samuel, a British Jew; F. Scott, a British 
Christian. The officers were Jewish and Christian, the 
N.C.O/s mostly Jewish, the rank and file all Jews. 
During the final offensive, in September 1918, Jewish 
troops in the Jordan Valley formed a "Patterson Col- 
umn/' and had the distinction of capturing the 
Umm-esh-Shert ford on the Jordan, a few miles north 
of Jericho a deed mentioned in Allenby's dispatches. 
This was the first Jordan ford taken by the Allies; a 
couple of hours after the capture, Anzac cavalry 
crossed it and invaded Transjordan. "Patterson's Col- 
umn" was the first British infantry force in Trans- 
Jordan; Colonel Margolin, at the head of his battalion, 
was the first British commander of captured Es-Salt. 
(Today Jews are prohibited from even entering Trans- 
Jordan.) After the Armistice, the Judaeans did garrison 
duty in Western Palestine. In 1919, during the trouble 
in Egypt, when the bulk of the British troops left for 
Cairo, the whole of the railway line from Romani in 
the Sinai desert up to Haifa was under their guard. 
At the military cemetery on the Mount of Olives there 
is a section of Jewish graves. They are not many: the 
Jewish battalions had not been given a real chance of 
battle, perhaps simply because there happened to be 


no serious engagement where they happened to be 
stationed. What they were told to do they did well. 
There was no reason why the precedent should not 
have been followed when the present war broke out, 
and there still is no reason. 

But this time the precedent will have to be extended 
both in scope and in character. It must be, formally, 
a Jewish army, not a regiment within the British army; 
it must be given a chance to attain a strength of at 
least 100,000; and it must fight on all the Allied fronts 
to prove just what some people would prefer to for- 
getthat this is the Jews' war as much as Britain's, 
France's and Poland's. 

There is no need to remind the writer of the thou- 
sand and one excellent reasons why it is both unusual 
and "impossible" to have a Jewish army so long as 
there is no Jewish State, nor a Jewish treasury to 
maintain it. All the reasons are valueless. Unusual, 
yes; "impossible?" nonsense! Any child knows that 
there are not enough Jewish generals, or even officers, 
and especially noncommissioned officers, to staff an 
army; at the outset a Jewish army will be fully Jewish 
only as to the rank and file. But that alone will be 
enough to bring in very large numbers and to inspire 
a great and high spirit. The only question is whether 
an additional 100,000 men (or probably many more) 
are needed in the field; and, if so, what will be the 
best way of obtaining the maximum number of re- 
cruits, and securing from them the maximum effort. 
And this settles the problem of the treasury. If 100,000 
men, or more than that, are needed, they will have to 


be equipped, fed and trained just as in the case of 
Poles and Czechsat the Allies' expense, and it will 
make very little difference in the cost if they are styled 
an army. Secondly, while it is true that there is no 
Jewish State as yet, it is not quite exact to say that 
there is no Jewish treasury. It certainly exists as a 
spiritual but by no means negligible power, serving 
myriads of people in a score of countries, feeding a 
rather magnificent galaxy of social, educational and 
colonizing enterprises throughout all the continents. 
The formation of a Jewish army will mobilize its re- 
sources to limits never before suspected. It may yet 
prove extremely helpful in other connections also, 
especially if, simultaneously with the raising of the 
Jewish army, an all-Jewish civilian authority is recog- 

Outside the Allied countries, and the countries held 
or paralyzed by the enemy (U.S.S.R. included), there 
are more than six million Jews today whose dominat- 
ing preoccupation, without any fear of overstatement, 
can be described as looking for some way to help in 
the destruction of the common enemy. About 1,200,- 
ooo of these Jews are males between the ages of eight- 
een and thirty-five. An especially interesting corner of 
the Jewish world is Palestine, whose male Jewish 
population of army age could of itself provide 100,000 
men, a large proportion of whom are not only trained 
but fairly experienced in that old-fashioned kind of 
warfare which in the Middle East is not yet quite out 
of fashion. These are potential resources which it 
would be unwise to neglect, merely on numerical 


grounds, quite apart from their value as a moral factor 
in the war. 

True, there is a widespread opinion (this is written 
in February 1940, and may no longer fit the case when 
the book is printed) that man-power is of no value 
in the sort of war which the Allies are facing. Here 
is a jesting remark which was recently overheard in 
fairly exalted quarters: "If the biggest neutral were 
to offer to come in we should be terribly embarrassed, 
for where could one find Lebensraum for him on the 
Western front?" But, joking apart, we must all realize 
that if the war is ever to develop in a direction leading 
up to real victory, it will have to follow a different line 
of development. This is not only a pragmatic neces- 
sity; it is also, and even more conspicuously, a moral 
necessity. Neutrals (and that still means three-quarters 
of the anti-Nazi world) are beginning to lose immedi- 
ate interest in the scanty news from the front. The 
daily budget of events on the seas and in the air, epic 
as it is in quality, lacks that grandeur of mass-effort 
without which there is no "war," but only a kind of 
exceedingly cruel and highly motorized guerilla con- 
flict. This may become embarrassing. Neutrality today 
is an expensive business; it entails considerable losses 
and enormous inconvenience: if counterbalanced by 
a passionate, breathless excitement over what is hap- 
pening every minute in the great arena, all these draw- 
backs will be borne not only with patience, but even 
with a sort of grim satisfaction, for at heart every 
neutral is a sympathizer. But no sympathy can thrive 
on a diet of arid monotony. This explains why there 


are such obstinate relapses into peace talk, even from 
those neutrals whose wish to see Nazism crushed is 
every whit as ardent as our own: the quantitative 
pettiness of the incidents of this war, so strikingly out 
of keeping with the monstrous forces and the almost 
cosmic issues involved, saps their morale. There are, 
no doubt, very serious material reasons why this form 
of warfare has been allowed to predominate in the 
first stage of the conflict, and it certainly has been a 
godsend as permitting the accumulation of greater 
resources; but it cannot be permitted to continue 
longer than is strictly necessary and profitable. 

These are doubtless very cruel thoughts, but they 
are consistent with human nature, and are probably 
shared, at the moment, by most of the peoples in- 
timately affected. But even while the need for such 
monotonous warfare continues, its bromidic effect on 
the morale of the non-belligerent nations could be 
considerably counterbalanced if six million souls liv- 
ing in their midst had a concrete stake in the arena, 
instead of being concerned merely in the passive sense, 
as victims. 

The writer does not by any means forget the various 
laws affecting neutrality. These laws exist, .and they 
must be taken into account and treated with the 
utmost discretion. Yet we know by experience that 
the network of "don'ts" which these laws represent 
is both extremely sensitive and extremely elastic. 
Sweden and Italy are not belligerents, but a nucleus 
of Swedes or Italians with an active interest in the 
Mannerheim line can be imagined as existing in either 


country without really clashing with public sentiment. 
This example is of course not offered as a full analogy 
of the case which we are examining in the present 
paragraph: it is only an illustration of the feature just 
referred to as elasticity. On the other hand, the net- 
work of restrictions is very formidably sensitive; and 
this is one of the reasons why a Jewish army is a 
much more convenient entity than a Jewish legion in 
another people's army. The difference ought to be 
clear without further elucidation, but may be made 
still clearer with the help of another illustration by 
analogy (once again, only a very superficial analogy) : 
the case of propaganda. Anti-Nazi propaganda by the 
Allies would be resented even in pro-Ally countries; 
but an anti-Nazi propaganda by Jews is regarded as 
natural. An appeal to the Jews to play a part in the 
conflict is bound to produce a great moral effect: it 
would be resented if its source were British or French, 
but as coming from a purely Jewish source it would 
be weighed in a different balance. The tragedy of 
Dispersion is, after all, not without a few redeeming 
features; inadequate enough on the whole, yet some- 
times effective. 

But the most serious argument in favour of a Jewish 
army as preferable to Jewish units under other flags 
is that of numbers and elan. The author, for more 
than twenty-five years, has been obstinately engaged 
in fostering what some have been pleased to describe 
as Jewish militarism, and has thus been in close con- 
tact with the type of Jewish youth whose mentality 
responds to the appeal of the bugle (and today this 


covers practically the whole young manhood of the 
race): and he can affirm, with the completest con- 
fidence, that while a call to join Jewish regiments 
under an Allied flag would attract thousands, whole 
over-crowded streets would be emptied in the rush for 
a Jewish army. 


The writer avoids the term "Jewish Government' ' 
so as to avoid complicating his argument by offering 
a pretext for misunderstandings; and from this ret- 
icence arises the exasperating necessity of providing 
some sort of Ersatz-terminology, which is apt to sound 
rhetorical and artificial. As a matter of fact, there 
should be no room for any misunderstanding. No 
person in his senses could really imagine that a "gov- 
ernment" of this kind implies, or would ever claim to 
imply, the right to give compulsory orders to Jewish 
citizens of the different countries over the heads of 
parliaments, cabinets and police. Least of all can such 
a fantasy be entertained when there already exists a 
precedent: the Polish Government in exile. This gov- 
ernment does not attempt to issue decrees to the Poles 
in Poland, because they would be massacred if they 
obeyed; it does not claim any compulsory powers over 
Polish citizens who live outside Poland, even over 
those in the Allied countries. Yet it bears the title of 
"government," and is a government in a sense which 
is as important as anything in this war. If the Allies 
were to admit that a statehood destroyed de facto by 
bestial violence is non-existent in law, the admission 


would vitiate the very air we breathe. A statehood 
recognized by the comity of civilized nations cannot 
cease to be; it survives. 

No analogy need be perfect in all details. Fortu- 
nately for the Polish nation and the Czech, their lot 
is lighter than that of the Jews: they inhabit the terri- 
tory for whose freedom they are fighting while the 
Jews are in dispersion. But the root of the analogy is 
sound: it is the principle that a destroyed nation is 
still a nation. And when a list of destroyed nations 
waiting for restoration has been officially drawn up, 
the homeless section of the Jewish people has a fair 
claim to a place on that list 

With regard to the Polish claim, its recognition is 
expressed in the title "the Polish Government." With 
regard to Czechoslovakia, the official title is "the 
National Committee/' It does not matter what term 
is selected to describe the idea of Senatus Populusque 
/udaeorum. What does matter is the fact that there 
is a problem of immense importance to the world's 
health and peace, clearly distinct from all other prob- 
lems, a problem which means literally life or death to 
five or six million people, and affects the fate of sixteen 
millions; that these men and women are:/ just as 
anxious to help in solving their problem as any normal 
nation can be; and that they possess a total sum of 
moral and material power that can go a long way 
towards that solution, and ought to be given a chance 
to do so. All this constitutes, in its essential character 
and its magnitude, exactly what the dictionary calls 
a "nation/' with "national" tasks before it. If other 


nations want to help, they must begin by Inviting that 
Jewish entity to take a seat in the council chamber, 
to discuss aims and ways and means. This is the only 
meaning of "a Jewish government" with which we 
are concerned at the moment: a "headquarters/ 7 a 
"leadership," an "executive," a "presidency," an 
"authority" entitled to negotiate and to co-operate, 
not as petitioner but as partner. 

The writer does not lose sight of an obstacle whose 
obstructive force is as formidable as its moral value 
is negligible: its name is snobbery. There is a certain 
bureaucratic mentality which is sure to be shocked 
and angered, as at an unheard-of impertinence, by the 
suggestion that Jews are no longer content with the 
role of petitioners and pretend to be fit for the dignity 
of peers. The battle against this kind of snobbery will 
have to be fought some day; and now, perhaps, better 
than later. To begin with, it is extremely unfair to 
forget who is the chief sufferer in the whole drama, 
and the respect due to misfortune. But even apart 
from this aspect of the matter, which the sort of men- 
tality in question may fail to see, the snobbery itself 
is overwhelmingly devoid of any shred of justification. 
There is no need to engage in a contest of abstract 
claims to superiority, to ask one's opponent "who 
wrote the Bible?" only to be confounded by the ques- 
tion "where is your Shakespeare?" There are peoples 
innocent of either Bible or Shakespeare who are yet 
eminently fitted for partnership in statecraft: the 
Jews, then, are surely qualified for such partnership. 
It would be strange if any nation were to claim, on 


behalf of its upper strata, as compared with those of 
the Jewish people, any marked superiority in brains, 
learning, statesmanship and experience of statecraft, 
or in colonizing genius, to say nothing of the readiness 
and ability to back ideas with sound finance. There 
is no harm in asserting superiority where it is real, 
and it is proper to reject pretences that have no rea- 
sonable basis; thus, it would only be right to reject a 
claim to a "Jewish" seat on the Allies' General Staff 
(if such were made at the present moment), for this 
is a field in which we are learners. But on the political 
plane, where we have not more to learn than to teach, 
such obstruction would be an example of cheap and 
empty snobbery, and a handicap to the success of the 
common cause. It must be resisted with all the forces 
of reason, and rejected with all the scorn which it 
deserves. When overcome, it will probably be discov- 
ered that it was the only serious obstacle to a step 
which would be obviously sensible and useful: the 
recognition of a supreme organ of world-Jewry as a 
full partner in building up the world of peace. 


Should the Jewish problem, by some miracle, en- 
tirely disappear from the face of Europe, it would 
still probably require a couple of generations to estab- 
lish real equality of rights between members of differ- 
ent ethnical groups sharing the same territories. 
There was a time when people believed that such 
equality could be efficiently "guaranteed" anywhere, 
simply by mention in a legal document. There still 


are statesmen who pretend to believe this. Yet no sane 
adult can really share such optimism so far as Eastern 
or Central Europe is concerned. That zone is not 
among the areas where the miracle can be performed, 
unless it can be enforced by some ever-present and 
tangible reminder of supreme compulsion. 

The unlimited sovereignty of nations will have to 
go by the board, at least in Europe, if civilization 
hopes to survive. Statesmen seem to be realizing this 
gradually, and there is much less opposition to the 
theory than might have been expected; though it may 
be a different matter when it comes to practice. Yet 
there still lingers in most minds a schoolboy illusion 
that only in international affairs need sovereignty be 
qualified by certain concessions; "internal" sovereignty 
can remain unrestricted without any danger to its 
neighbours. Translated into the language of experi- 
ence, this means that as long as Nazism was preached 
and practised only in Germany, there was no real 
danger to her neighbours. This is nonsense. The 
sphere of any nation's "internal" interests which do 
not in any way affect other nations is extremely re- 
stricted, and it is becoming smaller day by day. No 
one will suggest that the abstract and logical conclu- 
sion should be enforced to the limit, so that everything 
done or suffered in Greece should be everybody's 
business in Portugal, and vice-versa. But the division 
of affairs, from the standpoint of mutual safety, into 
external and internal is a schoolboy's concept. If your 
neighbour's drains are bad it is your concern, and you 
must have the right to call in the police. 


How the world will settle this delicate problem is 
not the subject of this book: but as the main obsession 
of us all will be to avoid another war, it is not unrea- 
sonable to assume that some device will be found for 
keeping under joint neighbourly control such, "in- 
ternal" affairs as have a more or less direct and tangible 
bearing on the danger of war. Nor is the world likely 
to forget that supervision without a threat of coercion 
does not work. There will be devices for supervision; 
and there will be devices for immediate, quick and 
probably very painful coercion in case of default. For 
instance: if there should be demilitarized zones, and 
if the owner of one of these should attempt to rearm 
it unawares, his action will probably be treated as a 
casus belli and answered by some kind of armed occu- 
pation, or worse. This is not an attempt to guess at 
the terms of the future covenant: it is only intended 
to emphasize the assurance that the present storm will 
not be allowed to subside without the provision of 
some absolutely practical, efficient, and automatic ma- 
chinery for knocking out anyone who begins to lay a 
powder train before he has had time to carry it much 

And the writer believes that among those "internal" 
matters that have a direct and tangible bearing on the 
danger of war, the treatment of ethnical or religious 
minorities is among the most important A hundred 
years of European history have proved this. No claim 
of sovereignty can be allowed to protect a breach of 
the covenant of equality; any step in that direction is 
equivalent to laying a train of gunpowder; the machin- 


ery of compulsion must be set in motion, and the 
culprit knocked out 

To have such eminent power, the covenant of 
equality must fulfil two conditions among others: it 
must be terribly solemn, and it must be fully and 
carefully reasonable. 

"Solemn" means that there should be no interpola- 
tion of equal rights "clauses" or "paragraphs" in 
treaties dealing with other matters. None of those 
other matters can have one-tenth of the awful toxic 
power of the minorities problem; no chapter dealing 
with the former can possess one-tenth of the vast 
prophylactic importance of provisions affecting the 
latter. Nor is there, among all the problems of inter- 
national or "internal" statecraft, any problem so com- 
plicated, any that requires such attention to detail and 
such penetrating foresight as this. A special session of 
the Peace Conference should be entirely devoted to 
this one problem: and there should be a separate 
Covenant of Equality. 

But the Covenant must also be "reasonable." A law 
is unreasonable if it prescribes things which ordinary 
human nature cannot tolerate, or disregards conditions 
which, despite the best average will of the average 
obedient citizen, will render it exceedingly difficult for 
him to obey. Equality cannot be enforced where, by 
the nature of things, it is bound to degenerate into its 
opposite. Let us take an imaginary illustration: the 
case of Ruritania. The country is inhabited by two 
races. The Broadheads, the majority race, are decent 
people, but slow-witted; the Longheads, in a 20% 


minority, are equally decent, but very quick on the 
uptake. The principle of equal rights is unimpeach- 
ably respected throughout the country, in every walk 
of public and of private life. Among its other applica- 
tions, bi-lingual candidates are preferred for most gov- 
ernment or municipal offices. The Broadheads are 
painstaking and diligent, but are unable to speak any- 
thing but Broadhead; the Longheads are excellent 
linguists. On the strict basis of equal opportunity and 
the principle of "the best man wins/' regardless of 
craniometry, it is invariably the Longhead candidate 
who takes the honours. The result, after twenty-five 
years of this regime, is that 75% of the best jobs in 
government or municipal employ has been captured 
by the Longheads and it is practically the same in 
trade and the professions. The Broadheads ask: is this 
fair? Should people to whom God has refused the gift 
of tongues be penalized? Should there not be some 
kind of proportionality in the enjoyment of equal 

A reasonable Covenant will take this into account 
''Equal opportunity and the best man wins" does not 
cover the whole problem of equal rights; it has per- 
haps even very little to do with the real essence of 
that problem. Jockeys, to be really equal to one an- 
other in a race, are weighed and weighted; golfers are 
given varying handicaps. A Covenant of equality must 
ensure that, while the twenty Longheads get their full 
twenty loaves and not nineteenthe eighty Broad- 
heads get their eighty rations, and not seventy-nine. 

Whether such a Covenant, however perfect, can 


work the miracle and produce such a state of affairs 
as will effectually prevent friction, is a query which 
only the future can answer. Some people doubt it, 
and believe that the only real solution of the minorities 
problem is a redistribution of the races over the surface 
of the earth, i.e. the mass evacuation of all scattered 
minorities. This may be an exaggeration. There are 
minorities which, though cut off from their ethnical 
mainland, still form mono-ethnical "islands" or en- 
claves, or at least villages of their own, so that it is, 
so to speak, only on market-day that they have to rub 
shoulders with the majority people. Or there may be 
cases where both races are more or less congenial, and 
"good mixers" mutually, so that if left alone and given 
time they might be encouraged to intermarry, or sim- 
ply to forget the insignificant difference. The Covenant 
must foresee all that can be foreseen: time alone will 
show if the problem can be solved. 

But the Covenant must be reasonable, and its 
authors cannot expect the impossible to happen: in 
particular, they cannot expect Jewish equality in East- 
Central Europe to be anything but a lie unless their 
colleagues, the other statesmen at the other session of 
the Peace Conference, establish the Jewish State. 


The whole of this book has been devoted to this 
subject; here it will suffice to recapitulate the main 
points of the argument. 

The Jewish State is a true and proper war aim. 
Without it, the ulcer that poisons Europe's health 


cannot be healed: for without it there can be no 
adequate emigration of the millions whose old homes 
are irretrievably condemned; without it there can be 
no equality; and without this, no peace. 

There must be an organ of international authority 
to devote itself, from now on, to the study of this 
problem, and the preparation of the scheme, or the 
schemes, to be laid before the future Peace Confer- 
ence. If that organ is the Intergovernmental Com- 
mittee on Refugees, it must be rebuilt and reinforced 
in agreement with Jewish authorities, and instructed 
to abandon the prescription of partial remedies and 
concentrate on the problem of the Jewish State. 

There can be no preliminary limitations as to the 
various geographical projects which this body may 
have to examine before it makes its choice. It must 
be instructed to investigate any plan which presents, 
prima facie, the essential features of a serious solution: 
if necessary, it must consider every province of what 
we have called the Fata Morgana Land. But the first 
item on its agenda must be the examination of the 
Palestine plan. This is a fair proposal, which excludes 
nothing except any attempt to steal a march in either 

It will be for the Jews to prove what is, after all, not 
difficult to prove: that the Palestine plan with all its 
drawbacks, is apart from all other considerations the 
only one that is practicable. 


IT WAS my privilege to enjoy the friendship and 
confidence of Vladimir Jabotinsky for a quarter 
of a century. I watched him in the forefront of the 
battle, valiantly helping to drive the Turks out of 
Palestine. I listened to his powerful plea on behalf of 
his people before the Peel Commission in the House 
of Lords in London. I closely followed his heart- 
breaking efforts during all the years when he worked 
and gave every ounce of his strength in selfless, unre- 
mitting toil for the emancipation of the Jewish masses 
in Eastern Europe. 

Throughout the whole of this period, in spite of 
countless rebuffs and bitter disappointments, caused 
by the failure of the anti-Jewish clique in the British 
Government to carry out England's promises, Jabotin- 
sky never lost confidence in the British people's sense 
of righteousness and justice. Jabotinsky, great-hearted 
and fair-minded, never doubted that, once the true 
facts of the Jewish case were brought home to them, 
the British people would resent any breach of faith 
on the part of their Government, and would demand 
that England's solemn pledge to the Jewish people be 




I always shared, and still share, Jabotinsky's belief 
in the justice of the British people. It would be sheer 
hypocrisy on the part of England to proclaim that she 
is fighting a war to uphold liberty, democracy and the 
sanctity of the pledged word, if at the same time she 
repudiates her own solemn promise. 

Any such betrayal by England would leave millions 
of homeless and persecuted people shut out from 
their rightful place in the brotherhood of nations. 

The Jewish peopleand, for that matter, the true 
Englandare under a heavy debt to Vladimir Jabotin- 
sky, undaunted and gallant fighter for justice and 
right. At this vital moment in Jewish history, when all 
Jewry is tossing on a stormy sea, Jabotinsky's prophetic 
courage is sadly missing. Much that he thought and 
felt about the present situation is contained in this 
book, The Jewish War Front, written in 1939, and yet 
fully aware of the development and implications of 
this world struggle. 

Had he been spared, his steadfastness and political 
acumen would have led his people in this supreme 
opportunity to gain for themselves a strong nation- 
hood in Palestine. 

But it was not to be. 

Let his prophetic words, speaking clearly through 
the pages of this book, be read by many thousands. 

May this book awaken the Jewish people, that they 
may close their ranks and, uniting as one people, make 
Jabotinsky's battle cry their own. 

Eretz Israel for the Children of Israel/ 

C 2